Data Sources - Air Force Manual No. 200-25A, Department of the Air Force, Washington, October 16, 1961 page 1. Sanitized copy. National Archives KOREAN Conflict Casualty File (KCCF) 1950-1954.

03/92 -- Korea, and the men yet to be accounted for -- the "official list" -- is a list of U.S. servicemen known to have been held as prisoners of war by the red Chinese and North Koreans from the Korean War but not released or accounted for by the communists, as released on May 27, 1957 at a hearing of the House Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific by the Department of Defense.

The lists, the printed minutes of the May 27, 1957 hearing and the "sense of congress" resolution were subsequently buried in the archives. The original list had 450 names compiled from American POWS who were repatriated by the Reds, as well as from photographs released by the Reds, Chinese radio propaganda broadcasts, and letters written home by captured men. The "revised" list was narrowed down in august of 1961 to 389 men, and all were arbitrarily declared dead by the military services, the USG still lists them as "unaccounted for".

Names and ranks only were released at the time, and printed in "The Spotlight" on August 27, 1979, along with the above information and background. Further information has been compiled by the P.O.W. Network from the Hawaii POW/MIA Korean Memorial records, National Archives documentation, and public United States Air Force documentation, and changes made to the original published information. (FEBRUARY 1992)

Louis Bermann is listed on the "HONOR ROLL OF FORGOTTEN AMERICANS" yet is noted as having died "while missing" by the National Archive.

This study was prepared by Mr. Peter G. Tsouras, DAC Major Werner Saemler
Hindrichs, USAF Master Sergeant Danz F. H. Blasser, USAF with the assistance
of Second Lieutenant Timothy R. Lewis, USAF Mr. Paul H. Vivian, DAC Staff
Sergeant Linda R. H. Pierce, USA Sergeant Gregory N. Vukin, USA

This study is to be used for internal use only. It contains subjective
evaluations, opinions, and recommendations concerning on-going analysis that
may impact future U.S. foreign policy decisions. This document has not yet
been finalized for public release.

U.S. Korean War
POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union and never repatriated.

This transfer was a highly secret MGB program approved by the inner circle
of the Stalinist dictatorship.

It is possible that Stalin, given his positive experience with Axis POWs,
viewed U.S. POWs as potentially lucrative hostages.

The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs
in the GULAG is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it.

The Soviet 64th. Fighter Aviation Corps which supported the North Korean and
Chinese forces in the Korean War had an important intelligence collection
mission that included the collection, selection and interrogation of POWs.

A General Staff-based analytical group was assigned to the Far East Military
district and conducted extensive interrogations of U.S. and other U.N. POWs
in Khabarovsk. This was confirmed by a distinguished retired Soviet
officer, Colonel Gavriil Korotkov, who participated in this operation. No
prisoners were repatriated who related such an experience.

Prisoners were moved by various modes of transportation. Large shipments
moved through Manchouli and Pos'yet.

Khabarovsk was the hub of a major interrogation operation directed against
U.N. POWs from Korea. Khabarovsk was also a temporary holding and
transshipment point for U.S. POWs. The MGB controlled these prisoners, but
the GRU was allowed to interrogate them.

Irkutsk and Novosibirsk were transhipment points, but the Komi ASSR an Perm
Oblast were the final destinations of many POWs. Other camps where American
POWs were held were in the Bashkir ASSR, the Kemerovo and Archangelsk
Oblasts, and the Komi-Permyatskiy and Taymyskiy National Okrugs.

POW transfers also included thousands of South Koreans, a fact confirmed by
the Soviet general officer, Kan San Kho, who served as the Deputy Chief of
the North Korean MVD.

The most highly-sought-after POWs for exploitation were F-86 pilots and
other knowledgeable of new technologies.

Living U.S. witnesses have testified that captured U.S. pilots were, on
occasion, taken directly to Soviet-staffed interrogation centers. A former
Chinese officer stated that he turned U.S. pilot POWs directly over to the
Soviets as a matter of policy.

Missing F-86 pilots, whose captivity was never acknowledged by the
Communists in Korea, were identified in recent interviews with former Soviet
intelligence officers who served in Korea. Captured F-86 aircraft were
taken to at least three Moscow aircraft design bureaus for exploitation.
Pilots accompanied the aircraft to enrich and accelerate the exploitation
process.

