[0150-71.CM 04/19/96] [NETWORK NOTE: This document was scanned and retyped to make it an ASCII file. The Block format of a USG document was altered to just "text") REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT NUMBER NIYD 96F002, BY RB/VSW, DATE 2/16/96 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT Note: This Document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws. Title 18, U.S.C., Sec 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CONFIDENTIAL This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. [RAND STAMPED W28342] 1. COUNTRY: CB; VS 2. SUBJECT: (U) OB of the 16th AA Bn 3. ISC NUMBER: 736.500 773.500 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 23 Dec 70 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CMIC, SAIGON, VS 13 Feb 71 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6 7. SOURCE: PW Interrogation 8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 029 0150 71 9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 Feb 71 10. NO. OF PAGES: 10 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 1G3k, 1J10, 1M2k MACV: ICP OIR-1 GUN BOAT ICP 12: ORIGINATOR: US Element, CMIC, USMACV 13: PREPARED BY: JONATHAN F. TURNER SP5, USA 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (SIGNED) W. H. BEARDSLEY LTC, USA Dir, US Elm, CMIC 15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains OB information on the 16th Artillery Battalion, to include unit history, mission, composition, disposition, strength, weapons and ammunition, equipment, logistics, unit plans, unit training, combat efficiency, and personalities. THIS REPORT PARTIALLY SATISFIES REQUIREMENTS OF GUN BOAT ICP. 1. (C) Background Information: a. Name: NGUYEN XUAN KHAI (NGUYEENX, XUAAN KHAI), CMIC 3306-70 b. Rank: PFC c. Position and Unit of Assignment: Ammunition-bearer; 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, C-2 Co, 16th AA Bn, 75th Arty Gp d. DPOB: 1933; XUAN LY Hamlet, XUAN TRUONG Village, THO XUAN District, THANH HOA Province, NVN 16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: DIA 1 cy DIRNSA 1 cy SAC 1 cy CINPAC 1 cy CINPAC AF 2 cys CINCUSARPAC 2 cys COMUSMACTHAI 1 cy MACJ212-2 2 cys MACJ213-1 1 cy MACJ23 1 cy MACJ231 1 cy 17. DOWNGRADING DATA: GROUP 3 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED THIS DOCUMENT IS RELEASEABLE TO REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES GOC 18: ATTACHMENT DATA: None PAGE 2 of 10 e. Parents's Names: Father, NGUYEN VAN BAT (NGUYEENX, VEAN BATS), deceased; Mother, MAI THI LOAN (MAI, THIV LOAN), deceased f. Circumstances of Capture. Source was captured by an unidentified ARVN unit, (vic XT058950), SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA, on 23 Dec 70, after his company and the 1st Bn, 38th NVA Regt, ambushed an ARVN convoy. Source had one box (50 rounds) of 12.7mm rounds in his possession when captured. g. Significant Activities: (1) 1945 to Feb 70. From 1945 to 1952, Source studied at his POB. He became a farmer, married, and had two children. Source was drafted in Feb 69, and was assigned to the 4th Sqd, 10th Plat, 3rd Co, 1st Inf Bn, 1st Regt, 338th Div, MR-III, NVN. During Feb and Mar 69, the battalion built a base camp for its headquarters at THANH LONG Village, THACH THANH District, THANH HOA Province, NVN. In Apr 69, the battalion was sent to the CHU River in THANH HOA Province for about 25 days to build dikes for flood control. The battalion returned to its base camp and started basic training in late Apr 69. On 29 Sep 69, after five months of basic and infiltration training, the battalion began infiltration to the RVN and arrived at the K-31 Commo-liaison Station at an unknown location in CAMBODIA in late Jan 70. (2) Feb 70 to Dec 70. In early Feb 70, Source was assigned to the 6th Sqd, 2d Plat, 3rd Co, 24th AA Bn, WS-1, as an ammunition-bearer. Late in Mar 70, Worksite 1 disbanded and became part of Worksite 9 and Source was reassigned to the 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, 2d Co, 16th Bn, 75th Gp, COSVN. From Apr to Aug 70, the 2d Company was inactive because of increased Allied operations within the battalion area of operations. In mid-Sep 70, the 16th AA Battalion was given the mission of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment. On 23 Dec 70, after participating in an ambush of an ARVN convoy in SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA, Source was captured by members of the ambushed unit. h. Additional References: CMIC PW/Rallier Exploitation Guide; War Material Used by the Viet Cong in South VIETNAM or Presumably Available to North VIETNAM, J-2, MACV; Weapons and Equipment Recognition Guide, DA Pam 381-10; Identification Guide, USAREUR Pam 30-60-1; Map CAMBODIA, AMS Series L7016, Sheets 6132 II, 6132 III, Edition 1, dtd 1965, Scale 1:100,000; EEI of 29 Dec 70 2. (C) OB of 16th Battalion: a. Unit History. In Feb 70, Source was assigned to the 24th AA Battalion, Worksite 1. Late in Mar 70, Worksite 1 dissolved and became part