Reproduced at the National Archives
DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT
NUMBER NND 93759f, RB/VSW, DATE 1/23/96
Bulletin No. 8186
CDEC
Log No. Summary Capture Data
11-2480-67 11 Nov 67
(8 page YS602865
original, A/7/RAR,9 1st
typewritten.) ATF.
Received CDEC.
(B) 27 Nov 67
(CONFIDENTIAL)
POW handling procedures by MR 1.
(C) A study dated 13 Sep 669 prepared by the
Enemy Proselyting Sec/Political Staff of "T"
[probable MR 1], addressed to the 800th Bn
[probably Dong Nai Bn, MR 1] and to various "U"
[Prov] provides detailed analysis of the US
servicemen's morale and ideology as well as methods
and procedures to be applied for the capture and
evacuation of US POW's. Document first outlines the
state of mind and social status of each of the
various categories of US military personnel, i.e.
the Officer, the NCO and EM, prior to their
enlistment. Also pointed out are the common
reactions shown by these people once taken prisoner
by the VC. It was asserted that, by and large, US
officers originated from "wealthy" or "influential"
families of the American society' and as such they
are often class-conscious and generally endowed
with innate anti-communist outlooks. Indications
were that many US officers held by the VC as POW's
just showed contempt toward their captors and
often refused to supply answers to their
interrogations. Some even attempted to snatch
weapons from the VC or resorted to bribery or
cajolery to escape. The US NCO, document adds, is
characterised by a mechanical obedience to his
superior's orders for the sake of promotion and
money, where as most of the enlisted personnel
were initially draftees who had been
"contaminated" by erroneous indoctrination hence
becoming strictly law-abiding.
It was noted that although a fairly high
number of US "advisors" have been thus far captured
in action, the bulk of VC cadre and soldiers still
failed to realize how important an asset US POW's
represent to the VC struggle as far as political
and diplomatic issues are concerned. Due to an
attitude of balking at difficulties and hardships,
VC servicemen often preferred to kill their enemies
rather than to capture them alive, even in case
such an opportunity occursed. This practice has led
commanders of many [VC] regular units to place
greater emphasis on the necessity of capturing US
POW's. As a result, specific plans have been
worked out for this purpose. High lights of these
plans are as follows:
- Additional training will be imparted to VC
cadre and soldiers so as to acquaint them with the
political implications derived from the number of
US POW's captured, Besides, VC personnel should be
encouraged to learn common English phrases.
- A POW evacuation element will be organized
within each unit. This element will fight as any
other combat
3
elements until the time the battle is over.
Then, this element will manage to evacuate the
captives to a prearranged location where orders
will be given through interpreters.
- During the assault of a battle, the men will
shout various commands in English such as "Gun
down" or "Hands up" in an attempt to intimidate the
"enemies". Subsequently, the men from the assault
element will direct the [Allied] soldiers who have
been captured in the process to move the "rear" where
the evacuation team will take care of them. In case
Allied reinforcements arrive at the tattle area, every
effort will be made to force the POW's to run away
at gun point.
Document further specifies that no attempt
will be made to capture seriously injured
soldiers, unless these people appear to be able
to yield vital information or to become fruitful
for eventual political or diplomatic issues.
Document also discloses that due to inadequate
surveillance, a number of POW's had succeeded in
escaping from Binh Gia and Ba Ria [Prov in MR 1].
Document deems it vital to equip evacuation
elements with an adequate number of weapons in
order to preclude such mishaps. As a general rule,
during daytime the POW's hands should be tied and
their eyes covered [during movement]. At night
time, their feet should also be tied.
Also included is a listing of ranks in the US
Army from PVT to Col and a few samples of service
numbers for the purpose of distinguishing
officers from enlisted personnel.
(U) CDEC COMMENTS: No Further Significant Information.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
(signed Edward Spankaski for)
TOSHIO NAKANISHI
LTC GS
Dir, US Elm, CDEC