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SECTION 01 OF 03
AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//
REF/A/FAX/DET 2/30DEC92//
AMPN SUBJ: (OHR-001-92) ORAL HISTORY REPORT--MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI
REGARDING CASE 1274 (PRIDEMORE) AND HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP//
THIS IS A RETRANSMITTAL OF A PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGE, SAME
PAGE 02 RUHQSGG5367 UNCLAS
SUBJ//
RMKS/I. SUMMARY: ON 26 DECEMBER 1992, DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN
(R.J. DESTATTE) AND DET 2 ANALYST (SSGT W.H. NEWELL), ACCOMPANIED BY
THREE MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEARCHING FOR MISSING
PERSONS (VNOSMP), INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI AT HIS OFFICE IN
HANOI, VIETNAM. EARLIER INVESTIGATIONS OF CASE 1274 IDENTIFIED HR.
TRI AS A FORMER CADRE OF THE HEADQUARTERS SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION
ARMY'S (HQ SVNLA) U.S. POW CAMP DURING THE WAR. THE PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERVIEW WAS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP
RESOLVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FATE OF U.S. ARMY STAFF SERGEANT (SSG)
DALLAS PRIDEMORE, WHO WAS CAPTURED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF SAIGON, ON 8
SEPTEMBER 1968. MR. TRI WAS VERY OPEN AND CANDID AND DEMONSTRATED
A CLEAR AND ACCURATE RECALL OF WAR TIME EVENTS. HE WAS CERTAIN ALL
AMERICANS CAPTURED IN HQ SVNLA'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (EXCLUDING
MILITARY REGION NINE) WERE MOVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO HQ SVNLA'S
U.S. POW CAMP. HE RECALLED THAT THIS CAMP, WHILE MOBILE, REMAINED
IN THE AREA ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER BETWEEN NORTHERN TAY NINH
PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA. HE WAS CERTAIN HQ SVNLA
NEVER HAD A POW CAMP IN SVAY RIENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA. HE WAS
CERTAIN NO PRISONER NAMED DALLAS PRIDEMORE EVER-REACHED HQ SVNLA'S
PAGE 03 RUHQSGG5367 UNCLAS
U.S. POW CAMP. IN HIS JUDGMENT, SSG PRIDEMORE MUST HAVE DIED BEFORE
HE COULD BE MOVED TO THE HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP. HE DESCRIBED IN
GENERAL TERMS PROCEDURES FOR EVACUATING U.S. POWS TO HQ SVNLA.
HE IDENTIFIED TWO PERSONS WHO NIGHT HE ABLE TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION REGARDING THIS CASE. HE RECALLED THE NAMES OF
SEVERAL AMERICANS WHO WERE IN THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP AND WHO
HE HAD INTERVIEWED, SEEN, OR HEARD ABOUT. HE SUPPLIED LIMITED
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNRESOLVED CASES 0043, 0050, 0099, 1410,
1610, AND 9960.
2. SOURCE DATA:
NAME: NGUYEN HUNG TRI ((NGUYEENX HUNGF TRIS)).
AGE: 50 YEARS ((DOI: DEC 1992))
WAR TIME POSITION:
OCT '65-OCT '66, 2ND LIEUTENANT, PEOPLES ARMY OF
VIETNAM (PAVN, INTERPRETER, U.S. POW CAMP UNIT TB-20.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA, AKA MIEN.
CURRENT POSITION, ADDRESS, PHONE, FAX:
DIRECTOR, EXPORT DEPARTMENT, VIETNAM NATIONAL
PETROLEUM IMPORT-EXPORT CORPORATION, NO. 1 KHAM THIEN
STREET, HANOI, VIETNAM; PHONE: 84-4-268060, 84-4-
PAGE 04 RUHQSGG5367 UNCLAS
252603; FAX: 84-4-59203.
