[210702Z.OH 08/04/96]

ADMINISTRATIVE  MESSAGE
ROUTINE
R 210702Z OCT 93 ZYB PSN 826195P31

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO  SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA//
INFO WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
JOINT STAFF  WASHINGTON DC//JS// USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC
DIA  WASHINGTON DC CJTFFA  DET ONE BANGKOK TH
USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/CCS/EAP/VLC//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//
UNCLAS//N03460//
SECTION 01 OF 02
MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J2//
SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MG TRAN BACH DANG//
REF/A/FAX/DET 2/30SEP93//


AMPN/SUBJ/ENTRY NUMBER 41, LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW REQUESTS//
THE  FOLLOWING  MESSAGE IS A VERBATIM  TRANSCRIPTION Of AN ORAL HISTORY
PROJECT FIELD REPORT//
RMKS/1. BACKGROUND ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1993, A JOINT U.S/VIETNAM ORAL
HISTORY PROGRAM INTERVIEW TEAM INTERVIEWED RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (MG)
TRAN BACH DANG, - A 73 YOA RESIDENT Of 14 PHAN KE BINH STREET,
DISTRICT 1, HO CHI MINH CITY (HQMC). MG TRAN BACH DANG IS A FORMER
COMMANDER OF THE SAIGON - GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE AND PARTY SECRETARY
OF THE B2 FRONT. HE IS CURRENTLY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN Of THE HCMC
SOCIAL SCIENCES COUNCIL. THE TEAM MET AT THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OFFICE, 6 THAI VAN LUNG STREET, DISTRICT 1 HCMC, TO INTERVIEW MG TRAN
BACH CANG, LISTED IN REFERENCE AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE Of INFORMATION
CONCERNING U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) IN VIETNAM. THE
U. S. CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF MR. [XXXX][XXXX][XXXX], DET 2 CASUALTY
RESOLUTION SPECIALIST, AND SGT [XXXX][XXXX][XXXX], JTF-FA

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ANALYST/LINGUIST. THE VIETNAMESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTINGENT CONSISTED
OF LTC LE KY, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE; AND MR. NGUYEN  VAN THANG  LOI,
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. OTHER PERSONNEL ATTENDING THIS INTERVIEW WERE MR.
LE KIM LAM, HCMC MIA TEAM CHIEF; MR. HA, HCMC PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE
REPRESENTATIVE; AND PAVN LTC TRAN VAN TAN, MILITARY REGION SEVEN (MR7)
HEADQUARTERS REPRESENTATIVE.

2. SUMMARY. THE SOURCE, MG TRAN  BACH DANG, FORMERLY THE PARTY SECRETARY
OF - THE SAIGON - GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE, AND CONCURRENTLY THE COMMANDER
OF THE SPECIAL ZONE, DESCRIBED HIS WARTIME ROLE AND THE  SPECIAL ZONE'S
POLICY CONCERNING PRISONERS Of WAR. MG  DANG TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT U.S.

POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM AND HIS OPINIONS REGARDING POW/MIA SEARCH EFFORTS.
HE CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. PERSONNEL LIVING  FREELY  OR AGAINST
THEIR WILL IN VIETNAM SINCE 1973.