of Worksite 9, and Source was reassigned to the 2d Co, 16th Bn, 75th Gp, COSVN. When source joined the 16th Battalion, it was composed of three artillery companies and a headquarters section. Source had no further knowledge concerning unit history: PAGE 3 of 10 b. Misison. On or about mid-Sep 70, the 16th Battalion was given the mission of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment (aka HOC MON Regiment), Worksite 7. The area of operations for the 16th Battalion in Sep and Oct 70 was from DAM BE Junction to COC CHA, along Highway No 2 in CAMBODIA. In Dec 70, the area of operations changed to ROMEAS HEK District, SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA. Source did not have any knowledge of future plans for the 16th Battalion. c. Composition: (1) Identification of Unit: (a) Name/Numerical Designation: 16th AA Battalion (b) Code Names/Cover NumBers: Unknown (c) Type of Unit: Artillery (d) LBNs: 8655OYK (e) Echelon/Size: Battalion (f) Date of Unit Designation: Unknown (g) Previous Designation: Unknown (h) Method Used to Select Unit Designation: Unknown (2) Parent Unit: (a) Name/Numerical Designation: 75th Artillery Group (b) Code Names/Cover Numbers: BIEN HOA Artillery Group (c) Type of Unit: Artillery (d) LBNs: Unknown (e) Echelon/Size: Source estimated the size to be larger than a regiment, but he was not certain if it was full division-size or not. (f) Date of Unit Designation: Unknown (g) Previous Designation: Unknown (h) Method Used to Select Unit Designtion: Unknown (3) Organization. The 16th AA Battalion had three artillery companies, designated C-1 through C-3, and a headquarters section, which had an undesignated reconnaissance/liaison squad. Each company had two platoons, designated B-1 and B-2; each platoon had two squads, PAGE 4 of 10 designated A-1 and A-4 in each company; and each squad had four cells, designated 1 through 4. Source thought the 75th Artillery Group had at least two additional artillery battalions, one armed with an unknown number of 120mm and 82mm mortars, and one armed with an unknown number of recoilless rifles of unknown caliber. d. Disposition of Unit: (1) Location. On 23 Dec 70, the 16th Battalion Headquarters was located in QUAN PHU District, TAY NINH Province, RVN, aproximately 18 to 20 kilometers west of KATUM City and approximately nine to 10 kilometers south of KHDAR City, MEMOT District, KOMPONG CHAM Province, CAMBODIA (Interrogator's Note: Map sheet 6232 II, Series L607, Scale 1:100,000 was used to determine this approximate location). C-1 and C-3 Companies of the 16th Battalion (C-2 Company was at the site of the ARVN Convoy ambush at this time), two infantry battalions of the 38th NVA Regiment, two artillery battalions, and an unknown number of support companies from the 75th Artillery Group were also at the camp at this location. The 16th Battalion moved to this camp on or about 21 Dec 70. Source did not know how long the 16th Battalion would stay there. The previous location of the 16th Battalion was approximately three kilometers north of KHCHEAY City, MEMOT District, KOMPONG CHAM Province, CAMBODIA, in the vicinity of (XU400103), where the battalion had had a base camp. The city of KHCHEAY (vic XU396072) was used by the 75th Artillery Group as a meeting/rallying point. The 16th Batalion had utilized the base camp area north of KHCHEAY City from May or Jun 70 until 21 Dec 70. (2) Base Camp Security. The combined units' base camp in QUAN PHU District, TAY NINH Province, RVN, utilized the following security procedures. The perimeter was approximately two kilometers and was roughly in the shape of a circle with the 38 th Regimental Headquarters located in the center. Source did not visit the regimental headquarters, so he could not provide a description of the security measures employed by it. The three companies of the 16th Battalion camped in aa triangular formation with battalion headquarters located in the center and approximately 10 minutes' walk from each company. The size of the 16th Battalion base camp area was unknown to Source. Each company posted one guard, armed with an AK-47 with a basic load of 100 rounds, in the company areas. These guards were stationery, were rotated hourly, and were maintained 24 hours a day. For additional security, each company sent out a three-man patrol, armed with AK-47s with basic loads of 100 rounds. Each patrol went on duty at 0800 hours. The patrols marched about the company perimeters, which usually took 30 minutes. If no enemy activity was spotted, the patrols then rested until 1200 hours, whereupon they made one more trek about the perimeters. Again, if no activity was noted, they then rested until 1500, at which time they went off duty. The men for the patrols changed daily. The 16th Battalion had utilized the same security precautions when in their old base camp, PAGE 5 of 10 north of KHCHEAY City. There were no warning devices, mines, or booby traps around or near either base camp. (3) Unit Facilities. At