3. DETAILS:
A. HR. TRI IS A NATIVE OF NORTHERN VIETNAM. AS A 2ND LIEUTENANT
IN THE PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN), HE DEPARTED HANOI IN MARCH
1965 AND ARRIVED AT HQ SVNLA IN JUNE OR JULY 1965. HE WAS THE
DEPUTY COMMANDER OF HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP FROM OCTOBER 1965
THROUGH OCTOBER 2966. HR. TRI RECALLED THAT WHEN HE JOINED THE CAMP,
IT WAS KNOWN AS UNIT TB-20. HE SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS REDESIGNATED
TB-21 UNIT AT SOME LATER DATE. FROM OCTOBER 1966 THROUGH THE END OF
HE WAR HR. TRI WROTE ARTICLES FOR LIBERATION NEWS RADIO AND PRINT
MEDIA. IN THAT CAPACITY HE VISITED THE U.S. POW CAMP OCCASIONALLY TO
INTERVIEW U.S. POWS.
B. HR. TRI SAID HE WAS THE INTERPRETER FOR THE HO SVNLA
DELEGATION DURING TWO POW EXCHANGES. THE FIRST WAS ON 28
DECEMBER 1965; CASE 0024 (G. SMITH AND MCCLURE). THE SECOND WAS
ON 1 JANUARY 1969; CASE 1173 (D.G. SMITH), CASE 1263 (T.N.
JONES), AND CASE 1278 (J.W. BRIGHAM). HR. TRI GAVE THE DET 2
RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN A COPY OF A BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
DEPICTING THE THREE U.S. POWS RELEASED ON 1 JANUARY 1969, FLANKED
BY THE U.S. DELEGATE AND HIS INTERPRETER ON ONE SIDE AND THE HQ
PAGE 05 RUHQSGG5367 UNCLAS
SVNLA DELEGATE WITH HR. TRI ON THE OTHER SIDE. HR. TRI EASILY
RECALLED ACCURATE DETAILS ABOUT PAVN MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TUOI
((NGUYEENX VAWN TUOOI)), AKA BAY TUOI ((BAYR TUOOI)), A
HQ SVNLA STAFF OFFICER WHO ALSO WAS INVOLVED IN THE 1 JANUARY
1969 EXCHANGE. (( FIELD COMMENT: JCRC SPECIALISTS AND THE DET
2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED TUOI IN THE EARLY 1980'S IN
INDONESIA AND BELGIUM.))
C. HR. TRI SAID HE WAS ALSO PRESENT AT LOC NINH WHEN THE U.S.
POWS WHO HAD BEEN HELD IN THE HQ SVNLA CAMP WERE RELEASED IN THE
FINAL POW EXCHANGE IN EARLY 1973 ((OPERATIONS HOMECOMING)). (( FIELD
COMMENT: DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN PROMISED TO GIVE HR. TRI SOME
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOS A U.S. ARMY PHOTOGRAPHER TOOK OF THE HQ SVNLA
DELEGATION AT THE LOC NINH EXCHANGE.))
D. CASE 1274 (PRIDEMORE):
(1) HR. TRI SAID HE NEVER MET SSG PRIDEMORE. HE HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SSG PRIDEMORE OR HIS FATE.
(2) DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN SUNMARIZED THE LOCATION,
DATE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF SSG PRIDEMORE'S CAPTURE, AND INVITED
MR. TRI TO COMMENT ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF THE STORY.
(3) MR. TRI NOTED THU DUC DISTRICT WAS PART OF COMMUNIST
PAGE 06 RUHQSGG5367 UNCLAS ù
SUB-REGION IV IN HQ SVNLA'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE SAID
ALL POWS CAPTURED IN SUB-REGION IV WERE EVACUATED AS QUICKLY
AS POSSIBLE TO THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP.
(4) MR. TRI RECALLED THAT HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP, WHILE
MOBILE, REMAINED IN THE AREA ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER BETWEEN
NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA. MR.
TRI SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT HQ SVNLA NEVER KEPT ANY FOREIGN POWS
IN SVAY RIENG PROVINCE.
