[I80002.OH 07/14/96]
Reference: 180-002 (or 179-025A)
5 February 1980
FROM: JCRC-LNB :
SUBJ: Refugee Report, Comments of Former Viet Cong Major
TO: Commander, JCRC
Barbers Point, HI 96862
1. Former Viet Cong Major Nguyen Van Tuoi (Boat #TG212C), a 42
year old native of Tay Ninh, was re-interviewed at Pulau Galang,
Indonesia, on 30 January 1980. This was a follow-up to a previous
interview (see I79-025 dated 27 December 1979) and was aimed at
eliciting in-depth information on U.S. casualties and missing in
Vietnam and Cambodia A comparison of the results of the two
interviews will reveal several seeming inconsistancies and/or
contradictions. Rather than delete those apparent areas of
inconsistancies, and await later clarification, the entire interview
is being reported as it was understood by the interviewer. During
subsequent interviews with Tuoi, attempts will be made to resolve
those areas still in questions In this interview Mr. Tuoi revealed a
long standing relationship with McKinley Nolan and provided a rather
extensive insight into the handling of prisoners and-the recovery of
U.S. remains by COSVN prior to and following the fall of South
Vietnam. He also provided hearsay information on the active program
of gathering remains of U.S. casualties in North Vietnam and
indicated that 300 to 400 remains have already been recovered in the
North.
2. Major Tuoi spent much of his Viet Cong military career in Tay
Ninh and Cambodia primarily assigned to COSVN: headquarters working
since 1961 under the Bureau of Enemy Propaganda (Cuc Dich Van) which
is actually a branch of the Central Political Bureau (Tong Cuc Chinh
Tri), one of 4 military agencies under the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the others being initiated General Staff (Bo Tong Tham
Muu), Central Bureau for Economic Development (Tong Cuc Xay Dung
Kinh Te), and another agency believed to be a subordinate aide staff
(Tong Cuc Hau Can). The Bureau of Enemy Propaganda (Cue Dich Van),to
which Tuoi was assigned since the location of responsibility for
U.S. prisoners of war and more recently the location of.U.S.
remains. Currently heading this bureau in Hanoi is Colonel Vo Van
Thoi, a 58-year old native of Kien Boa, with whom Tuoi has been in
frequent contact over the years. Other members of the bureau staff
are as follows:
Le Dien Colonel: Deputy Bureau Chief (from Central Vietnam).
Nguyen Thuc Dai, Sub-Colonel, Office Chief.
Vo Van Thuong, Sub-Colonel, Deputy for Enemy Propaganda.
Pham Dinh Thuc, Lt Colonel, Office Chief.
Bui Thiep, Lt Colonel, Deputy, Office for Re-Education Administration
Military Region 7 (Saigon).
Pham Ban, Lt Colonel, Deputy, Office for Re-Education Administration,
Military Region 7 Saigon) (from North Vietnam).
The last two officers, Bui Thiep and Pham Ban, have responsibility
for enemy affairs in the south. This includes former ARVN
re-education, prisoners of war, and U.S. casualty affairs.
3. Tuoi recounted his most recent meeting with Colonel Vo Van Thoi
in early 1979 at Saigon. They just met in passing but Colonel Thoi
brought up the subject of U.S. remains recovery, noting that the
program had been successful in the north with: 300 to 400 sets of
remains already recovered (some still in the provinces), but Colonel
Thoi lamented that this recovery program in the south was a shambles
due to reasons revolving around the difficult wartime situation,
poor records, and inefficiency. Colonel Thoi said the recovery
program in the south had barely gotten off the ground, and expressed
little confidence that it would be successful. As an aside, Tuoi
mentioned that all remains recovered in the north were air-related
casualties that occurred in the north. None were from the south.
Colonel Thoi was still recovering from injuries suffered in an auto
accident in late 1978 and is now living with his family in Saigon at
114B Hong Thap Tu Street (now called So Viet Nghe Tinh St.),. Tuoi
feels that Colonel Thoi will soon retire and his deputy Le Dien
will assume the Bureau Chief duties.