Part I: Technological Exploitation
The First Modern Air War
The Technology Gap
The 64th. Fighter Aviation Corps
The Soviet Interrogation Effort
The Soviet Hunt for F-86 Pilots
The 15 F-86 Pilots That Came Home
A Chinese Link in the Chain of Evidence
A Special Air Force Unit
Avraham Shifrin
The Soviet Hunt for the F-86 Sabre Jet
Sand in the Fuselage
MGB and GRU: Who Did What? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Three Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The Case of Cpt Albert Tenney, USAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Case of Roland Parks, USAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
The Case of Cpl Nick A. Flores, USMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Part II: The Hostage Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
POW Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
The Stalin - Chou En-lai Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Lieutenant General Kan San Kho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Colonel Gavril I. Korotkov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Lieutenant Colonel Delk Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
John Foster Dulles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Captain Mel Gile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
CCRAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Zygmunt Nagorski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Turkish Traveler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Sightings in the Komi ASSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Sightings in Khabarovsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Sightings in Irkutsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Sightings in Taishet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Sightings in Mordova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Sightings in Novosibirsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Sightings in the Bashkir ASSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Sightings in Norilsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Sightings in Kemerovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Sightings in Kazakh SSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Sightings in Archangesk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Patterns Among the Sightings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 51
Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
Appendices
Appendix A: How Many Men Are Truly Unaccounted For? . . . . . . . 53
Appendix B: 31 Missing USAF F086 Pilots Whose Loss Indicates
            Possible Capture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .57
Appendix C: Korean War USAF F086 Pilots Who Were Captured
            and Repatriated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix D: Outstanding Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Appendix E: Individual Sources of Information
            Cited in this Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix F: Soviet Officers Whose Names Appear On
            Interrogations of U.S. Korean War POWs . . . . . . . .76

TABLES
Table 1.    USAF Korean War Pows On Whom the Russian
            Archives Should Have Information . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2.    BNR Cases Where Death Was Witnessed by
            Repatriates or Otherwise Documented . . . . . . . . . 55

The United States lists 8,140 casualties from the Korean War whose remains
have not been repatriated. Some of that number are "truly unaccounted for"
in that there is not evidence at all as to the circumstances of their loss
or to their ultmate fate. One estimate is provided at Appendix A.

Since the Joint Commission was established, a mass of convincing evidence
has accumulated that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union in a tightly
controlled MGB operation and never repatriated.

We believe that the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union involved two
separate programs.

1. Technological Exploitation. This program was a pure intelligence
collection program for the purpose of acquiring high-tech equipment and
their operators technical exploitation. The F086 Sabre Jet was the great
prize. However, we believe that Soviet intelligence collection requirements
were not limited to the F086. There is growing evidence that other types
of aircraft, including the B-29, were also the subject of intelligence
collection.

2. The Hostage Connection. The other program was based on the collection
of POWs as hostages and for general inteligence exploitation.

These programs are discussed in Parts I and II which present our assessment
of the origins and operation of the transfers.

From the conduct of the transfer operation, we switch in Part III to the
next stage in the issue: evidence of Americans actually within the Soviet
concentration camp system. Here we discuss the mass of sightings by citizens
of the former USSR of U.S. Korean War POWs.

Note 1: Throughout this document references will be made by various quoted
sources to the primary Soviet security organ as the NKVD, the MGB, or the
KGB. All references are to the same organization and represent only an
organizational name change. At the time of the Korean War, the organization
was titled the MGB and will be referred to as such. Quotations will not be
altered where the speaker is imprecise. The MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvenoi
Bezopasnosti) was formed in March 1946 by the merging of the NKVD and the
NVD (Ministry of Internal Security). This new organization w s broken back
into its original two parts in March 1953 after Stalin's death. That part
that had been the NKVD was renamed the KGB.

Note 2: Task Force Russia was organized under the auspices of the U.S. Army
in June 1992 to support the U.S. side of the U.S. - Russian Joint Commission
on POW/MIAs. There were two elements in the Task Force: (1) The
Washington-based analytical, translation, and administrative element
(TFR-H), and (2) the Moscow-based research, interview, and liaison group
(TFR-M). In June 1993, Task Force Russia was subordinated to the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, and TFR-H was
renamed the Joint Commission Support Branch (JCSB). The Moscow-based
element will continue to be designated Task Force Russia - Moscow
(TFR-M).

Note 3: Translations of documents provided by the Russian side of the Joint
Commission were translated by TFR-H and are numbered as TFR documents, e.g.,
TFR-36, and are referred to as such in the narrative.

One of the worst-kept secrets of the Cold War was the head-to-head clash in
Korea between the two former Allies of World War II, the Soviet Union and
the United States. Although the ground war was fought essentially with the
weaponry and tactics of the new air power technologies of the postwar world.
The Korean War was the first modern air war and was characterized by an
entirely new techonology that was electronics intensive and depended not
only on the keen wits and high mastery of the pilots flying the jet combat
aircraft but on a host of advanced support activities such as air-intercept
radar and airborne reconnaissance.

This was the backdrop for an even more insidious form of warfare. The
Soviet Union cloaked its participation in the Korean War partly to conceal
its urgent need to bridge the techonological gap with the West, which was
widening geometrically even then. Based upon a precedent repeatedly
acknowledged by senior Soviet officers, which began with the wholesale
reverse engineering of the Massey-Ferguson tractor by the State Automobile
Factory in the 1930s, the Willys Jeep in the 1940s, and a variety of
propeller technology aircraft during World War II, the Soviets sought to
avert he inevitable by systemized theft of design.