(5) CITING SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SAFETY FACTORS, MR. TRI
SAID HE WAS CERTAIN NO ECHELON SUBORDINATE TO HQ SVNLA COULD HAVE OR
WOULD HAVE TRIED TO HOLD A U.S. POW FOR A LONG PERIOD. (( FIELD
COMMENT: IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS INTERVIEW, HQ SVNLA ARMY WAS
UNDERSTOOD TO INCLUDE COMMUNIST MILITARY REGION 6, 7, 8, AND 10, AND
THE SAIGON, CHOLON, GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE; AND TO EXCLUDE MILITARY
REGION 9, WHICH WAS THE REGION SOUTH OF THE MEKING RIVER.))
(6) HR. TRI SAID HE IS CERTAIN ANY AMERICAN CAPTURED IN
HQ SVNLA'S AREA WHO DID NOT ENTER THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP
ADMINISTERED BY UNIT TB-20/TB-21 DIED BEFORE REACHING THE CAMP.
(7) LTC PHAM TEO (MND MIA SPECIALIST ASSIGNED TO THE
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SECTION 02 OF 03
AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//
VNOSMP) NOTED THE THU DUC DISTRICT SPECIAL ACTION UNIT ((BIEETJ
DDOONGJ DDOOIJ)) CAPTURED SSG PRIDEMORE. IN RESPONSE, MR. TRI
EXPLAINED SEVERAL FACTORS RECOMMENDED THAT ANY SEARCH FOR
DOCUMENTS AND WITNESSES SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE CAPTURING UNIT.
PAGE 02 RUHQSGG5368 UNCLAS
FIRST, GUERRILLA FORCES, SUCH AS A DISTRICT SPECIAL ACTION
UNIT, ARE LEAST LIKELY TO HAVE THE RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND
INCLINATION TO MOVE A POW TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON;
THEREFORE, IT IS LIKELY A POW CAPTURED BY SUCH A UNIT WOULD BE
KILLEDOR DIE BEFORE HE REACHED THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON--IN THIS
INSTANCE PROVINCE LEVEL. MR. TRI STATED THAT PAVN MAIN FORCE UNITS,
E.G., THE PAVN 5TH, 7TH, AND 9TH DIVISIONS, WERE THE MOST LIKELY
UNITS TO HAVE THE RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE TO IMPLEMENT
POLICY TO MOVE U.S. POWS TO HQ SVNLA. LTC PHAM TEO INFORMED MR. TRI
THAT FOUR SEPARATE JOINT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE FAILED TO LOCATE
CREDIBLE EYE WITNESSES FROM THE CAPTURING UNIT.
(8) HR. TRI SAID HQ SVNLA RECEIVED DAILY TELEPHONE REPORTS
THAT INCLUDED INFORMATION ABOUT POWS. HOWEVER, HE SAID IT WAS NOT
UNCOMMON, AFTER WAITING A FEW WEEKS, TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE STATUS OF
THE POW AND LEARN HE HAD DIED WHILE ENROUTE TO HQ SVNLA HE SAID
THAT FREQUENTLY REPORTS NOTED A SUBORDINATE UNIT HAD BURIED THE BODY
OF AN AMERICAN; BUT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIFIC
LOCATION. HE SAID TYPICALLY COMMUNIST FORCES WOULD LEAVE A BODY
WHERE IT WAS FOUND OR, IF THEY BURIED THE BODY, THEY DID NOT MARK
THE GRAVE.
PAGE 03 RUHQSGG5368 UNCLAS
(9) MR. TRI SAID THE NORMAL REPORTING CHANNEL FOR THE THU
DUC DISTRICT UNIT WOULD BE THROUGH THE PROVINCE AND SUBREGION
COMMANDS TO THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT FOR HQ SVNLA. MR. TRI
SAID REPORTS ON DECEASED AMERICANS WOULD NOT BE SENT TO THE HQ SVNLA
U.S. POW CAMP. HE SAID REPORTS ABOUT DECEASED AMERICANS WOULD HAVE
BEEN SENT TO THœ HQ SVNLA'S ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT.
