[0150-71.CM 04/19/96]
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT
NUMBER NIYD 96F002, BY RB/VSW, DATE 2/16/96
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Note: This Document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws. Title 18, U.S.C., Sec
793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL
This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not
be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
[RAND STAMPED
W28342]
1. COUNTRY: CB; VS
2. SUBJECT: (U) OB of the 16th AA Bn
3. ISC NUMBER: 736.500 773.500
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 Dec 70
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CMIC, SAIGON, VS 13 Feb 71
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: PW Interrogation
8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 029 0150 71
9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 Feb 71
10. NO. OF PAGES: 10
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 1G3k, 1J10, 1M2k MACV:
ICP OIR-1 GUN BOAT ICP
12: ORIGINATOR: US Element, CMIC, USMACV
13: PREPARED BY: JONATHAN F. TURNER
SP5, USA
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (SIGNED)
W. H. BEARDSLEY
LTC, USA
Dir, US Elm, CMIC
15. SUMMARY:
(C) This report contains OB information on the 16th Artillery Battalion, to
include unit history, mission, composition, disposition, strength, weapons and
ammunition, equipment, logistics, unit plans, unit training, combat
efficiency, and personalities. THIS REPORT PARTIALLY SATISFIES REQUIREMENTS
OF GUN BOAT ICP.
1. (C) Background Information:
a. Name: NGUYEN XUAN KHAI (NGUYEENX, XUAAN KHAI), CMIC 3306-70
b. Rank: PFC
c. Position and Unit of Assignment: Ammunition-bearer; 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, C-2 Co,
16th AA Bn, 75th Arty Gp
d. DPOB: 1933; XUAN LY Hamlet, XUAN TRUONG Village, THO XUAN District, THANH
HOA Province, NVN
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
DIA 1 cy
DIRNSA 1 cy
SAC 1 cy
CINPAC 1 cy
CINPAC AF 2 cys
CINCUSARPAC 2 cys
COMUSMACTHAI 1 cy
MACJ212-2 2 cys
MACJ213-1 1 cy
MACJ23 1 cy
MACJ231 1 cy
17. DOWNGRADING DATA: GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
THIS DOCUMENT IS RELEASEABLE TO REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND FREE WORLD
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES GOC
18: ATTACHMENT DATA: None
PAGE 2 of 10
e. Parents's Names: Father, NGUYEN VAN BAT (NGUYEENX, VEAN BATS), deceased;
Mother, MAI THI LOAN (MAI, THIV LOAN), deceased
f. Circumstances of Capture. Source was captured by an unidentified ARVN
unit, (vic XT058950), SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA, on 23 Dec 70, after his
company and the 1st Bn, 38th NVA Regt, ambushed an ARVN convoy. Source had
one box (50 rounds) of 12.7mm rounds in his possession when captured.
g. Significant Activities:
(1) 1945 to Feb 70. From 1945 to 1952, Source studied at his POB. He became
a farmer, married, and had two children. Source was drafted in Feb 69, and
was assigned to the 4th Sqd, 10th Plat, 3rd Co, 1st Inf Bn, 1st Regt, 338th
Div, MR-III, NVN. During Feb and Mar 69, the battalion built a base camp for
its headquarters at THANH LONG Village, THACH THANH District, THANH HOA
Province, NVN. In Apr 69, the battalion was sent to the CHU River in THANH
HOA Province for about 25 days to build dikes for flood control. The
battalion returned to its base camp and started basic training in late Apr 69.
On 29 Sep 69, after five months of basic and infiltration training, the
battalion began infiltration to the RVN and arrived at the K-31 Commo-liaison
Station at an unknown location in CAMBODIA in late Jan 70.