4. Tuoi himself had gone north in l954 (he would have been l7 at the
time). He was assigned to the Bureau of Enemy Propaganda in 1961 and
sent south in 1965 to take a post with that agency in COSVN. While
there he worked with about 19 American POWs. The one he recalls most
vividly was Doug Ramsey, a civilian, who Tuoi thought was the
ranking member of the group. One other was a captain but Tuoi could
not recall his name. Tuoi was present at two POW returns in the
south. One took place in 1969 when three American POWs were turned
over. (One of the three was a Negro soldier who had been badly
injured in the back of his head.) In 1973 Tuoi also represented
COSVN when the rest of the U.S. prisoners in the south were
released. Tuoi stated firmly in this interview that all American
POWs held in the south were turned over at that time that there was
no possibility that some had been withheld in the south without his
knowledge. He said that he was at the level where such decisions
were known. He did say, however, that orders previously received
from Hanoi telling them to recover and turn over U.S. remains during
this same turnover were rescinded at the 11th hour with no
explanation. Later he was told this was due to Paris Accord
ceasefire violations by the U.S. Tuoi learned later, however, that
the provinces in the south proved incapable or unwilling to carry
out this order and it was recinded to avoid embarrassment. Tuoi
repeatedly stated that many U.S. gravesites in Tay Ninh were
destroyed beyond hope by B-52 bombing of the graveyards. Largely
represented in these graveyards were casualties of the U.S. First
Infantry Division. When asked again if ha wee absolutely certain
that all U.S. prisoners of war in the south had been returned in
1973 and none captured subsequent to 1073 were still being dug held,
Tuoi said he guaranteed that all prisoners of war had been returned
from the south. He stated that he had no knowledge of any still
being held in the north but could not rule that out because it was
outside his area of responsibility. He was reluctant to give an
opinion on whether or not there were still prisoners in the north,
but finally said that it would be inconsistent with orders issued by
Hanoi at that time.
5. Asked about American deserters, Tuoi recounted the case of a
black American who deserted from the U.S. First Infantry Division in
Tay Ninh during 1968. His half-Cambodian girlfriend, later his wife,
had been instrumental in causing hls desertion. Tuoi said the
soldler'a name was "Kinley Nolan" (later he pronounced it
"McKinley"), and he had been used by Tuoi's outfit in the
preparation of propaganda leaflets containing Nolan's picture and a
letter over Nolan's signature. Tuoi said Nolan stayed in the area
camps TB-21 and TB-22 [corrected-handwritten B-20 TB20] in the Katum
area of Tay Ninh for the first few years after he rallied. Although
Nolan was used in propaganda efforts to proselytize American
soldiers to the communist side, Tuoi said he did not bear arms or
participate in operations against American units. Nolan's primary
activity was to raise pigs, chickens, and vegetables, all of
which he did very well, according to Tuoi. He was also respected for
his strength and boxing ability. Tuoi said that Nolan and Ramsey had
seen each other in these two camps but never spoke to each other.
During the offensive against COSVN in 1970, Tuoi and his unit
evacuated into Cambodia, along with the entire headquarters, until
the withdrawal of the American and GVN troops. Nolan and family were
with them as they moved to Memot, Cambodia, and then back to Tay
Ninh's border with Cambodia. Nolan's wife had been married twice
previously - first to a Cambodian by whom she had a son in 1957, and
then briefly to a Filipino who fathered a son before abandoning her
and the baby upon returning to his country. Nolan was very fond of
the half-Filipino child and renamed him "McKinley" after himself.
This child died of malaria at the age of five in Cambodia. Nolan
fathered two children. One, a daughter, also died shortly after
birth in 1968 and the other, a son, was born in 1970. Nolan's
stepson with the Cambodlan father is now a sergeant
in the Vietnamese Army in the public security unit at Tay Ninh
re-education camp. (His name is "Chien" and he is about 33 years old.)
Quite often Nolan had confided in Tuoi and a few other sympathetic
communists that he was homesick and wanted very badly to return to his
country, but he knew he would be punished. He was advised by Tuoi and
others not to make these feelings known to unsympathetic communists or he
might be executed. Tuoi and others did assist Nolan by delivering letters
from him to the U.N. in Hanoi and the "Sihanouk Commission", but no
result was forthcoming from these efforts, according to Tuoi. Then in
late 1972 or early 1973, before the ceasefire, Nolan took his wife and
youngest child and "escaped" into Cambodia. Normally scheduled patrols
were alerted to be on the lookout for him (as a deserter), but no special
search parties were sent out. Tuoi suspects that Nolan was killed by
Cambodians but never heard even a rumor about his fate.