3. DETAILS.  AFTER INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS BY THE JOINT TEAM, THE
SOURCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWIING  INFORMATION:
  A. THE  SOURCE. MG  TRAN BACH DANG (TRAANF BACHJ DAWNGF) SAID THAT
DURING THE  WAR  HE WAS COMMANDER OF A MILITARY REGION. HE SAID THAT FOR
THIS  REASON WHEN A U.S. SERVICEMAN WAS CAPTURED, HE WAS ULTIMATELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PW. MG DANG SAID THAT TODAY THE MILITARY REGION
THAT HE CONTROLLED DURING THE WAR IS SOMETIMES INCORRECTLY REFERRED TO
AS MILITARY REGION SEVEN (MR7). HE SAID THAT DURING THE WAR THERE
WERE ACTUALLY FOUR MILITARY REGION: MR1, MR2, MR3. MR4. THE FOUR
MILITARY  REGIONS OR ZONES WERE LATER KNOWN AS MR7, MR8, MR9, AND
SAIGON  SPECIAL  ZONE, RESPECTIVELY. MG  DANG SAID THAT THE SAIGON
SPECIAL ZONE WAS HIS LEADERSHIP'S ANSWER  FOR DEALING WITH SPECIAL
SITUATIONS IN AREAS SUCH AS SAIGON, CU CHI, UNDEVELOPED RURAL AREAS,
AND DELTA REGIONS WHICH REQUIRED SPECIAL ADMINISTERING.
   B. MG DANG SAID THAT HE WAS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIBERATION ARMY
(SVNLA) B2  FRONT PARTY SECRETARY FOR THE SAIGON - GIA DINH SPECIAL
ZONE DURING THE WAR, AND AS SUCH, WAS SEPARATE FROM THE MILITARY
GENERAL STAFF. HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL STAFF FOR THE REGION HAD ITS
OWN STAFF TO DEAL WITH MILITARY MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL STAFF
WOULD BRING SOME CONCERNS TO HIS ATTENTION BUT, AS A RULE, THE GENERAL
STAFF TOOK CARE OF THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. AS THE PARTY SECRETARY, MG DANG
SAID HE DID NOT PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN COMBAT DURING THE WAR, BUT
FOUGHT BATTLES OF A POLITICAL NATURE. MG DANG SAID THAT HE CURRENTLY
SERVES AS MUNICIPAL PARTY SECRETARY FOR HCMC.
    C. MG DANG SAID THAT THE SPECIAL ZONE, ALONE, COULD NOT PROVIDE FOR
PW'S BECAUSE IT HAD NO REAR AREA. ACCORDINGLY, THE ZONE RELIED UPON THE
CU CHI AREA TO PROVIDE ALL PROVISIONS. IN ORDER TO EFFECT THIS, THE
SPECIAL ZONE HAD ITS OWN HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND POST. HE SAID THAT BY
1975, NEARLY EVERY PART OF THE CU CHI AREA HAD BEEN HIT BY AIR STRIKES,
CONTRIBUTING GREATLY TO THE SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS PROBLEMS FACED BY THE
SPECIAL ZONE.
    D. MG DANG SAID SPECIAL ZONE UNITS DID NOT CAPTURE A LARGE
NUMBER OF PW'S OVER THE YEARS, BUT  AS HE RECALLED, BOTH KOREANS AND
AMERICANS  WERE CAPTURED. ACCORDING TO  POLICY, MG  DANG SAID, THE PW'S

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WERE TAKEN TO HOLDING CAMPS OUTSIDE THE ZONE HE CONTINUED TO SAY THAT
HE AND HIS STAFF DID NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO THE FATES OF THE PW'S
ONCE THEY WERE OUTSIDE THE ZONE. HIS CONCERNS WERE IMPLEMENTING THE
POLICY FOR TREATMENT OF PW'S WHILE BEING EVACUATED FROM THE ZONE, SUCH
AS ENSURING THAT THEY RECEIVED ADEQUATE FOOD AND SHELTER. MG DANG SAID
THAT OCCASIONALLY THE SVNLF EXCHANGED PRISONERS WITH THE U.S AND THE
LAST OF THE U.S. PW'S WERE REPATRIATED AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS
PEACE ACCORDS IN 1973.
    E. MG DANG POINTED OUT THE IMPACT OF THE U.S RAID ON THE SON TAY
PRISON. HE SAID THAT THE SON TAY RAID SERVED AS A SYMBOL TO THœ
VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP ABOUT THEIR PW SYSTEM. THE  RAID DEMONSTRATED THE
CAPABILITY Of THE U.S. TO GO INTO VIETNAMESE TERRITORY, BUT ALSO
ALLOWED THE VIETNAMESE TO REDEFINE THEIR METHODS OF ENSURING THAT PW'S
WERE HELD IN LOCATIONS THAT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE LOCATED BY ANY MEANS.
    F. AFTER 1973, MG DANG SAID THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO KEEP
AMERICAN PW'S. HE SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE U.S MIA ISSUE, BUT
THERE WERE MANY, MANY REASONS FOR THE INDIVIDUALS TO STILL BE
MISSING. HE WEIGHED THIS WITH THE FACT THAT THE VIETNAMESE STILL HAVE
MORE THAN 300,000 MIA'S FROM THEIR OWN COUNTRY WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
FOUND. MG DANG SAID THAT BASED ON HIS OWN EXPERIENCE LOSSES RESULTING
FROM COMPANY-SIZE OR SMALLER COMBAT ACTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO
ACCOUNT FOR. IN AN ASIDE, MG DANG MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY MET
WITH FORMER U S. SENATOR EDMUND MUSKIE AND THAT THE TWO OF THEM HAD
DISCUSSED THIS SAME SUBJECT. HE BRIEFLY DISMISSED OTHER SITUATIONS
THAT  RESULTED IN MIA'S, WHICH HE FEELS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE,
SUCH AS U S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER LAOS OR CAMBODIA.
    G. IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. POSITION AS A WORLD SUPER POWER, MG DANG
SAID IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FOOLISH FOR VIETNAM TO DETAIN PRISONERS AFTER
THE  END OF THE WAR, KNOWING THE DAY WOULD ARRIVE WHEN VIETNAM AND THE
U.S MUST COME TO TERMS WITH EACH OTHER. HE SAID THE LEADERS OF HIS
COUNTRY WERE INTELLIGENT ENOUGH TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND KNOW THEY
WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS TOWARD U.S. PW'S MG DANG
SAID THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT  HAD A POLICY PROHIBITING THE
MISTREATMENT OF PW'S AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HAVE DETAINED PRISONERS
AFTER 1973. AFTER THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE COUNTRY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE TO  CONTINUE HIDING PW'S FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD, HE SAID, AND
THERE WAS NOTHING TO JUSTIFY THE COST.  HE SAID THAT SOME
//