(2) Feb 70 to Dec 70. In early Feb 70, Source was assigned to the 6th Sqd, 2d
Plat, 3rd Co, 24th AA Bn, WS-1, as an ammunition-bearer. Late in Mar 70,
Worksite 1 disbanded and became part of Worksite 9 and Source was reassigned
to the 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, 2d Co, 16th Bn, 75th Gp, COSVN. From Apr to Aug 70,
the 2d Company was inactive because of increased Allied operations within the
battalion area of operations. In mid-Sep 70, the 16th AA Battalion was given
the mission of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment. On 23 Dec 70, after
participating in an ambush of an ARVN convoy in SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA,
Source was captured by members of the ambushed unit.
h. Additional References: CMIC PW/Rallier Exploitation Guide; War Material
Used by the Viet Cong in South VIETNAM or Presumably Available to North
VIETNAM, J-2, MACV; Weapons and Equipment Recognition Guide, DA Pam 381-10;
Identification Guide, USAREUR Pam 30-60-1; Map CAMBODIA, AMS Series L7016,
Sheets 6132 II, 6132 III, Edition 1, dtd 1965, Scale 1:100,000; EEI of 29 Dec
70
2. (C) OB of 16th Battalion:
a. Unit History. In Feb 70, Source was assigned to the 24th AA Battalion,
Worksite 1. Late in Mar 70, Worksite 1 dissolved and became part of Worksite
9, and Source was reassigned to the 2d Co, 16th Bn, 75th Gp, COSVN. When
source joined the 16th Battalion, it was composed of three artillery companies
and a headquarters section. Source had no further knowledge concerning unit
history:
PAGE 3 of 10
b. Misison. On or about mid-Sep 70, the 16th Battalion was given the mission
of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment (aka HOC MON Regiment), Worksite
7. The area of operations for the 16th Battalion in Sep and Oct 70 was from
DAM BE Junction to COC CHA, along Highway No 2 in CAMBODIA. In Dec 70, the
area of operations changed to ROMEAS HEK District, SVAY RIENG Province,
CAMBODIA. Source did not have any knowledge of future plans for the 16th
Battalion.
c. Composition:
(1) Identification of Unit:
(a) Name/Numerical Designation: 16th AA Battalion
(b) Code Names/Cover NumBers: Unknown
(c) Type of Unit: Artillery
(d) LBNs: 8655OYK
(e) Echelon/Size: Battalion
(f) Date of Unit Designation: Unknown
(g) Previous Designation: Unknown
(h) Method Used to Select Unit Designation: Unknown
(2) Parent Unit:
(a) Name/Numerical Designation: 75th Artillery Group
(b) Code Names/Cover Numbers: BIEN HOA Artillery Group
(c) Type of Unit: Artillery
(d) LBNs: Unknown
(e) Echelon/Size: Source estimated the size to be larger than a regiment, but
he was not certain if it was full division-size or not.
(f) Date of Unit Designation: Unknown
(g) Previous Designation: Unknown
(h) Method Used to Select Unit Designtion: Unknown
(3) Organization. The 16th AA Battalion had three artillery companies,
designated C-1 through C-3, and a headquarters section, which had an
undesignated reconnaissance/liaison squad. Each company had two platoons,
designated B-1 and B-2; each platoon had two squads,
PAGE 4 of 10
designated A-1 and A-4 in each company; and each squad had four cells,
designated 1 through 4. Source thought the 75th Artillery Group had at least
two additional artillery battalions, one armed with an unknown number of 120mm
and 82mm mortars, and one armed with an unknown number of recoilless rifles of
unknown caliber.
d. Disposition of Unit:
(1) Location. On 23 Dec 70, the 16th Battalion Headquarters was located in
QUAN PHU District, TAY NINH Province, RVN, aproximately 18 to 20 kilometers
west of KATUM City and approximately nine to 10 kilometers south of KHDAR
City, MEMOT District, KOMPONG CHAM Province, CAMBODIA (Interrogator's Note:
Map sheet 6232 II, Series L607, Scale 1:100,000 was used to determine this
approximate location). C-1 and C-3 Companies of the 16th Battalion (C-2
Company was at the site of the ARVN Convoy ambush at this time), two infantry
battalions of the 38th NVA Regiment, two artillery battalions, and an unknown
number of support companies from the 75th Artillery Group were also at the
camp at this location. The 16th Battalion moved to this camp on or about 21
Dec 70. Source did not know how long the 16th Battalion would stay there.