both base camps, the personnel of the 16th Battalion lived in an unknown number of three-man foxholes measuring (2.5m x 1.8m x 1.2m). There had been a small stream running through the old base camp in CAMBODIA but in the camp in the RVN each company utilized a well. The three wells had been dug by an unknown unit that had previously been in the area. The wells appeared to be 18 to 24 months old. The personnel placed their artillery pieces inside the foxholes to protect them from the elements. They cleaned the weapons daily. e. Strength of Unit: (1) Personnel. Source estimated the 16th Battalion to have approximately 300 men. C-2 Company had approximately 80, and Source estimated the strengths of C-1 and C-3 to be about the same. Source's company, C-2, was 100 percent NVA. (2) Personnel Losses. In May 70, in the V-41 Area (exact location unknown), CB/RVN border area, the C-2 Company suffered three killed, four wounded, and 10 missing in action, when attacked by an ARVN/US armored element. In Aug 70, while in the KHCHEAY area, CAMBODIA, the C-2 Company suffered 18 to 19 killed and 10 to 11 wounded as result of a B-52 attack. Source was not knowledgeable about losses of the other companies. (3) Personnel Replacements. In late Nov 70, the C-2 Company received approximately 30 newly-arrived infiltrators as replacements. Source did not think the battalion was expecting any more replacements. f. Weapons and Ammunition. The 16th Battalion and the following weapons, all of which were in fair to old condition: Quantity Type Basic Load 12 12.7mm HMG 500 Seven B-40 ATGL Five or Six Six RPD 300 44 to 48 AK-47 100 10 K-54 Unknown In Aug 70, a B-52 strike damaged two 12.7mm HMGs and destroyed 1000 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition. The 82nd Rear Service Unit (NFI) obtained two new 12.7mm HMGs for the battalion in about two weeks. g. Equipment. The 16th Battalion had the following equipment, PAGE 6 OF 10 origins unknown, and all in old condition, except the picks, which were issued in May 70: Quantity (approximate) Type 24 Picks 72 Shovels 24 Saws 12 Machetes Three Compasses Individual equipment of the personel included the following equipment, all of which was in old condition: One Ammunition belt (USSR/COMMUNIST CHINA) One Canteen (COMMUNIST CHINA/USA) One or two Grenades (COMMUNIST CHINA) One Field pack (unknown) One Cotton uniform, green (NVN) One pair Rubber sandals (VC/NVA) One Cotton bandage (unknown) One Nylon protective mask (VC) Numerous small items of indivdual equipment had been lost over the past two years; however, Source did not know why none of it was ever replaced. h. Unit Logistics: (1) Weapons and Equipment. The 16th Battalion was adequately equipped with weapons, the majority of which were old but still reliable. The battalion needed more picks and shovels. When Source was with the battalion, each squad had two picks and six shovels. (2) Resupply of Ammunition. The procedure for the resupplying of ammunition was the following. After an operation in which ammunition was expended, the executive officers of the three companies took stock of the needed ammunition and reported what they needed to the battalion chief of staff. The chief of staff reported to the 82nd Rear Service Group, who supplied the battalion with the needed amounts. Delivery time ranged from five days to two weeks. PAGE 7 of 10 (3) Adequacy of Medical Support. Source thought the 16th Battalion utilized the K-71 Hospital, located somewhere in KOMPONG CHAM Province, near the CB/RVN border. That hospital was utilized for treatment of the seriously ill when the 16th Battalion supported the 38th Regiment, it utilized the regimental hospital. Source was not knowledgeable on either hospital. The 16th Battalion had one medical technician and each company had three medics. Source felt all the medical personnel were inadequately equipped. He thought the technician had one stethoscope, plus other small items. The company medics had small quantities of quinine tablets and rolls of bandages. Wounded personnel were transported in hammocks. (4) Rations. At the beginning of each month, the battalion adjutant issued unknown amounts of money to the company adjutants. Source thought the amount to be three riels per soldier per day. The money was retained by the company adjutants who used it to purchase pigs, dried fish, and peanuts, from any nearby villagers. The 82nd Rear Service Group issued enough rice two or three times a month so that each man could have 600 grams per day. Wild vegetables were picked in the jungles. The pork was fresh, the dried fish retained its flavor, but the rice was sometimes old and mildewed. Source did not know the location of any food depots or caches. (5) Mobility. The 16th Battalion traveled on foot, carrying weapons and equipment on their backs. (6) Designation and Location of Higher Logistical Unit. Although the 82nd Rear Service Group figured extensively in the resupply of the 16th Battalion, Source had no