[0148-72.CM 04/14/96]

[NETWORK NOTE: This document was scanned and retyped to make it an ASCII
file. The Block format of a USG document was altered to just "text")


NUMBER NIYD 96F002, BY  RB/VSW, DATE 2/16/96

Note: This Document contains information affecting the national defense of
the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws. Title 18,
U.S.C., Sec 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.


This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should
not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
                                                        [RAND STAMPED

1.  Country: VS

2.  Subject: (U) Air Defense Tactics

3.  ISC Number 681.560   681.740
               681.580   744.102
               681.605   744.510

4.  Date of Information: 1968 to 1970

5.  Place and Date of Acq: CMIC, SAIGON, VS 18 Oct 71

6.  Evaluation Source F Information 6

7.  Source: Returnee Interrogation

8.  Report Number: 6 029 0148 72

9.  Date of Report: 20 Apr 72

10.  No. of Pages: 7                                                         

11.  References: DIRM: 1H2f, 1H2h, 4E1e2, 4E1h1,
                       4E1h3, 4E1h4 SICR: A-IEB-49017

12.  Originator: US Element, CMIC, USMACV

13.  Prepared by: TARLTON H. BAILEY,
                  SP 4, USA

14.  Approving Authority: DAVID L. PEMBERTON
                          LTC, USA
                          Dir, US Elm, CMIC

15.  Summary: (C) This report is a translation of ARVN Interrogation
Report No 5211/TTTVHH/BT, dtd 10 Dec 71, and contains information
concerning air defense tactics used by VC units in the RVN and CAMBODIA.
This information includes countermeasures against heliborne troops, air
observation, jet fighters, helicopter gunships, AC-47 airplaines, B-52
airplanes, and recommended methods to combat VC heliborne tactic
countermeasures (SICR A-IEB-49017) QUOTE:

A.  Source:


b.  VC Position: Asst Plat Ldr of the 1st Plat, 325B Co, AN GIANG Province

c.  Date and Place of Return: Source surrendered on 12 Jun 71 at KHANH
BINH Village, CHAU PHU District, CHAU DOC Province.

    DIA                    1 cy
    DIRNSA                 1 cy
    SAC                    1 cy
    CINPAC                 1 cy
    CINPAC AF              2 cys
    CINCUSARPAC            2 cys
    COMUSMACTHAI           1 cy
    MACJ212-2              2 cys
    MACJ213-1              1 cy
    MACJ23                 1 cy
    MACJ231               10 cys



                                                           page 2 of 7

d.  Weapons and Documents Seized: None

e.  Date and Place of Evacuation: He was evacuated from NCHC to CMIC on 19
Oct 71

B.  Information:

1.  Countermeasured Taken Against ARVN Airstrikes and Heliborne Tactics:

a.  Troop Disposition: The 385B Organic Mobile Company, AN GIANG Province
Unit, often camped in undergrowth while on operations in CAMBODIA.
Shelters were dug according to the Korean type; (see overlay page 6)
therefore, they could not be destroyed by an exploding bomb or artillery
shell, or be crushed by an M-113 APC.  The VC always applied the rule of
concentrating heavy weapons and splitting up the assault when setting up a
camp site.  At the camp sites, heavy and light machineguns were always
placed at the corners of the site in the undergrowth.  The distance from
the assault line to the unit headquarters was 100 meters.  Shelters were
usually not over 50 meters apart depending on terrain features.  At the
headquarters, which ws an artillery element (see overlay page 7) there
were three 82mm mortars and two 12.8mm heavy machine guns to support the
assault team.  The heavy weapons were concentrated on the side considered
most vulnerable to attack.

b.  Countering Heliborne Troops: When the helicopters dropped troops, the
unit immediately positioned itself.  The VC concentrated their heavy
weapons fire in the direction of the ARVN troops attached in order pin
them down.  A number of VC troops in the rear withdrew from position, cut
through the jungle in a 100 meter circle to attack the ARVN troops in
their rear.  If the enemy withdrew, the engaging wing opened fire to pin
the enemy down and allow the 82mm mortars to shell the enemy position.

c.  Countering Air Observation.  The VC were not afraid of air observation
because they had Korean type shelters which were difficult for observation
planes to spot.  Every two days the shelters were camouflaged with new
vegetation.  When moving in open fields, the troops lay down if an
airplane engine ws heard, so they would be difficult to discover.  In the
jungles they had to take shelter at the foot of trees.