6. In answer to questions about American gravesites, Tuoi told
several stories. The first was of an incident in October 1968 when a
U.S. Special Forces soldier with light brown skin led a group of
helicopter-inserted ARVN in a sneak attack on his unit. An ambush
using claymores had been set up on the approach route and a security
force laid in wait. The American and seven ARVN Rangers were killed.
All bodies were deposited in a B-52 bomb crater and covered with
dirt. This attack occurred on the border at approximate coordinates
XT4591, and followed a B-52 strike which had killed over 20 men in
Tuoit's unit. Tuoi recalled that the American was wearing a good
military watch with chrome setting and black face.
7. Another incident he recalled happened in that same area in August
of 1968. A helicopter which had apparently been hit elsewhere and
was maneuvering wildly crashed and burned near Tuoi's position. One
pilot in flight clothes and helmet had managed to get out, or was
thrown out of the aircraft, but died of burns before Tuoi reached
him. Any other crew members were either burned to ashes or had
fallen from the aircraft elsewhere. This occurred at about noon but
Tuoi could not pinpoint the date. This pilot was caucasian of
average height. Severe burns made other identifying description
impossible. Tuoi said this pilot was properly buried and that the
grave was marked, but subsequent B-52 strikes destroyed this and all
other graves in the area.
8. Tuoi expressed the hope that his name would not appear on any
reports shared with the communist government, fearing reprisals to
his relatives. He is asking for political asylum in the United
States since his communist
Reference: 179-025 FROM: JCRC-LNE 27 December 1979
SUBJ: Refugee Report, Comments From Former Viet Cong Major
TO: Commander, JCRC
Barbers Point, HI 96862
1. Mr. Nguyen Van Tuoi (Boss #TG212C, Barracks 13), a 41 year old
native of Tay Ninh, was interviewed at Pulau Galang, Indonesia, on
16 December 1979. Mr. Tuoi was a former Viet Cong Major, having
worked for the VC for 25 years. For about 20 years he had been
partially responsible for "POW affairs and propaganda". Tuoi had
been a VC Captain from July 1972 to June 1976, then a Major in the
Security Police until January 1977.
2. One of Tuoi's closest friends is Colonel Vo Van Thoi, a
southerner who is "Chief of the Bureau of Enemy Affairs" (Cue
Truong, Cuc Dich Van) having to do with American and ARVN POWs.
Colonel Thoi's office is in Hanoi, but his family resides in Saigon
at 114B Soviet Nghe Tinh (formerly Hong Thap Tu Street). Tuol
reported on a conversation which he had with Colonel Thoi in early
1979 in Saigon. Colonel Thoi allegedly stated that Hanoi was still
keeping many American prisoners. These prisoners were supposedly
kept somewhere north of Hanoi until the threat of war with China
caused the Vietnamese officials to move the prisoners down to the
central part of Vietnam. Tuoi could not report on the former or new
locations of the prisoners, or on the number of prisoners involved.
He speculated that the prisoners may have been taken to Kontum,
Pleiku, or Darlac, regions which Hanoi thinks are "safe". Tuoi also
said that Colonel Thoi indicated that these prisoners were
high-ranking, or were related to various American VIPs. Specifically
mentioned was a relative of Averell Harriman. (Tuoi reported he had
heard of an alleged conversation between Mr. Xuan Thuy and Mr.
Harriman some years ago in Paris. During this alleged conversation,
Thuy supposedly showed a photo to Harriman of one of Harriman's
relatives kept in captivity in Vietnam). In addition to the
prisoners, Colonel Thoi said that Hanoi also had kept many sets of
U.S. remains. Again, Tuoi did not know how many remains or where
they were being kept. Tuoi said it was his understanding that these
remains had been accumulated by the Vietnam Red Cross and that they
had been gathered only from the area of North Vietnam.