(10) NORMALLY, MR. TRI BELIEVED, THE THU DUC DISTRICT
SPECIAL ACTION UNIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING THE
PRISONERS TO THE PROVINCE COMMAND. THE PROVINCE COMMAND WOULD NAVE
SOUGHT INSTRUCTIONS FROM SUB-REGION IV. DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES,
SUB-REGION IV MIGHT HAVE DIRECTED THE PROVINCE TO MOVE THE PRISONER
TO SUB-REGION OR TO HOLD THœ PRISONER PENDING ARRIVAL OF AN ESCORT
TEAM FROM SUB-REGION. SUB-REGION IN TURN WOULD HAVE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ SVNLA. NORMALLY, FOR SECURITY REASONS, HQ
SVNLA WOULD SEND A TEAM TO RECEIVE THE POW SOMEWHERE ENROUTE
BETWEEN PROVINCE AND SUB-REGION.
(11) MR. TRI SAID THAT OUTSIDE THE LOCAL GUERRILLA UNIT,
THE ORGANIZATION MOST LIKELY TO HAVE PRESERVED USEFUL DOCUMENTARY
INFORMATION ABOUT SSG PRIDEMORE SHOULD BE THE HQ SNLVA ENEMY
PAGE 04 RUHQSGG5368 UNCLAS
PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT.
E. POTENTIAL WITNESSES;
(1) DANG THUAN HOA ((DDANGJ THUUANJ HOAF)). INTERPRETER FOR
HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE POW EXCHANGE ON 1
JANUARY 1969. HOA CURRENTLY WORKS IN THE HO CHI MINH COMMERCIAL
AFFAIRS OFFICE ((SOWR THUOWNG NGHIEEPHJ)). (( FIELD COMMENT: VNOSMP
MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT SHOULD BE EASY TO
LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. HOA.))
(2) LUU QUANG TUYEN ((LUWU QUANG TUYEENS)). THE CHIEF or
THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA,- FROM ABOUT 1969
THROUGH 2975. AFTER THE WAR HE BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF OF LONG AN
PROVINCE. CURRENTLY RETIRED, HE NOW LIVES IN SAIGON. ((FIELD
COMMENT: VNOSMP MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT
SHOULD BE EASY TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. TUYEN.))
(3) NGO OAT TAI ((NGOO DDAATJ TAIF)): AKA 10 TRAI
((TRAIX)) AND 10 TAI ((TAIF)). CHIEF or THE ENEMY PROSELYTING
DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA FROM ABOUT 1967 TO 1969. HE FELL VICTIM TO
POOR HEALTH AND RETURNED TO NORTH VIETNAM IN ABOUT 1969. CURRENTLY
RETIRED, HE LIVES ON ONG ICH KHIEM STREET (( PHOOS OONG ICHS
KHIEM)), HANOI, VIETNAM. HIS PREDECESSOR, LE HOA ((LEE
PAGE 05 RUHQSGG5368 UNCLAS
HOAF)) DIED OF OLD AGE IN ABOUT 1977 OR 1978. (( FIELD COMMENT:
VNOSMP MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT SHOULD
BE EASY TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. TAI.))
(4) LE QUANG HUY ((LEE QUANG HUY)); AKA 8 HUY. COMMANDER OF
THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP FROM 1967 THROUGH 1975. ((FIELD COMMENT:
THREE DIFFERENT U.S. SPECIALISTS, INCLUDING DET 2
RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN, HAVE INTERVIEWED MR. HUY. MR. HUY HAS
PREVIOUSLY SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE A VERY VAIN AND UNCOOPERATIVE
WITNESS. HIS ONE AND ONLY PREDECESSOR (1964-1967) WAS LE HUE ((LEE
HUEEJ)), WHO IS DECEASED. ((FIELD COMMENT: AS COMMANDER OF THE
U.S. POW CAMP, LE QUANG HUY COULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE LITTLE OR NO
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ANY AMERICANS OTHER THAN THOSE WHO WERE
UNDER HIS DIRECT SUPERVISION.))