The previous location of the 16th Battalion was approximately three kilometers
north of KHCHEAY City, MEMOT District, KOMPONG CHAM Province, CAMBODIA, in the
vicinity of (XU400103), where the battalion had had a base camp. The city of
KHCHEAY (vic XU396072) was used by the 75th Artillery Group as a
meeting/rallying point. The 16th Batalion had utilized the base camp area
north of KHCHEAY City from May or Jun 70 until 21 Dec 70.
(2) Base Camp Security. The combined units' base camp in QUAN PHU District,
TAY NINH Province, RVN, utilized the following security procedures. The
perimeter was approximately two kilometers and was roughly in the shape of a
circle with the 38 th Regimental Headquarters located in the center. Source
did not visit the regimental headquarters, so he could not provide a
description of the security measures employed by it. The three companies of
the 16th Battalion camped in aa triangular formation with battalion
headquarters located in the center and approximately 10 minutes' walk from
each company. The size of the 16th Battalion base camp area was unknown to
Source. Each company posted one guard, armed with an AK-47 with a basic load
of 100 rounds, in the company areas. These guards were stationery, were
rotated hourly, and were maintained 24 hours a day. For additional security,
each company sent out a three-man patrol, armed with AK-47s with basic loads
of 100 rounds. Each patrol went on duty at 0800 hours. The patrols marched
about the company perimeters, which usually took 30 minutes. If no enemy
activity was spotted, the patrols then rested until 1200 hours, whereupon they
made one more trek about the perimeters. Again, if no activity was noted,
they then rested until 1500, at which time they went off duty. The men for
the patrols changed daily. The 16th Battalion had utilized the same security
precautions when in their old base camp,
PAGE 5 of 10
north of KHCHEAY City. There were no warning devices, mines, or booby traps
around or near either base camp.
(3) Unit Facilities. At both base camps, the personnel of the 16th Battalion
lived in an unknown number of three-man foxholes measuring (2.5m x 1.8m x
1.2m). There had been a small stream running through the old base camp in
CAMBODIA but in the camp in the RVN each company utilized a well. The three
wells had been dug by an unknown unit that had previously been in the area.
The wells appeared to be 18 to 24 months old. The personnel placed their
artillery pieces inside the foxholes to protect them from the elements. They
cleaned the weapons daily.
e. Strength of Unit:
(1) Personnel. Source estimated the 16th Battalion to have approximately 300
men. C-2 Company had approximately 80, and Source estimated the strengths of
C-1 and C-3 to be about the same. Source's company, C-2, was 100 percent NVA.
(2) Personnel Losses. In May 70, in the V-41 Area (exact location unknown),
CB/RVN border area, the C-2 Company suffered three killed, four wounded, and
10 missing in action, when attacked by an ARVN/US armored element. In Aug 70,
while in the KHCHEAY area, CAMBODIA, the C-2 Company suffered 18 to 19 killed
and 10 to 11 wounded as result of a B-52 attack. Source was not knowledgeable
about losses of the other companies.
(3) Personnel Replacements. In late Nov 70, the C-2 Company received
approximately 30 newly-arrived infiltrators as replacements. Source did not
think the battalion was expecting any more replacements.
f. Weapons and Ammunition. The 16th Battalion and the following weapons, all
of which were in fair to old condition:
Quantity Type Basic Load
12 12.7mm HMG 500
Seven B-40 ATGL Five or Six
Six RPD 300
44 to 48 AK-47 100
10 K-54 Unknown
In Aug 70, a B-52 strike damaged two 12.7mm HMGs and destroyed 1000 rounds of
12.7mm ammunition. The 82nd Rear Service Unit (NFI) obtained two new 12.7mm
HMGs for the battalion in about two weeks.