3. Tuoi stated that he knew that after the agreements made in Paris
in 1973, no remains had been repatriated from the south. He also
knew there were many Americans killed in the south and that these
remains were left in the villages where they had been originally
buried. Tuoi himself knew the location of the graves of three
Americans burled near Katum in northern Tay Ninh Province where he
lived during much of the war with the Americans. These graves were
of three Americans, two white and one black, who had led an attack
into his area after a B-52 strike some years ago. Tuoi said that if
he had access to a 1:50,000 military map, he could pinpoint the
grave locations. (Note: Will try to locate these sites during a
future reinterview.) Tuoi named three other individuals who had
knowledge of these grave sites, and perhaps other sites as well:
Mr. Pham Ban, Lt Colonel, Phong Quan thuan, Quan Khu 7
Mr. An (can't remember full name), Captain, Cuc Dich Van/Tong Cuc
Chinh Tri, Quan Doi Nhan Dan VN
Mr. Nguyen Hung Tri, Bo Ngoai Thuong/VN (Hanoi) Tuoi believes that
Mr. Tri is the most knowledgeable of the three cited above. Tuoi did
not have precise addresses for any of the three.
4. Tuoi claimed to have participated in the repatriation of 3
American NCO captives on 1 January 1969, and said he was the chief
spokesman for the communist side at that event. Tuoi also claimed to
be a close acquaintance of Mr. Douglas Ramsey (State Department
Officer who was a long-time POW in the South). Tuoi said he was with
Ramsey at the time of Ramsey's release at Loc Ninh in early 1973.
Ramsey would recall him well as the man who had custody over Ramsey,
but would know him by the name of "Bay Tuoi".
5. Tuoi claimed to have participated in high level meetings at
various times. He cited a meeting which he attended in January 1978
in Saigon on the subject of the operations of the Chinese
organizations Hoa Nam and Hoa Van which allegedly plant Chinese
agents overseas and within the refugee camps. Attending this
meeting, in addition to himself, were Le Duc Thor Tran Quoc Hoan,
Head of Security Police for all of Vietnam (based in Hanoi); and Mai
Chi Tho, Head of Security Police for Ho Chi Minh City.
6. Tuoi was questioned by the interviewer concerning the allegation
that the SRV was still holding live captive Americans. The
interviewer mentioned the numerous denials and assurances by high
SRV officials concerning the holding of captives. Tuoi was asked how
these officials could save face if captives were ever surfaced in
the future. Tuoi's reply was to the effect that we Westerners never
seem to understand the communist way of thinking. First, these
prisoners have been saved back for future insurance because the SRV
officials do not trust the word of the U.S. that the U.S. will not
again either attack, or support an attack, against Vietnam.
Secondly, Vietnam always expects to have to bargain and negotiate in
every dealing with others. In the case of the U.S., the prisoners
and the remains are simply additional bargaining chips for Vietnam.
As far as saving face is concerned, the Vietnamese communists always
leave themselves an opening and they will be able to come up with
some excuse to explain the sudden discovery of prisoners or remains.
Whether or not the excuse is believed is of little significance
because the offering of an excuse is more important than its
plausibility.
7. At the conclusion of this interview, Mr. Tuoi expressed the
desire to go to the United States, saying he would then like to come
to work for us and to help explain the true nature of the Vietnamese
communists.
PAUL D. MATHER
Lt Col, USAF
JCRC Liaison Officer
JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
LIAISON OFFICE
AMERICAN EM EMBASSY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346
Reference: 180-002A
(See also 179-025)
28 April 1980
FROM: JCRC-LNB
SUBJ: Refugee Report, Interview of Former VC Major
TO: Commander, JCRC
Barbers Point, HI 96862
Former Major (VC) Nguyen Van Tuoi was re-interviewed at Pulau
Galang, Indonesia, on 10 April 1980. (Note: This interview was
conducted prior to receipt of DIA messages 100210Z APR 80 and
111336Z APR 80.) The purpose of this follow-up interview was to
clarify dicrepancies in two earlier interviews with Tuoi by two
separate interviewers, and to question Tuoi about photos of McKinley
Nolan recently obtained from DIA.
Tuoi recognized McKinley Nolan in pictures provided by DIA
(apparently taken by communists). He also recognized Nolan's wife
and two sons in one picture, pointing out that the oldest son,
Chien, is now a VC sergeant and that the youngest son who was half
Filipino, had died at age five. The other picture showing Nolan
shaking hands with a Vietnamese was presented and Tuoi said he
recognized the Vietnamese as a member of COSVN staff but could not
recall his name, rank, or position, saying that the picture had been
taken immediately after Nolan's arrival at the headquarters in Tay
Ninh.