d.  Countering Jet Fighters.  When attached by jet fighters, it was
necessary to take shelter.  According to Source, the attacks conducted by
jet fighters were ineffective because they flew too fast.  Source's unit
was exposed to jet fighter attacks several times, but suffered no losses.

e.  Countering Helicopter Gunships.  Source's unit was afraid of HUEY,
COBRA, and OHGA helicopters because they fired profusely and accurately,
but his unit seldom encountered these types of helicopters.

f.  Countering AC-47 Airplanes.  Source explained that this airplane was
not dangerous, because its rounds could be seen after

                                                        page 3 of 7

they were fired; theerfore, the VC could find a way to escape.  Source
said that the VC were happy to see this airplane releasing flares, because
they could recover the fallen parachutes and sell them later.  Sometimes
they got 5.000$ or 6.000$ RVN in one night from the sale of these

g.  Countering B-52 Airplanes.  Source said that when B-52s bombed his
unit, the damages suffered were usually caused by the first series of
bombs.  If the first series of bombs caused no damage to the unit, the
following series were not dangerous.  Normally every five minutes the
B-52s released a series of bombs.  In VIETNAM the bomber attacks occurred
at 45 minute intervals.  In CAMBODIA the interval between attacks was 60
minutes.  Source disclosed that the Division Technical Office of the MR
normally in formed the units of the B-52 raids from six to ten hours in
advance.  Sometimes no airplanes came, although the unit had been informed
they were coming.  Source's unit received the above information by an
AN/PRC-25 radio.  Besides informing them of the B-52 raids, the Technical
Office also informed the VC units of ARVN operations.

2.  Comments on ARVN Heliborne Tactics:

a.  Strong and Weal Points of Heliborne Tactics.  The VC were afraid of
heliborne tactics because they could not determine very far in advance
where they would attack.  Although the VC units tried to avoid encounters,
they were frequently forced to engage in such fights.  Source stated the
heliborne operations rarely gained satisfactory results, because the VC
could prepare for them shortly before the troops were landed.  The main
indicator that an attack was imminent was observation aircraft circling
overh ead.  When observation aircraft circled their position, the VC split
its forces and dug fortifications.  The VC leaders realized the imminence
of heliborne troops landing and ordered the units to position themselves
for ground fighting.  Jet fighters and helicopter gunships usually bombed
before landing ARVN troops.  Because of this action, the ARVN troops lost
the advantage of surprise.

b.  Recommended Countermeasures.  In Source's opinion when desiring to
make use of the surprise factor the ARVN troops first need to determine
the objective when informed of a VC unit's location.  If necessary, an
observation airplane could briefly fly over the objective to make a check;
however, no attack should be launched.  The next day ARVN troops should be
quickly dropped from helicopters for action.  In this context the ARVN is
advised to employ raid or surprise tactics to break up the VC defense syst

(1) Raid Tactics With Overwhelming Force.  When familiarized with the
location of a VC troop cantonment, helicopters should divide into four
wings.  One wing should quickly drop troops 500 meters in front of the
enemy's line.  The attacking force should be divided into two groups,
advancing in V-shaped formations and should attack the VC defense line
directly.  The remaining elements should he landed on both sides and await
the correct moment to open fire.  Helicopters should drop another element
in the cen ter of the enemy troop canonment because

                                                        page 4 of 7

Source said that during battle the VC assault force would move to the
combat line, but the heavy weapons and headquarters elements would remain
at the center of the cantonment.  When the ARVN troops land heavy weapons
could not be used.  The troops landing in the center would be able to
occupy the objective easier.  When the central element overruns the
headquarters it could begin to cut across to link up with the groups
positioned on either side of the cantonment.