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ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
ROUTINE
UNCLAS //N03460//
FINAL  SECTION OF 02
MSGID/GENADNIN/CDR JTF-FA/J2//
SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MG TRAN BACH  DANG//

RMKS/ U.S. SERVICEMEN SIMPLY LEFT VIETNAM, OTHERS DESERTED AND PERHAPS
SOME WENT TO THAILAND, SINGAPORE, OR OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT THERE WERE
CERTAINLY NONE LEFT IN VIETNAM. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO  WAY
FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO ACCOUNT FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, BUT  THERE WERE
NO "STAY BEHINDS" IN VIETNAM.
    H. MG DANG  SAID THAT THœ RECOVERY Of REMAINS WAS A SEPARATE
MATTER. HE SAID THAT THE SRV HAD RECOVERED ALL REMAINS OF U.S.
PERSONNEL WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN  FOUND AND HAD ALREADY RETURNED THEM
TO THE U.S. HE SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT THERE WERE REMAINS IN
HAWAII WHICH COULD NOT BE  POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND SPECULATED THAT
THE CHANCES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF THESE CASES IS POSSIBLY TEN
PERCENT. HE SAID THOSE WHO ARE LEFT UNACCOUNTED FOR WILL REMAIN
UNACCOUNTED FOR BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING LEFT TO RECOVER. ON THIS
POINT, MG  DANG WAS VERY  ADAMANT. HE OFFERED TO SIGN A STATEMENT
STATING  THAT "EVEN IF RELATIONS ARE  RE-ESTABLISHED  BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND VIETNAM, THERE IS NO WAY TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REMAINS OF MIA'S."
    I. MG DANG THEN DISCUSSED AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A
FRENCH-VIETNAMESE MAN WHO HAD BEEN PROSECUTED TWICE IN HO CHI MINH
CITY COURTS FOR REMAINS DEALING WITHOUT PROVIDING DETAILS. HE  SAID
THAT  THE ISSUE OF RECOVERING REMAINS HAS ALREADY CAUSED MANY
PROBLEMS.
    J. MG DANG CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE Of WAR-TIME DOCUMENTS OR RECORDS.
HE SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE CAUSED
PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS IT CAN BE DETERMINED THAT THEY ARE
GENUINE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS, BUT THE INFORMATION IS FALSE. CONCERNING THE
CAPTURE OF PW'S, MG DANG SAID THAT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT  THE U.S.
SIDE CAN CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL CASES, BUT IF THE
INFORMATION IS ONLY HEARSAY AND DOES NOT COME FROM DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,
IT TOO IS OF NO VALUE.
    K. MG  DANG SAID THAT HE FEELS THAT THERE  IS NO FUTURE  FOR A