Regarding Nolan's defection, Tuoi said that Nolan's wife was
instrumental in getting Nolan to rally to the communist side because
she was afraid he would be killed in combat. Tuoi said there had
been no attempt to proselyte Nolan nor had there been any prior
contact with his wife for this purpose. It was accomplished entirely
on her initiative. She did not have a communist background or
necessarily support the revolution.
Regarding previous conflicting reports that Tuoi did/didn't
attribute remarks that U.S. prisoners may still be held in the North
to Colonel Vo Van Thoi, Tuoi stated that the references in his first
interview were to rumors repeated among his cohorts, none of which
he attributed to Colonel Thoi, that the Vietnamese government is
holding U.S. prisoners as negotiating insurance. Such rumors are
common and Tuoi feels that party members may be responsible for
them. He could not explain why except to say that he noted political
cadre talking of such things with much bravado and eye-winking as if
to say the SRV was once again outsmarting the Americans. Tuoi says
he does not have any reason to believe these rumors, and the
credibility of political cadre has long since become a joke to him.
In addition, Tuoi was asked how he arrived at the figure of "three
to four hundred" sets of U.S. remains as the amount the Vletname se
government had recovered in the north. He stated simply that Colonel
Vo Van Thoi had used those figures when telling Tuoi of the recovery
program in the north.
When confronted with conflicting statements attributed to him in his
first JCRC interview (see 179-025), Tuoi said that an interpreter
had been used in that interview (a woman) and he believes she was
not accurate in interpreting his statements.
One other correction was noted and that was in camp designations
listed in paragraph 5, line 8, of Tuoi's re-interview (see 180-002).
Tuoi clarified saying that the camp designations referred to should
read T-20 and T-21 (vice T-21 and T-22 erroneously stated), and that
these two camps were part of a camp area designated as B-20 in the
Katum area.
PAUL D. MATHER
Lt Col, USAF
JCRC Liaison Officer
T R A N S L A T I O N
ANSWERS TO 13 QUESTIONS
Respondent: Nguyen Van Tuoi, former VC Major, disenchanted with the
system, escaped with family to foreign country.
Question 1: During the war period, the agency responsible for the
maintenance of both Vietnamese and foreign POWs was the Cuc Dich Van
(Bureau of Emeny Proselyting), assigned to the Political Head Office
(one of 3 Head Offices of the Department of Defense). The Bureau of
Enemy Proselyting is also called "C-14" and "Research Bureau" (Cue
Nghien Cuu) of the Political Head Office. From 1972 to 1975, due to
large number of POWs captured, the Military Justice Bureau (Cue Quan
Phap) was also in charge as well. The Military Justice Bureau was in
charge of the imprisonment and trials, and the Bureau of Enemy
Proselyting was in charge of education and carrying out POW
policies. (Both agencies were actually only in charge from Tri Thien
Province (VC name for Quang Tri-Thua Thien) north, while War Zone
Region 5 (Central VN), and South Vietnam was strictly handled by
Enemy Proselyting. - The Bureau of Enemy Proselyting has two
deputies in charge of POWs:
1. Le Dien, Colonel
2. Nguyen Van Thuong, Sub-Colonel
- The lower echelons I don't know because I returned to the south in
1965.
- In the Southern War Zone (from Central VN to the tip of Ca Mau) in
charge of the POWs is the Office of Enemy Proselyting for the south
(assigned to the Political Head Offices of the Liberation Army of
South Vietnam, also called "R", based in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and
transferred to Cambodia from 1970 till the end of 1972).
- In charge of POW affairs for the Office of Enemy Proselyting in
South Vietnam was Major Nguyen Tan Luc (killed by a U.S. B-52 strike
in December 1972 on Cambodian soil). After that Major Dao Sy To was
in charge. (Presently Major To works for the Office of Military
Training, training officers from the old system in re-education in
Region 7. The area for this office is at #6 Don Dat Street, Saigon
1).
