Reproduced at the National Archives
NUMBER NND 93759f, RB/VSW, DATE 1/23/96

Bulletin No. 8186

Log No.         Summary                                         Capture Data
11-2480-67                                                      11 Nov 67
(8 page                                                         YS602865
original,                                                       A/7/RAR,9 1st
typewritten.)                                                   ATF.
                                                                Received CDEC.
    (B)                                                         27 Nov 67
            POW handling procedures by MR 1.

                (C) A study dated 13 Sep 669 prepared by the
            Enemy Proselyting Sec/Political Staff of "T"
            [probable MR 1], addressed to the 800th Bn
            [probably Dong Nai Bn, MR 1] and to various "U"
            [Prov] provides detailed analysis of the US
            servicemen's morale and ideology as well as methods
            and procedures to be applied for the capture and
            evacuation of US POW's. Document first outlines the
            state of mind and social status of each of the
            various categories of US military personnel, i.e.
            the Officer, the NCO and EM, prior to their
            enlistment. Also pointed out are the common
            reactions shown by these people once taken prisoner
            by the VC. It was asserted that, by and large, US
            officers originated from "wealthy" or "influential"
            families of the American society' and as such they
            are often class-conscious and generally endowed
            with innate anti-communist outlooks. Indications
            were that many US officers held by the VC as POW's
            just  showed contempt toward their captors and
            often  refused to supply answers to their
            interrogations.  Some even attempted to snatch
            weapons from the VC  or resorted to bribery or
            cajolery to escape. The  US NCO, document adds, is
            characterised by a mechanical obedience to his
            superior's orders for the sake of promotion and
            money, where as most of the enlisted personnel
            were initially draftees who had been
            "contaminated" by erroneous indoctrination  hence
            becoming strictly law-abiding.
                It was noted that although a fairly high
            number of US "advisors" have been thus far captured
            in action, the bulk of VC cadre and soldiers still
            failed to realize how important an asset US POW's
            represent to the VC struggle as far as political
            and diplomatic issues are concerned. Due to an
            attitude of balking at difficulties and hardships,
            VC servicemen often preferred to kill their enemies
            rather than to capture them alive, even in case
            such an opportunity occursed. This practice has led
            commanders of many [VC] regular units   to place
            greater emphasis on the necessity of capturing US
            POW's. As a result, specific plans have been
            worked out for this purpose. High lights of these
            plans are as follows:
                - Additional training will be imparted to VC
            cadre and soldiers so as to acquaint them with the
            political implications derived from the number of
            US POW's captured, Besides, VC personnel should be
            encouraged to learn common English phrases.
                - A POW evacuation element will be organized
            within each unit. This element will fight as any
            other combat
            elements until the time the battle is over.
            Then, this element will manage to evacuate the
            captives to a prearranged location where orders
            will be given through interpreters.
                - During the assault of a battle, the men will
            shout various commands in English such as "Gun
            down" or "Hands up" in an attempt to intimidate the
            "enemies". Subsequently, the men from the assault
            element will direct the [Allied] soldiers who have
            been captured in the process to move the "rear" where
            the evacuation team will take care of them. In case
            Allied reinforcements arrive at the tattle area, every
            effort will be made to force the POW's to run away
            at gun point.
                Document further specifies that no attempt
            will be made to capture seriously injured
            soldiers, unless these people appear to be able
            to yield vital information or to become fruitful
            for eventual political or diplomatic issues.
                Document also discloses that due to inadequate
            surveillance, a number of POW's had succeeded in
            escaping from Binh Gia and Ba Ria [Prov in MR 1].
            Document deems it vital to equip evacuation
            elements with an adequate number of weapons in
            order to preclude such mishaps. As a general rule,
            during daytime the POW's hands should be tied and
            their eyes covered [during movement]. At night
            time, their feet should also be tied.
                Also included is a listing of ranks in the US
            Army from PVT to Col and a few samples of service
            numbers for the purpose of distinguishing
            officers from enlisted personnel.
            (U) CDEC COMMENTS: No Further Significant Information.
                                        (signed Edward Spankaski for)
                                            TOSHIO NAKANISHI
                                            LTC           GS
                                            Dir, US Elm, CDEC