F. ENEMY PROSELYTING AND MILITARY PROSELYTING. MR. TRI DEFINED
ENEMY PROSELYTING ((DDICHJ VAANJ)) AS A FUNCTION PERFORMED BY THE
MILITARY AND DIRECTED AT ADVERSARY MILITARY FORCES. HE DESCRIBED
MILITARY PROSELYTING (( BINH VAANJ)) AS A FUNCTION CARRIED OUT BY THE
COMMUNIST PARTY--IN THIS INSTANCE THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH
VIETNAM (( COSVN)) AND IS DIRECTED AT MOBILIZING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE
SOCIETY. STATED IN OTHER WORDS,
PAGE 06 RUHQSGG5368 UNCLAS
ACCORDING TO MESERS TRI AND PHAM TEO, ENEMY PROSELYTING IS A
SUBSET OF MILITARY PROSELYTING.
G. THE 2ND OFFICE (( PHONGF 2)), AKA RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
((PHONG TRINH SAT)), AKA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ((QUAAN BAOS)) WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERROGATING POWS FOR TACTICAL INFORMATION. THE
ENEMY PROSELYTING ELEMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERROGATING POWS FOR
PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PURPOSES.
H. MR. TRI RECALLED HAVING HEARD ABOUT, SEEN, OR SPOKEN WITH
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING U.S. POWS, IN ADDITION TO THE POWS NAMED IN
PARA 3B AND 30, ABOVE:
(1) CAPTAIN (SIC) SCHUMANN (CASE 0099). MR. TRI RECALLED
((MAJOR)) SCHUMANN DIED IN CAPTIVITY. MR. TRI CITED THIS CASE TO
ILLUSTRATE HIS BELIEF IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND GRAVE SITES OF
THE MEN WHO DIED WHILE IN THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP. MR. TRI
NOTED THAT UNIT TB-20, THE UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAMP, MOVED THE
CAMP FREQUENTLY. HE NOTED MOST OF THE ROUTES TRAVELED BY THE UNIT
WERE NRROW FOOT OR BICYCLE PATHS CUT THROUGH THE JUNGL. HE RECALLED
THE UNIT SELOM USED THESE PATHS LONGER THAN THREE MONTHS, AFTER
WHICH THEY QUICKLY REVERTED BACK TO JUNGLE GROWTH. MR. TRI STATED
FIRMLY HE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE BT #5368
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FINAL SECTION OF 03
AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RELOCATE THE PATHS AND CAMP SITES WHERE
POWS DIED AND WERE BURIED.
(2) USMC CAPTAIN COOK (CASE 0050). MR. TRI RECALLED
CAPTAIN COOK WAS CAPTURED IN BINH GIA AND THAT NE DIED IN
PAGE 02 RUHQSGG5369 UNCLAS
CAPTIVITY. ((FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO REPORT 55 SUMMARY,
RETURNED POW DOUGLAS RAMSEY--WHO SPOKE VIETNAMESE FLUENTLY-
REPORTED THAT NGUYEN HUNG TRI TOLD HIM CAPTAIN COOK HAD
DIED OF MALARIA IN DECEMBER 1967 WHILE CAPTAIN COOK WAS
BEING TRANSFERRED BETWEEN CAMP SITES IN TAY NINH PROVINCE,
SOUTHERN VIETNAM. SEE 3DI, ABOVE, FOR MR. TRIPS VIEWS
ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERING REMAINS.))
(3) CRAFTS (CASE 0049). MR. TRI RECALLED CRAFTS WAS
CAPTURED IN BINH GIA AND RELEASED EARLY.
(4) 1ST LIEUTENANT (SIC) JOHN DUNN (CASE 1093). MR. TRI
RECALLED (( CAPTAIN)) DUNN WAS RELEASED.
(5) CAPTAIN YOUNG (CASE 1620). MR. TRI MENTIONED HE HAD
INTERVIEWED CAPTAIN YOUNG, BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON CAPTAIN YOUNG'S
FATE ((SEE 3DI, ABOVE, FOR MR. TRIPS VIEWS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR
RECOVERING REMAINS.))
(6) CIVILIAN DOUGLAS RAMSEY (CASE 0234). MR. TRI RECALLED
RAMSEY WAS RELEASED IN 1973 AND THAT RAMSEY WAS A NATIVE OF NEVADA.
(7) WARRANT OFFICER HESTAND (CASE 1727). MR. TRI
RECALLED WO HESTAND WAS A HELICOPTER PILOT AND THAT HE WAS
PAGE 03 RUHQSGG5369 UNCLAS
RELEASED.