- In charge with, and at higher echelons above Major Luc and Major
To from 1965 to 1975 were:
1. Lt Col Le Hoa (retired in Hanoi)
2. Lt Col Ngo Dat Tai (retired in Hanoi)
3. Sub-Colonel Luu Quang Tuyen (from 1970 to 1974 after which he
was transferred to another job)
4. Lt Col Pham Ban and Lt Col Bui Thiep, at present the deputy for
the Office of Military Training, Military Region 7.
5. Lt Col Bui Thanh Ngon, presently the chief of the Office of
Military Training, Military Region 9.
- In charge of the U.S. POW camp in South Vietnam (assigned to
Office of Enemy Proselyting, South Vietnam--"R" as stated above)
were:
1. Sub-Captain Hue, killed in a B-52 strike in 1970 enroute
transferring the camp from Tay Ninh to Kratie in Cambodia.
2. Sub-Captain Le Binh, presently doing Military Training duties
at a camp in MR 7.
3. Sub-Captain Huy, presently transferred to the Education Service
in Ben Tre Province.
4. Sub-Captain Nguyen Hung Tri, a good English translator who
attended and translated at FPJMT meetings at Tan Son Nhut. Presently
transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and has a house at 212
Ba Trieu Street, Hanoi. (Translator's note: Not clear if this is his
residence or the location of the Ministry of Foreign Trade).
Code number of the POW camp(s) for South Vietnam (mentioned above) is
"B-20"; TB 20; TB 21 (one camp changed name 3 times).
All POWs in the POW camp for South Vietnam are turned over from War
Zones South Central, South East, and Central Southern (the Southwest
Zone is too far so POWs are kept in place, and Mid-Central,
Tri-Thien, and Western Highlands POWs are transferred north by the
Truong Son Road). - All PoWs held in SVN camps (called B-20 or TB20
and TB21) until 1973 were turned over to the U.S. at Loc Ninh
airfield. (At that time I was in charge of issuing news releases for
this turnover). I remember vaguely, it seems there were 9 or 19 or
so persons (including Doug Ramsey). Absolutely none were retained in
captivity. I know this for certain.
Question 2: In August 1965 I returned to the South with the job of
propaganda reporter at the Office of Enemy Proselyting, South
Vietnam (mentioned above) and heard the people who had been there
some time say that about the beginning of 1965 they executed (shot)
one U.S. POW at the Suoi Nuoc Duc area (northwest of Katum base).
This person was buried at that location. The reason for the
execution was in retaliation for the execution of students in Saigon
who opposed the regime (GVN). I just heard about it but could not
describe it clearly.
- Each time an American POW was captured, the unit at the place of
capture would send a cell of armed soldiers to escort the POW and
deliver him to the regional camp. If they know the route and know
the location of the camp, they guide them directly, if not they
follow commo liaison routes (with the POWs blindfolded).
Question 3: (Heard talk only)
Question 4: (Know nothing about it)
Question 5: (Heard talk only)
Question 6: (Heard talk only)
Question 7: I wish to speak about those American POWs that were
turned over at Loc Ninh in 1973. After receiving the directive from
Hanoi and from Major General Tran Van Tra from Tan Son Nhut, VC
Headquarters in South Vietnam (R) directed the Office of Enemy
Proselyting, South Vietnam (us) to make a list of American POWs
following sample guidance from Hanoi and transfer these Americans in
camp TB21 from Kratie (Cambodia) to Loc Ninh preparatory to turnover
to the United States. I was given the job with a Sub-Captain to
prepare a place for the POWs to stay and coordinate with the various
agencies responsible at Loc Ninh to organize the turnover
ceremonies.
On the day of the turnover, the VC side had a delegation (including
me); the American side had a delegation headed by an elderly
Brigadier General. Under the control of the 4 parties and the United
Nations, we turned over the name list for the American delegation to
review first. After that we took the POWs out to the ramp and had
them stand in a row. We read each POW's name for comparison with the
name list. After adequately inspecting the name list, the American
brigadier general signed receipt.
Note: One month prior to the turnover the American prisoners were
fed in a special manner for nutrition more than the ARVN prisoners,
and received treatment for malaria, and were given vitamins,
receiving perfect treatment.
END OF TRANSLATION
Translator's note: There were six more questions that Tuoi did not
answer in his written report due to time limitations. These
questions were asked in an interview and, with the exception of
organizational charts, answers were not written out by Tuoi, but
rather recorded in the interviewer's notes.