g. Equipment. The 16th Battalion had the following equipment,
PAGE 6 OF 10
origins unknown, and all in old condition, except the picks, which were issued
in May 70:
Quantity (approximate) Type
24 Picks
72 Shovels
24 Saws
12 Machetes
Three Compasses
Individual equipment of the personel included the following equipment, all of
which was in old condition:
One Ammunition belt (USSR/COMMUNIST CHINA)
One Canteen (COMMUNIST CHINA/USA)
One or two Grenades (COMMUNIST CHINA)
One Field pack (unknown)
One Cotton uniform, green (NVN)
One pair Rubber sandals (VC/NVA)
One Cotton bandage (unknown)
One Nylon protective mask (VC)
Numerous small items of indivdual equipment had been lost over the past two
years; however, Source did not know why none of it was ever replaced.
h. Unit Logistics:
(1) Weapons and Equipment. The 16th Battalion was adequately equipped with
weapons, the majority of which were old but still reliable. The battalion
needed more picks and shovels. When Source was with the battalion, each squad
had two picks and six shovels.
(2) Resupply of Ammunition. The procedure for the resupplying of ammunition
was the following. After an operation in which ammunition was expended, the
executive officers of the three companies took stock of the needed ammunition
and reported what they needed to the battalion chief of staff. The chief of
staff reported to the 82nd Rear Service Group, who supplied the battalion with
the needed amounts. Delivery time ranged from five days to two weeks.
PAGE 7 of 10
(3) Adequacy of Medical Support. Source thought the 16th Battalion utilized
the K-71 Hospital, located somewhere in KOMPONG CHAM Province, near the CB/RVN
border. That hospital was utilized for treatment of the seriously ill when
the 16th Battalion supported the 38th Regiment, it utilized the regimental
hospital. Source was not knowledgeable on either hospital. The 16th
Battalion had one medical technician and each company had three medics.
Source felt all the medical personnel were inadequately equipped. He thought
the technician had one stethoscope, plus other small items. The company medics
had small quantities of quinine tablets and rolls of bandages. Wounded
personnel were transported in hammocks.
(4) Rations. At the beginning of each month, the battalion adjutant issued
unknown amounts of money to the company adjutants. Source thought the amount
to be three riels per soldier per day. The money was retained by the company
adjutants who used it to purchase pigs, dried fish, and peanuts, from any
nearby villagers. The 82nd Rear Service Group issued enough rice two or three
times a month so that each man could have 600 grams per day. Wild vegetables
were picked in the jungles. The pork was fresh, the dried fish retained its
flavor, but the rice was sometimes old and mildewed. Source did not know the
location of any food depots or caches.
(5) Mobility. The 16th Battalion traveled on foot, carrying weapons and
equipment on their backs.
(6) Designation and Location of Higher Logistical Unit. Although the 82nd
Rear Service Group figured extensively in the resupply of the 16th Battalion,
Source had no knowledge concerning it, other than that it was supposedly
located somewhere in CAMBODIA.
(7) Quartermaster Supply. The battalion adjutant received uniforms from the
82nd Rear Service Group; he issued them to the company adjutants. The
uniforms were issued only to men whose uniforms had become rags.
i. Unit Plans. In the event of an air strike, two 12.7mm HMG crews of each
company fired at the attacking plane(s) while the two remaining gun crews of
each company took refuge in foxholes. Anti-aircraft gun crews changed daily.
Although the battalion had never been attacked by ground forces, the battalion
cadre had instructed the men to fight back. Source had no knowledge
concerning reorganization or expansion of the 16th Battalion, nor did he have
any knowledge in regard to contingency plans or plans for receiving foreign
manpower assistance.
j. Unit Training:
(1) Military Training. When located in a base camp between operations, the
16th Battalion reviewed tactics at the squad level. These tactics were how to
deliver antiaircraft fire, how to attack an outpost, and how to withdraw in
the face of the enemy. There was
PAGE 8 of 10
no set schedule for this review. Once amonth, first aid was reviewed at
company level by the company medics. The medics instructed the men on proper
bandaging of wounds.