The Soviet Union initiated its battlefield testing in the Korean War with
the activation of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps Headquarters in Antung:
(now Dandong), Manchuria, in November 1950, just as North Korea teetered on
the edge of destruction. The Corps was charged with a threefold mission:
(1) air defense of the area north of the 38th Parallel; (2) protection of
the trans-Yalu bridges; and (3) training of North Korean and Chinese pilots.
Analysis of documents provided by the Russian side, however, shows that the
64th had yet another mission: the management of the overt and covert Human
forces. A review of the documents provided by the Russians reveals regular
and intense coordination between Moscow, the senior advisors to the Korean
General Staff, and the Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (General
Georgii A. Lobov) on a variety of topics related to prisoner of war
interrogation and control. The gaps in this document insinuate a direct
role which the Russian side to date denies.

The air-focused Soviet priorities are perhaps best summed up by the comment
of retired Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, a veteran of the 64th, and
the chief (note above says not a chief) of intelligence for one of its
divisions. He casually dismissed the significance of ground forces
personnel with the comment that he knew more about the operations of the
American infantry battalion that a U. S. Army captain would. Orlov, himself
a captain at the time of the Korean War, then described in painstaking
details Soviet intelligence collection requirements which were focused on
aircraft technical parameters.

The Soviet interrogation effort was largely disguised. Soviet
interrogators, when present for interviews, wore Korean and Chinese uniforms
without visible rank, and in some cases were ethnic Koreans or other
oriental Soviet nationalities. One such officer is Colonel Georgii
Plotnikov, who called him self by the Korean translation of his name
Kim-Mok-Su, which means carpenter in both languages.

Most Soviet involvement was probably concentrated on the preparation and
translation of collection requirements to be filled by their North Korean
and Chinese allies. Some, however, appears to have taken place without the
Chinese and North Koreans. One such case is that of escaped POW Marine
Colonel Nick A. Flores who was mistaken for an F086 pilot when captured by
Soviet anti-aircraft troops and sent directly to Soviet interrogation at a
Soviet airbase in Antung. This case is developed in more depth at the end
of this section. Additionally, General Lobov, Commander of the 64th Fighter
Aviation Corps, has stated that at some point in the war, the Chinese and
North Koreans became somewhat less cooperative in turning over captured U.S.
POWs for interrogation. As a result, Lobov had 70 Soviet teams out looking
for shot down U.S. pilots.

According to one report, Stalin had singled out U.S. Air Force POWs to be
held as hostages.

All USAF Pows already held in the camp system were segregated from other
POWs, held in separate camps under Chinese jurisdiction on North Korean
territory, and subjected to interrogation by Chinese and Soviet personnel.
One such POW was USAF Sergeant Daniel Oldewage who has stated that he and a
number of other captured USAF NCOs were transported to Antung for
interrogation by the Chinese and the Soviets. Oldewage stated that the
Soviets were dressed in Chinese uniforms and appeared to be pilots based
upon their thorough professional understanding of air operations against the
B-29.

According to U.S. Air Force data, 1,303 USAF personnel were declared
missing for all reasons between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953. After
reclassification, this figure had been reduced to 666 whose bodies were not
recovered (BNR).

Of that number, the argument can be made from an analysis of their
circumstances of loss, that several hundred survived their crashes and were
potential candidates for transfer to the Soviet Union. There is almost
blatant evidence that this was, in eed, the case for a number of technically
proficient, well-educated, and highly-skilled pilots of the F-86 Sabre jet.
Most captured American pilots who did not die in the prison camps did in
fact return. However, these is one major statistical aberration: the F086
pilots.

A total of 56 F-86 aircraft were downed in aerial combat or by anti-aircraft
artillery. From these aircraft, 15 live pilots (Appendix C) and one set of
remains were repatriated. Of the 40 remaining losses, for whom no pilots
were repatriated, the circumstances of loss indicate a high probability of
death for nine. Of the remaining cases (Appendix B), conditions were such
that survival was possible. The 55 percent missing in action rate is
unusually high compared to missing rates for pilots flying other
airframes.

In late Summer 1992, the Russian side provided two lists of U.S. POWs that
they stated had been provided to them by the Chinese and/or North Koreans.

One list had 59 names and the other 71 names. There were 42 names that
appeared in both lists and in almost identical sequence. The list of 59
names purported to be of those POWs who had transited an interrogation
point. On a number of documents provided by the Russian side (translated in
TFR-76) were the names of Soviet officers who had had some role in
interrogations or the reporting process. The most prominent of them was a
Lieutenant General Razuvayev whose position was such that he could report on
occasion directly to the Defnese Minister and the Chief of the General
Staff.

At the request of the American side, the Russian side provided the
interrogation files associated with these two lists. However, the Russians
provided files for only 46 individuals. By reviewing the archival data
handwritten on the files, Task Force Russia determined that 120 pages were
missing. In those cases where interrogation material was missing, another
41 names can be correlated from the two lists.

Analysis of ancillary information and coordination with Air Force Casualty
Affairs indicates that the 120 missing pages should contain data on eight
identifiable MIAs. In addition to these eight, a ninth MIA was identified in
the interrogation files who name was not on either list. The nine MIAs are
listed below.