(8) CAMACHO (CASE 0024). MR. TRI RECALLED WITHOUT
HESITATION THAT ((SFC)) CAMACHO ESCAPED FROM THE HQ SVNLA U.S.
POW CAMP A FEW MONTHS BEFORE MR. TRI ARRIVED AT THE CAMP.
(9) MURPHY (CASE 1410). MR. TRI RECALLED THAT ((SP5))
MURPHY WAS ONE OF THREE MEMBERS or A U.S. COMMANDO ( ( BIET KICH MY))
TEAM WHO WERE KILLED WHEN THEY WERE AMBUSHED BY PAVN FORCES SHORTLY
AFTER HELICOPTERS SHORTLY AFTER HELICOPTERS INSERTED THE COMMANDO
TEAM INTO A LANDING ZONE NEAR THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA BORDER. MR. TRI
RECALLED THAT ALTHOUGH PAVN FORCES WERE ABLE TO RECOVER ((SP5))
MURPHY'S IDENTIFICATION CARD; U.S. AIRCRFT ATTACKS DESTROYED ALL
THREE BODIES THAT THE CMMANDO TEAM LEFT BEHIND WHEN ITWITHDREW. MR.
TRI SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS COMMON FOR U.S. AIR STRIKES TO DESTROY
REMAINS LEFT ON THE BATTLE FIELD. HE CITED THIS INCIDENT AS ANOTHER
((SEE 3DI, ABOVE)) ILLUSTRATION THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO
RECOVER REMAINS OF MANY UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS.
(10) MCKINLEY NOLAN (CASE 9950). MR. TRI RECALLED THAT
MCKINLEY NOLAN HAD CROSSED OVER TO THE SVNLA. MR. TRI SAID NOLAN
WAS NOT A POW. MR. TRI SAID HE DID NOT HAVE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF
PAGE 04 RUHQSGG5369 UNCLAS
NOLAN'S FATE; HOWEVER, HR. TRI HEARD THAT NOLAN STAYED IN CAMBODIA
WHEN PAVN AND SVNLA MOVED BACK INTO SOUTHERN VIETNAM AFTER THE
PARIS PEACE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED IN EARLY 1973. MR. TRI
EXPLAINED THAT NOLAN'S WIFE WAS AN ETHNIC CAMBODIAN
NAMED THAACH THI DEN (( THACHJ THIJ ZEEN)). HR. TRI
SPECULATED THAT NOLAN'S WIFE MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCED NOLAN'S
DECISION TO STAY IN CAMBODIA.
(11) DAWSON (CASE 0043). HR. TRI RECALLED THAT A BROTHER
OF AN MIA PILOT VISITED A TEMPORARY POW CAMP NORTH OF SAIGON. MR.
TRI RECALLED THE BROTHER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A YOUNG WOMAN WHO
ACTED AS HIS INTERPRETER (( FIELD COMMENT: A YOUNG EURASION WOMAN
NAMED COLLETTE EMBERGER HR. TRI SAID HE LEARNED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT
WHEN HE VISITED THE CAMP SOMETIME AFTER THE EVENTS IN QUESTION. DET
2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN NOTED THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) GAVE
THE BROTHER ((DONALD DAWSON)) AN ITEM OF PERSONAL FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
THEY SAID BELONGED TO 1ST LT DANIEL DAWSON AND PROMISED THE THE
NLF WOULD RETURN 1ST LT DAWSON'S REMAINS AFTER THE WAR. IN
RESPONSE, HR. TRI SAID HE BELIEVES IT IS UNLIKELY THE ITEM BELONGED TO
1ST LT DAWSON OR THAT ANYONE IN THE NLF HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LOCATION OF 1ST LT DAWSON'S GRAVE SITE.
PAGE 05 RUHQSGG5369 UNCLAS
4, REPORT PREPARED BY HR. R. DESTATTE, DET 2
RESEARCNER/HISTORIAN, AND REVIEWED BY SSGT WILLIAM H. NEWELL, DET
2 ANALYST. //
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#5369