knowledge concerning it, other than that it was supposedly located somewhere in CAMBODIA. (7) Quartermaster Supply. The battalion adjutant received uniforms from the 82nd Rear Service Group; he issued them to the company adjutants. The uniforms were issued only to men whose uniforms had become rags. i. Unit Plans. In the event of an air strike, two 12.7mm HMG crews of each company fired at the attacking plane(s) while the two remaining gun crews of each company took refuge in foxholes. Anti-aircraft gun crews changed daily. Although the battalion had never been attacked by ground forces, the battalion cadre had instructed the men to fight back. Source had no knowledge concerning reorganization or expansion of the 16th Battalion, nor did he have any knowledge in regard to contingency plans or plans for receiving foreign manpower assistance. j. Unit Training: (1) Military Training. When located in a base camp between operations, the 16th Battalion reviewed tactics at the squad level. These tactics were how to deliver antiaircraft fire, how to attack an outpost, and how to withdraw in the face of the enemy. There was PAGE 8 of 10 no set schedule for this review. Once amonth, first aid was reviewed at company level by the company medics. The medics instructed the men on proper bandaging of wounds. (2) Political Training. Source had political training only three times with the 16th Battalion. The first time (dates unknown), the company political officer lectured Source's company upon the situation in the RVN and the worthiness of the VC/NVA cause. The second time, the history of the 75th Artillery Group was discussed by the company political officer. On the third and last occasion, the history of the Vietnamese people's struggles against FRANCE was discussed by the company political officer. (3) Physical Training. Immediately upon rising in the morning, squad leaders led their squads through 15 minutes of physical training. (4) Weapons Training. Approximately 20 days of each month were given over to review of special weapons training. The review consisted of assembly, disassembly, and cleaning of all 12.7mm HMGs. Practice was also given in aiming. The review was conducted at squad level and lasted from 0700 to 1100 hours and from 1330 to 1630 hours. k. Combat Efficiency: (1) Combat Experience. About mid-Sep 70, the 16th Battalion was given the mission of supporting the 38th NVA Infantry Regiment in an ambush against Allied vehicles on Highway No2, near COC CHA Village, CAMBODIA (exact location unknown). The 16th Battalion prepared trenches and foxholes; hoever, the attack never took place because no Allied units showed up. The two units relocated back to their former base camps. On 18 Dec 70, the 16th Battalion and the 38th Regiment assembled at KHCHEAY City. After five nights of traveling, the units reached a new ambush site on Highway No78 (referred to by Source as Highway 22) in ROMEAS HEK District, SVAY RIENG Province, CAMBODIA, in the viciniity of (XT052950). On 23 Dec 70, the 1st Bn, 38th Regt; the 2d co, 16th Bn; and one squad each from two unidentified artillery battalions attacked an ARVN convoy. Source was captured after his squad's 12.7mm HMG jammed. The outcome of this attack was not know to Source. (2) Morale. Approximately 50 percent of the 16th Battalion had low morale, due to being tired of fighting and being homesick. The remaining 50 percent had fair morale. Morale was never high because of the sometimes lack of rations, the high malaria rate, and the shortages of medicine and equipment. Source's morale while with the unit was low because he wanted badly to return to his family in NVN. 1. Personalities. Source provided information on the following personalities: 16th Battalion: (ranks unknown unless indicated) PAGE 9 of 10 CO: CPT TUNG (TUNGL); age 40, 1.60m, 50kg, light complexion XO: CPT TUYN (TUYN) ; age 42, 1.50m, 50kg, dark complexion PO: LT BON (BOONL); age 41, 1.55m, 50kg, light complexion CofS: LT GIOI (JOWIS); age 36, 1.53m, 40 kg, light complexion Medical Technician: MUI (MUIL); age 30, 1.60m, 60 kg, dark complexion Adj: TUAN (TUAAN); age 40, 1.60m, 55kg, light complexion 2d company, 16th Battalion: CO: LT MUU (MUWU); age 28, 1.60m, 48kg, dark complexion XO: LIEN (LIEEN); age 27, 1.55m, 50kg, light complexion PO: LT HOA (HOA); age 30, 1.55m, 54kg, light complexion Asst PO: PHONG (FONG); age 31, 1.50m, 52kg, light complexion Medic: SAM (SEAMS); age 22, 1.50m, 50kg, light complexion Medic: SU (SUWL); age 21, 1.60m, 50kg, light complexion Medic: BAY (BAYR); age 19, 1.45m, 46kg, light complexion (C) COMMENTS: Source was cooperative and often volunteered informatIon. He answered control questions consistently. Source scored Average (19) on the Cross-Cultural IQ Test. PAGE 10 OF 10 Organizational Chart of the 16th AA Battalion, as provided by captive NGUYEN XUAN KHAI, CMIC 3306-70 (DOI: 23 Dec 70) [NETWORK NOTE: a copy of the ORGANIZATIONAL CHART is available - call or write using the file number 0150 71.]