NAME                         RANK           AIRCRAFT     DUTY POSITION
1. Tenney, Albert Gilbert    CPT              F-86          Pilot
2. Wendling, George Vincent MAJ              F-86          Pilot
3. Harker, Charles A., Jr.   1LT              F-84          Pilot
4. Niemann, Robert Frank     MAJ              F-86          Pilot
5. McDonough, Charles E.     MAJ              RB-45C        Pilot
6. Unruh, Halbert Caloway    CPT              B-26          Pilot
7. Shewmaker, John W.        CPT              F-80          Pilot
8. Reid, Elbert J., Jr.      SSgt                           Gunner
9. Bergmann, Louis H.        SSgt             B-29          Radar Operator

Of the seven pilots in this group, three flew the F-86 and one the
experimental RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft, types of aircraft in which the
Soviets had high interest. In addition to the F-86s, the Soviets would have
had an equally high inerest in the RB-45C flown by Major Charles McDonough.
The North American RB-45C was the first operational U.S. multi-engine jet
bomber employed by the U.S. Air Force, and its reconnaissance configuration
would have made it doubly interesting.......

[This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive (POWs), who were not returned.]

WARNING: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the U.S. within the meaning of the espionage laws, title 18 USC section 793 & 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

PLEASE DUPLICATE THIS POW INFORMATION AT LEAST 10 TIMES PASS IT OUR TO YOUR FRIENDS AND YOUR CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS!!!!

Present in an anomalous position as the only open channel to attempt to make contact with prisoners.

-Korean diplomats would say, YES we have live Americans, but help us get your government to recognize our government- FIRST

-At a museum in Pyongyang there is a display of American military equipment captured during the war and human parts.

-In August 1988 the Pentagon reported that U.S. Korean War POWs played a role in a 12-part North Korean film.

-As of July 29, 1955 the SECDEF Advisory Committee on POWs estimated that 2,730 of the official 7,900 American POWs in Korea died in captivity.

-There were atrocities; mass killing of Americans including men who were shot at the moment of surrender.

-American POWs that were confirmed in captivity are much different from MIAs who were seen to bail out safely or were lost in circumstances that suggested they could have been taken prisoner, but they never showed up
alive in the prison system-they are simply MIAs. The discrepancy is in the areas where Americans were identified as captured live prisoners but never were released or accounted for.

e) There is irrefutable evidence that the KGB and other Soviet officers interrogated American POWs in Korea.

f) U.S. aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War had revealed at least three Manchurian airfields that held Soviet plains

g) Col. Seregin was a senior intelligence advisor to Soviet Ambassador Razuvaev during the Korean War

h) Col. Aleksei Ivanovich Zherabyatov was an officer of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) and the head intelligence advisor to the North Korean general staff as was Col. Sozinov

j) The first aerial combat between U.S. and Soviet pilots took place on 17 December 1950

k) Lt. Gen. V.N. Razuvaev was Soviet Ambassador to Pyongyang from August 1951 to August 1953

m) The Director General of the POW control bureau was a Col. Andreyev and his Deputy Director was Lt. Col. Baksov.

r) Xu Ping Hua was head of a collection team for the 164th Chinese Division of volunteers that dealt in POWs in Korea. Xu personally turned over a number of American POW pilots to Soviet Officers.

s) The War Prisoner Administrative Office in Pyongyang was headed by Col. No-men-ch'i-fu. American POWs were reported in camps along the Yalu river, a schoolhouse in Anju on North Korea's West coast, a former brick
factory in the Pyongyang region at Huandong, at the former Unsan gold mine, at a girls school in Pyongyang, near the Hamhung railway station, in a former Japanese Army barracks, at an elementary school in Manpojin,
in the city of Hoeryong-in a school, railway station, and municipal office (Russian officers were observed entering Hoeryong POW camps in September 1950).

t) Marshal Stephan Krasovskiy was the Senior military advisor to the Communist Chinese army and commander of all Soviet aviation units in the Far East-North Korea, China & the USSR.

a) 14 men in Kaesong awaiting repatriation were last seen alive, but were not among those released.

-Capt. Jack V. Allen--------Capt. Harold Beardall
-1st Lt. Donald Bell--------2nd Lt. William J. Bell
-A/3c John C. Brennan-------SSGT Joseph S. Dougherty
-TSGT Robert F. Gross-------1st Lt. Edward S. Guthrie Jr.
-TSGT Robert W. Hamblin-----Capt. Luther R. Hawkins
-Maj. Kassell M. Keene------2nd Lt. Frederick R. Koontz
-1st Lt.Waldemar W. Miller--Capt. Fred B. Rountree

b) Names of captured Americans were used in newspapers, on radio (Lt. Herbert Lowe made an address over Pyongyang Radio) and in propaganda leaflets were named men who did not come home. Captured GIs signed
"peace petitions" while in prison camps but did not come home. Families received letters from them, but they never came home. Wilfred Burchett, a pro- communist reporter from Australia met POWs in North Korea.

c) From the 127 Army repatriates released in operation "Little Switch" the U.S. was provided definitive information on about 8,093 other men who had been captured. But, after operation "Big Switch" occurred, only
3,596 U.S. POWs were released alive and only 438 U.S. POW died in prison or "escaped" as North Korea described in its accounting. From the 3,195 Army returnees from operation "Big Switch" information was learned on about 20,000 other individuals. The UN Command gave the North Koreans a list of 3,400 UN troops that were still missing, including 944 Americans (who spoke in or were referred to in broadcasts, listed by North Korea
as captured, wrote letters from POW camps, or were seen in the POW camps by returnees. There are 800 isolated burial sites and 10 established cemeteries in North Korea where POWs died in enemy hands. The conservative estimate is that 2,200 American MIAs could have been captured alive, who were not released and no explanation has been provided.