(2) Political Training. Source had political training only three times with
the 16th Battalion. The first time (dates unknown), the company political
officer lectured Source's company upon the situation in the RVN and the
worthiness of the VC/NVA cause. The second time, the history of the 75th
Artillery Group was discussed by the company political officer. On the third
and last occasion, the history of the Vietnamese people's struggles against
FRANCE was discussed by the company political officer.
(3) Physical Training. Immediately upon rising in the morning, squad leaders
led their squads through 15 minutes of physical training.
(4) Weapons Training. Approximately 20 days of each month were given over to
review of special weapons training. The review consisted of assembly,
disassembly, and cleaning of all 12.7mm HMGs. Practice was also given in
aiming. The review was conducted at squad level and lasted from 0700 to 1100
hours and from 1330 to 1630 hours.
k. Combat Efficiency:
(1) Combat Experience. About mid-Sep 70, the 16th Battalion was given the
mission of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment in an ambush against
Allied vehicles on Highway No2, near COC CHA Village, CAMBODIA (exact location
unknown). The 16th Battalion prepared trenches and foxholes; hoever, the
attack never took place because no Allied units showed up. The two units
relocated back to their former base camps. On 18 Dec 70, the 16th Battalion
and the 38th Regiment assembled at KHCHEAY City. After five nights of
traveling, the units reached a new ambush site on Highway No78 (referred to by
Source as Highway 22) in ROMEAS HEK District, SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA,
in the viciniity of (XT052950). On 23 Dec 70, the 1st Bn, 38th Regt; the 2d
co, 16th Bn; and one squad each from two unidentified artillery battalions
attacked an ARVN convoy. Source was captured after his squad's 12.7mm HMG
jammed. The outcome of this attack was not know to Source.
(2) Morale. Approximately 50 percent of the 16th Battalion had low morale,
due to being tired of fighting and being homesick. The remaining 50 percent
had fair morale. Morale was never high because of the sometimes lack of
rations, the high malaria rate, and the shortages of medicine and equipment.
Source's morale while with the unit was low because he wanted badly to return
to his family in NVN.
1. Personalities. Source provided information on the following
personalities:
16th Battalion: (ranks unknown unless indicated)
PAGE 9 of 10
CO: CPT TUNG (TUNGL); age 40, 1.60m, 50kg, light complexion
XO: CPT TUYN (TUYN) ; age 42, 1.50m, 50kg, dark complexion
PO: LT BON (BOONL); age 41, 1.55m, 50kg, light complexion
CofS: LT GIOI (JOWIS); age 36, 1.53m, 40 kg, light complexion
Medical Technician: MUI (MUIL); age 30, 1.60m, 60 kg, dark complexion
Adj: TUAN (TUAAN); age 40, 1.60m, 55kg, light complexion
2d company, 16th Battalion:
CO: LT MUU (MUWU); age 28, 1.60m, 48kg, dark complexion
XO: LIEN (LIEEN); age 27, 1.55m, 50kg, light complexion
PO: LT HOA (HOA); age 30, 1.55m, 54kg, light complexion
Asst PO: PHONG (FONG); age 31, 1.50m, 52kg, light complexion
Medic: SAM (SEAMS); age 22, 1.50m, 50kg, light complexion
Medic: SU (SUWL); age 21, 1.60m, 50kg, light complexion
Medic: BAY (BAYR); age 19, 1.45m, 46kg, light complexion
(C) COMMENTS: Source was cooperative and often volunteered informatIon. He
answered control questions consistently. Source scored Average (19) on the
Cross-Cultural IQ Test.
PAGE 10 OF 10
Organizational Chart of the 16th AA Battalion, as provided by captive NGUYEN
XUAN KHAI, CMIC 3306-70 (DOI: 23 Dec 70)
[NETWORK NOTE: a copy of the ORGANIZATIONAL CHART is
available - call or write using the file number 0150 71.]