(2) Raid Tactics: If ARVN troops did not know the position of the heavy
weapons in the VC cantonment, they could employ surprise raids.  The
troops should be dropped two kilometers from VC positions and divided into
four wings.  When approaching, each wing should only send out one squad or
one platoon which should move in the front position to probe the
situation.  As the probing element opens fire, the major element of the
wing should provide reinforcements without interrupting the firing action.
Actually , the resistance the ARVN troops would encounter would only
consist of a group of mobile security guards who only resist for five
minutes before withdrawing to their defense lines; if the ARVN troops stop
firing, then these security guards have time to replace their magazines
and continue to pin down the ARVN forces.  If the ARVN forces hold these
security guards, the VC defense line is forced to open fire in support,
and the ARVN forces can locate the VC heavy weapons.  At the same moment,
the thr ee other wings should also emply themselves in the same way to
detect the other enemy heavy weapons.  When all enemy heavy weapons have
been located and it has been determined on which side these weapons are
concentrated, air force or artillery units could be called up to support
the attack.  This method of support would be more effective.  The surprise
raid tactics employed against the VC units require troops qualified in
combat.  During the operations occuring from 1968 to the end of 1970, ARVN
tr oops frequently t urned around when encountering the VC resistance
force.  Then, the ARVN troops set up fortifications and called aircraft or
artillery units to shell the VC units.  In this way, while the ARVN troops
withdrew, the VC were capable of maintaining enough resistance with only a
squad to prevent the ARVN troop advancement.  Meanwhile, the VC determined
the ARVN objective and resupplied ammunition.  When the ARVN troops
resumed the advance they still faced resistance and suffered casualties.
The ARVN troops usual ly suffered losses under these circumstances.
Source stated that the rules of combat in his unit were as follows: from
0800 to 1000 hours it would fight fiercely to drive the enemy away from
the line of defense.  Then the fighting would decrease from 1000 to 1700
hours.  If the VC were still surrounded by ARVN troops, they would
centralize the heavy weapons to launch an offensive from 2000 to 2100
hours against one side, and then the whole unit would move away.  Source
said he was in several battles of that type and that his unit escaped

(3) Comments on the bombs used by ARVN jet fighters.  Source and his unit
were only afraid of CBU and napalm bombs used by ARVN jet fighters.  The
CBU bombs had quite violent effects, because it contained large amounts of
shrapnel and it exploded above the ground.  Source's unit also feared
napalm bombs.  The VC were not concerned about the bombs if they weighed
250 kilograms or more because those page 5 of 7 bombs seldom harmed the VC
troops under cover in their Korean type shelters.  Source said that if the
air force intends to successfully support combat units, it should use CBU
and napalm bombs rather than big bombs.

(4) How to Salvage and Utilize Unexploded Bombs:

a.  Unexploded Bombs: The AN GIANG Province Unit Technical Team recovered
and dismantled unexploded bombs and removed the contents in order to make
mines and grenades (details unknown).

b.  CBU Bomb: The technical teams produced two kinds of mines from
unexploded CBU bombs.

1.  Above Ground Boobytraps.  The bomb was salvaged and kept intact, but
the ignition device and the spring were replaced prior to setting it as a
booby trap.  The bomb was placed above ground, camouflaged, and armed with
a stretched cord.

2.  Underground Mines: The bomb was left intact.  The ignition device was
checked to see if it were operable, and then the bomb was buried.  The
ignition device was placed under a camouflaged wooden plank.  Anyone
stepping on the plank would detonate the bomb.

D.  CMIC COMMENTS: Source was in good physical condition and had a
cooperative attitude.  The information furnished had valuable and useful
details needed for the documentation of the VA air defense tactics.  In
regard to Source's suggesting the ARVN heliborne troops land inside the
enemy cantonment, it was found that although ARVN troops gain the
advantage of surprise and a quick storming into the enemy's central
position avoids many of the casualties caused by heavy anticraft weapons,
our aircraft and lan ding troops would then become easy targets for the
VC's B-40s, AK-47s, and CKC rifles.  When using the above tactics we
should possess the correct intelligence; that means knowing the
disposition of enemy troops and knowing the point to land heliborne
troops.  Otherwise, we would be completely annihilated.  This combat
method might be employed under exceptional circumstances.  A repetition of
the tactic might allow the enemy to know our operating procedures and they
could plan an effect ive countermeasure. Unquote.

                                                               page 6 of 7

A sketch of the "KOREA' Shelters

[NETWORK NOTE: a copy of the SKETCH OF THE "KOREA' Shelters
is available - call or write using the file number 0148-72.]

                                                                page 7 of 7

Position of 385B Company in AN GIANG Province Unit

[NETWORK NOTE: a copy of the  SKETCH OF THE POSITION OF 385B Comapnay
is available - call or write using the file number 0148-72.]