-20 returnees were progressive and had a lot of Marxist ideology pounded into them-they were brainwashed and had to under go mental and psychological rehabilitation tests.

-21 American POWs refused repatriation and were brainwashed into staying according to a book titled "21 Stayed" by Virginia Pasley, 248 pages, 23 chapters with photos of each stay behind and a chapter on each,
published in N.Y. by Farar, Strauf and Cudahy in 1955. They are: Richard Corden, William Cowart, Lowell Skinner, LaRance Sullivan, Scott Rush, Otho Bell, Albert Belhomme, Aaron Wilson, Samuel Hawkins, William White, Harold Webb, Clarence Adams, Arlie Pate, Howard Adams, Rufus Douglas, Lewis Griggs, Morris Wills, Richard Tenneson, John Dunn, Andrew Fortuna and James Veneris. Some later changed their minds and returned to the U.S. to be dishonorably discharged while some moved into Eastern Europe.

Clarence Adams and James Veneris moved to China and still live there today. One was issued a VISA by the U.S. State Department to return to the America when his family was sick and then he returned to China.

a) Soviet Defector Yuri Alexanderrovich Rastvorov, who crossed over in 1954 was a Capt. in the MVD (KGB) who was involved in a program to recruit intelligence agents from Japanese POWs held in Siberian prisons.
Yuri told of Soviets at Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Chita, Vladivostok and Barnoul ready to use American POWs from Korea. Yuri told that North Korea sent thousands of South Korean POWs into Siberian exile during and
after the war, according to Kan San Kho, a former deputy head of the North Korean internal security department.

b) Bronius Skardzius told of a transit prison in Novosibirsk and that in June 1952 two prisoners arrived who said they were American pilots who had been shot down over Korea.

c) Anton Keburis said he met two captured American pilots from Korea in Moscow in July 1952.

d) A former inmate of Soviet labor camp No.307 in Yakutia said he had met two American POWs from Korea at the camp, Lt. Ted Watson and Sgt Fred Rosbicki

e) Yuri Filippovich Yezerskiy, a retired MVD (KGB) general-lieutenant, while serving as a camp administrator in Vorkuta between 1954 and 1963 said there were 4 or 5 young American men in their mid-20s in the camp complex during that time.

f) Nikolai Dimitriyevich Kazersky spent 4 1/2 years from 1950-1954 in a Soviet labor camp at Zimka. While there he met an American pilot shot down over North Korea who was forced to land in Soviet territory, with two others. He lived in barracks No.6. Kazersky picked out the photo of Capt. Ara Mooradian as best matching the American he saw.

g) Balys Gajauskas was imprisoned in a Soviet mining camp in the Balkash area where he met two American inmates-one named Victor Shaeffer

h) Gen. Georgi Lobov was one of the commanders based in Manchuria with the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, the main Soviet unit in North Korea and his chief deputy Col. Victor Alexandrovich Bushuyev both said
American POWs were present in Soviet prisons during and after the Korean war.

i) Artur Roopalu said he spent two days in a transit camp near Vladivostok with two Americans in September 1951

j) A former Gulag inmate now living in Moscow said he met an American pilot from the Korean War in a camp at Zimka. Shown a number of photos analysts say it was Lt. Donald E. Bell.

k) Col. Alexander Orlov in Pyongyang, Viktor Bushuyev in Antung and Col. Gavril Korotkov said that in Khabarovsk he was one of the participants in the interrogations of American POWs in Korea.

l) 49 interrogation reports have been located in the Soviet archives. Later the Russians said 262 American aviators were interrogated by Russians, but they were only able to find interrogation reports on 56
American POWs. Some of the names were:

-Col. John K. Arnold Jr.-------Col. Harold Fischer
-Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller------Col. Walker Mahurin
-2nd Lt. Michael DeMoyne-------Lt. Smith
-Lt. Harvey--------------------MSGT Louis Bergman
-Capt. Joseph Han--------------pilot Dedzin Kunega

l) Col. Georgy Kuzmich Plotniov worked as a military field advisor in North Korea and an interpreter who spoke English admitted interrogating some American POWs.

m) Evgenii Pepelyaev was one of 15-Soviet pilots led by Gen. Blagoveshchenski given the task of forcing an American F-86 to land unscathed so it could be shipped to mother Russia.

n) Marshal Rodion Yakovlovich Malinovskiy was commander- in-chief of the Far East Military District, known as the 7th Directorate-the 7th Special Propaganda Department its mission to extract useful information and
intelligence from Americans taken prisoner in the Korean War. Hundreds of American POWs had been processed through Khabarovsk interrogation facility throughout the 3 year war. The American POWs started their journey to the Soviet Union at a POW collection point at Paekut-San, a famous mountain on the Manchurian-North Korean border, from there by train to the port of Posyet, then north through Ussurijsk to Khabarovsk.