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LARGE COUNTRY LIKE THE U.S. WHICH REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE TRUTH, ADDING THAT
THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE FOR BOTH SIDES. HE SAID THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE SRV AND CHINA WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THE U.S. TO CONSIDER. AFTER
THEIR BORDER  WAR, THE TWO NATIONS NOW HAVE RELATIONS AND THERE IS NO
PROBLEM IN THE MIA ARENA. MG DANG SAID THAT  HE FELT THE NEW
BATTLEFIELD TODAY FOR THE SRV WAS TO WIN THE HEARTS OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE. HE SAID THERE IS NO TRUTH TO ALLEGATIONS OF PW 'S BEING HELD IN
VIETNAM TODAY AND THAT ALL NATIONS SHOULD REALIZE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER
NATIONS TO DEVELOP, BUT THE U.S. STILL HOLDS VIETNAM AS A POLITICAL
HOSTAGE WITH THE MIA ISSUE.
    L. AT THIS POINT, MG DANG SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK OPENLY AND CANDIDLY. HE SAID THAT THERE COULD
HAVE BEEN NO REASON TO JUSTIFY HOLDING BACK U.S. PW'S  BECAUSE DOING SO
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VERY INTELLIGENT, CONSIDERING THE STRENGTH AND POWER
OF THE U.S. MG DANG SAID HE REALIZED THAT NOTHING HE COULD SAY WOULD
ASSIST THE U.S. SIDE IN RESOLVING POW/MIA CASES AND THAT HE HAD NOTHING
SPECIFIC TO PROVIDE TO THE JOINT TEAM. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, HE COULD
NOT PROVIDE THE TEAM WITH INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC CAMPS OR LOCATIONS. HE
ADDED THAT HE FELT IT WAS TIME TO PUT AN END TO THE ISSUE SO THAT BOTH
COUNTRIES  COULD MOVE AHEAD IN THEIR RELATIONS.
    M. MG DANG OFFERED PERSONAL CONJECTURE ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF HOLDING
BACK EVEN ONE U.S. PW. HE ASKED, IF AN AMERICAN PW HAD BEEN HELD  BACK
AFTER 1973, HOW COULD THE COST OF FEEDING, CLOTHING, AND SHELTERING THE
PRISONER BE JUSTIFIED FOR 20 YEARS? HE ALSO ASKED FOR CONSIDERATION OF
THE MATTER FROM THE ASPECT OF RANK; IF THE INDIVIDUAL PW WAS A MAJOR, A
LIEUTENANT, OR A PRIVATE, WHAT COULD THE LEADERSHIP POSSIBLY EXPECT TO
GAIN THAT WOULD JUSTIFY  SUCH A COST? MG DANG SAID, IN HIS OPINION, THE
ANSWER TO HIS QUESTIONS ARE THAT THE LEADERSHIP COULD NOT HAVE
JUSTIFIED SUCH AN EXPENSE AND THAT THE LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO
GAIN. IN ORDER TO END THIS LINE OF REASONING, MG DANG SAID THAT IF THE
VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT WAS REALLY UNDERSTOOD, IT WOULD BE
OBVIOUS THAT THE LEADERSHIP COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY ALLOWED THE
RETENTION OF PW'S.
    N. WITH NO FURTHER QUESTIONS FOR MG TRAN BACH DANG, THE JOINT
TEAM AGREED TO CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW.
4. CORRELATIONS TO  EXISTING POW/MIA CASES. NONE.
5. POTENTIAL LEADS: NONE.
6.  MATERIAL EVIDENCE:  NONE. THE SOURCE BROUGHT NO RECORDS,
NOTEBOOKS,  DIARIES OR ANY MATERIAL EVIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH
UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. PERSONNEL.
7. COMMENT.
    A. THE SOURCE ACKNOWLEDGED HE HAD NO INFORMATION OF IMMEDIATE.
USEFULNESS FOR THE JOINT TEAM AND USED THE INTERVIEW AS A FORUM TO,
PONTIFICATE  ABOUT HIS PERSONAL  VIEWS Of THE ISSUE.
    B. REQUEST THE VNOSMP MAKE MG TRAN BACH DANG AVAILABLE FOR
REINTERVIEW IF NECESSARY.//

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