o) Chinese volunteer in Korea, Xu Ping Hwua headed a Division-level prisoner-capture team said he personally turned over 3-American pilots to the Soviets

p) 11 men who were never repatriated were named in Soviet documents, proving they were alive in their custody:

-A/1C Alvin D. Hart Jr.--------1st Lt. Henry D. Weese
-1st Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis---MSGT Johnny M. Johnson
-Capt. Charles E. McDonough***-SGT Louis H. Bergmann
-Capt. Halbert C. Unruh--------Capt. Albert G. Tenney*
-SGT Albert J. Reid Jr.--------2nd Lt. Charles A. Harker
-1st Lt. Robert F. Niemann**

*Tenney died in the vicinity of Myagou field, a Soviet airfield just inside Manchuria, according to the Russians

**Niemann died in the Slodzio (Sinuiju) Region, the Russians assert, based upon their records.

q) Hearsay Information (second hand) Avrham Shifin said a Gen. Djagadze who was assigned to North Korea during the war in a unit commanded by Joseph Stalin's son, Vasili, told him that during the Korean War he had
ferried six U.S. pilot- prisoners from Korea to Kansk, in the former Soviet Union.

r) Russian witnesses confirm that one advanced U.S. helicopter was shipped back to Moscow and three operational F-86s were dismantled, crated and shipped to back Moscow.

s) Col. Grigorij Pavlovich Derskiy who was an aid to the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea made arrangements for American POWs to be shipped to the Soviet Union.

t) Giorgi Matveyevich Leivikov said two Americans landed yards away from his gun emplacement. He said they were captured and taken by rail north of the Tumen River near the city of Barabash in the Soviet Union.

u) Valerij Petrovich Pavlenko a former Gulag inmate near the village of Susman in the Magadan region of Siberia was in prison with American Korean War POWs in 1979.

v) Soviet Lt. Col. Michael Golienewski defected and told of American POWs held in Verkuta from WWII and the Korean War.

ONE OF THE MOST OVERLOOKED AND UNTEMPERED DATABASES OF INTELLIGENCE ON POWs WHO WERE TAKEN TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION AND THOSE WHO CROSS OVER TO WORK FOR THE OTHER SIDE IS THE BODY OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE DEBRIEFINGS OF EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET DEFECTORS.

w) Vladimir Trotsenko reported that he saw U.S. servicemen in a Soviet military hospital near Arsenyev in the Russian Far East who may be the crew of a U.S. bomber downed November 6, 1951 or these Americans may
have been Korean War POWs.

a) A USAF lieutenant was questioned at Sinuiju shortly after capture and was taken later to Antung, Manchuria, where he was interrogated 8 to 10 times by Russians

b) Another POW told how a Russian General Officer attempted to question him at length about USAF techniques & equipment.

c) Fred Fink, a Marine Captain reported being interrogated by a mountainous Russian woman.

e) Lawrence V. Bach Jr. was questioned by a Soviet Officer with the help of an English-speaking Japanese interpreter.

g) Lt. Roland W. Parks was released from a prison in China in May 1955-he parachuted into a Soviet military zone in Manchuria on September 4, 1952-he was held back after the war and a Russian told him they were taking him to Moscow.

h) Marine Corporal Nick Flores was mistaken as an F-86 pilot was turned over to Soviet military interrogators at an airfield near Antung, Manchuria and was questioned for four hours by Russians.

i) Six repatriated Marine POWs were taken into Manchuria for medical care and/or interrogation: PVT. Alberto Pizarro- Baez, CPL. Nick Floes, MSGT Frederick J. Stumpges, 2nd Lt. Carl R. Lundquist, 1st Lt. Felix L.
Ferranto, Col. Frank H. Schwable.

j) Lee Kyu Hyon was the North Korean soldier who served as an interpreter for POW Gen. William Dean. Gen Dean-was sent to Moscow in September 1950 according to Maj. Mun Man Sun who was taken prisoner in October 1951 and interrogated by U.S. debriefers. The chronology of Dean's movements after capture could lead to a detailed explanation of his time in Russia.

k) George Rogers gave debriefers a list of 60 men who had been in Camp 5, who were not released including Roger Dumas. Walter O. EnBom and Cecil V. Preston also reported on Dumas.

l) Pvt. Wildon East sent a post card July 1, 1992 stating that he was a POW in North Korea-he went MIA September 1950.

m) Cho Chang-Ho was a POW missing in North Korea until he appeared in Seoul in October 1994.

1. On 12/1/89 The Washington Times Newspaper outlined in a story by Mark A. Sauter giving details about Ronald Van Wees who may have been shipped to Siberia. In addition this news article details 6 declassified CIA reports that track Americans captured in Korea, moved through China and then into the USSR. Mark has written a book to be released September 11, 1992 called "Soldiers of Misfortune".

2. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Editor-In-Chief of The Washington Times wrote to a letter on 12/12/89. He stated, "As you are well aware, newly obtained declassified government records, along with various other sources, revealed eyewitness accounts of American POWs in the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea."

3. On 7/13/90 The Washington Times outlined in a story by Major Garrett quotes retired Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Reagan administration as saying, "Let me say that intelligence reports I received left no doubt at all to me that American POWs left North Korea to go to the Soviet Union and China." The story showed copies of once SECRET CIA file documents that tracked the movement of U.S. POW's to China & Russia, who were captured in Korea.

4. On 10/1/85 the CIA released to 11 documents it was holding in its data base about Americans who were in China and in the USSR, all who were captured in Korea.

5. On 10/21/91 acquired from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas was a July 18, 1955 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT" written on the "Subject: Americans Detained in the Soviet Union" by "John Foster Dulles". The MEMO said, "On July 16 the American Embassy in Moscow gave the Foreign Office a list of eight American citizens about whose detention in the Soviet Union we have information from returned prisoners of war." (There is other information at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library that contains presidential papers and "Another document concerning World War II prisoners of war held by the Soviet Union is still security- classified" wrote David J. Haight the Archivist.)

6. On page #8 of a once CONFIDENTIAL CIA document it references a sighting in North Korea on 10/12/79 of labors observed on a collective farm. Of the 50 labors, "one was definitely identified as Caucasian; Eight to ten others also appeared to (be) Caucasian." "...speculated with some degree of certainty that these were American prisoners of war." Mr. Marshall Jacob, a retired school teacher, from North Miami Beach, Fla. has documents located in the CIA data base on "American Citizens Detained in Russia". Mr. Jacob had spent the last 7 years studying the disappearance of a West Point Cadet, who according to CIA documents, ended up in a Soviet prison. Mr. Jacob indicated that he had located in Ct. the eyewitness, through a former prisoner of war association, who provided the CIA a sighting-in 1979-in Korea of US POW's.

7. On 3/1/91 "THE INSIDER" (ISSUE #25) talked about GI's in Siberia-a summary of a story that appeared in the 1953 Esquire magazine written by Zygmunt Nagorski. The story gave extensive details of the names of the prison camps in China and the USSR where Americans captured in Korea were taken, as live prisoners.

8. Foreign Service Despatch #1716 dated March 23, 1954 from AMCONGEN, Hong Kong details 6-pages of a report on the subject "American POWs Reported en route to Siberia". This once SECRET report is the report filed by U.S. Air Force Lt. Col O. Delk Simpson, a top intelligence officer who was an attache in Hong Kong. The Philadelphia Inquirer Newspaper on 7/15/90, page 6-A carried Col. Simpson's story written by Jill Stewart of the Los Angeles Times. The Washington Post in a story dated in 1985 written by George Wilson outlined how ex-attache Delk Simpson was working with the Pentagon to locate TOP-SECRET cables, that was missing among 1000's of SECRET papers.

9. On September 14, 1990, General Daniel Graham went on CBN TV and said, "The Soviets went through the POW camps in North Korea and took out the-Special Talent-U.S. POW's."

10. On 10/15/90 Insight Magazine published a story by Susan Katz Keating, about the Korean war downing on 1/12/53 of Air Force radio operator Steve Kiba who was not released until August 1955, along with 10 others held in China. The story also shows a photo of Fecteau who was not freed until 1971.

11. In a document called "Communist mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war" dated 1954, there are questions asked of released POW's about "OVERT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR"-"Did you see any Russians while you were in North Korea? Were they in uniform? What were those Russians doing in North Korea? Manning AA? Flying aircraft? Advising NKPA and CCF?" This body of evidence, POW debriefings, is still held classified.

12. In a new book "Rangers in Korea" by Robert Black who lives in Carlisle, PA., it outlines some U.S. contact with Soviet forces in Korea.

13. In the December 1953 issue of U.S. News & World Report is outlined the disappearance of 944 missing GI's in Korea.

14. On 2/1/73 Avraham Shifrin testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at a hearing entitled "U.S.S.R. LABOR CAMPS" about his June 6, 1953 to June 6, 1963 time in a concentration camp in Kazakhstan. His opening remark-"First I must ask you to excuse my English, because I cannot speak like you. I learned my English in concentration camps and first my teachers were kidnapped American officers." Mr. Shifrin still operates a Research Center in Jerusalem, Israel, in 1992 that studies concentration camps of the USSR.

15. In hearing records of the 93 Congress (second session) Report No. 93-771, page 88, January 29, 1974 comes these remarks by witness, Mr. Wu. He said, "I can recall an episode in 1960 when I was a student at Tsinghua and went for...a study trip to a factory in Tsingtao, a city in Shantung Province. There I saw around 80 Westerners undergoing labor in that factory. I asked a Chinese worker in that factory, 'Who are those foreigners?' He told me: 'Some of them are former missionaries who served as foreign spies, and some of them are U.S. POW's from the Korean war. They are those stubborn elements that refuse to repent.'"

16. In the 1958 Ukrainian Review has a list of about 90 Soviet prison/concentration camps.

17. In a Soviet internal publication called Na Strazhe is a story by Major Amirov dated May 9, 1991 that interviews a Soviet officer in a veteran hospital near Sverdlovsk, now called Ekaterenberg. The Story tells about Grigorii Matevosovich Dzhagarov who put on a Chinese uniform in 1952 and went to North Korea to head an AA unit who's mission was to shoot down and capture American aircraft and pilots for shipment to the USSR. This story is written from an AA officers point of view. Maj. Amirov also has located Soviet witnesses who were at the "Secret Window" at the Soviet-China boarder through which Americans captured in Korea crossed into Soviet control. He also has located Soviets who were on the secret coach train that transported captured US POW's to debriefing sites inside Russia. (Ambassador Malcolm Toon gave Maj. Amirov's name to his Soviet counterparts in the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission meetings. Around the first of August 1992 Maj. Amirov was then called before a military tribunal. THE INSIDER, ISSUE #30 dated August 1, 1991 outlines this Soviet Secret Order to take captured Americans and their equipment in Korea to be shipped to Russia.

18. When Boris Yeltsin announced on June 12, 1992 that Americans missing from Korea may have fell into Soviet hands and delivered a letter to the Senate Select Committee. Attached to the letter was a list of 536 names discovered in the Soviet KGB archives. In this list were the names of 125 GI's missing in Korea who Russian officials say were captured, interrogated by Soviet intelligence agents and sent to China. [Ambassador Toon must know that there are about 90 Soviet prisons where Americans have been seen, held alive, over many years. Toon went to Moscow in the summer of 1992, spent 4 days, sent two teams to two Soviet prisons and then announced that Yeltsin mis-spoke. The State Departments Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Alexander R. Vershbow was confronted with a list of reports taken from the State Departments own archive, entitled "Americans Detained in the USSR". These reports outlined the 90 Soviet prisons where Americans had been reportedly, held alive. He responded in writing on August 16, 1990 about the sites where Americans were incarcerated in the Soviet Union by saying, "We have found no evidence to corroborate these reports." This generic attitude of State Department officials, who step forward making stated public assurances, about the validity of live American prisoner data they hold SECRET, needs to be challenged. Because the stated public assurances can not be supported by the evidence, and this needs to be exposed.] Please note that THE INSIDER and my associates met with Yuri E. Bokanev the
Third Secretary and Viacheslov N. Matouzov, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. on September 20, 1991 and outlined 90 Soviet prisons we wanted to visit to talk to guards and review prison records to learn the fate of Americans who were reportedly held alive and seen alive by other prisoners who were released.

19. On 3/3/87 in response to an inquire to Richard Armitage's office, he responded with a list of the 389 Americans who were captured and/or seen alive the day before the "BIG & LITTLE SWITCH"-prisoner release operations. These Americans who were not released, had been seen alive by released American POW's, the day before, in Korean prisons.

20. Dr. Paul Cole of the Rand Corporation in December 1991 researched, a $60,000.00 study, assigned to his company by Alan Ptak, the Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs. The Rand study related only to the Korean War MIA/POW issue and contains the most current opinions and views of intelligence related to Americans who were captured alive and unreleased.

21. On July 3, 1992 the L.A. Times Newspaper carried a story about American POW's, captured in Korea who were taken to and tortured in China. The story by Melissa Hearly is entitled "MIAs May Have Been Subjected to Tests in China." The story references a DIA report from an East European military officer who came forward with the knowledge that American POW's captured in Korea were taken to China to be use in chemical and stress test as genie-pigs then executed.

22. Xiao Qiang, is the head of an organization in New York called "Human Rights in China". He indicates that a friend who is now in business in China, and travels to and from the U.S. and China, was, at one point in time, in jail in China with an American, around the 1973 time frame.

23. MAN Magazine, August 1961 outlined information from a May-1957 hearing record, where Congressman C.J. Zablocki headed a probe in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in which witnesses brought forward testimony and proof that 944 captured Americans were in North Korea and China, but were not released. US crews observed the Americans being captured; these men were seen by returned POW's; Communist radio broadcasts revealed their names; their propaganda pictures were published by the Communists; and mail had been written by them while they were POWs. This information was written up in THE INSIDERS, July 1992.

24. On September 1, 1992 a Soviet newspaper article which interviewed Vladimir Roshine, a retired Soviet Air Force officer who went to North Korea to fight Americans. One mission he was assigned was to down an
American air craft, dismantle it and shipping it back to Mother Russia. He details hard copy documents he viewed about the capture of an American being shipment to Russia. This Soviet newspaper story is written from a Soviet pilots point of view.

25. The State Department archives have several documents that relate to American captured in Korea who were detained in the USSR. Examples of these documents are as follows:

A. John Noble, an American, taken captive by the Soviets on July 5, 1945and released on January 6, 1955 told of talking to other prisoners who reported seeing American soldiers captured in Korea held in Soviet camps-Patma, Irkutsk, Tafehet, and Omsk.

B. Informant, William Marchuk received information from Otto Herman Kirschner who said he encountered in Kirov camp and lived with 9 American flyers from Korea with the rank of Major and Captain prior to January 1955.

C. Foreign Service Despatch dated September 8, 1960 61161- 241/9860, subject: Korean War Prisoners Reported in Soviet Union. Embassy BRUSSELS, "A walk-in Polish refugee said he was released on May 1, 1960, after seven and one-half years detention, from Soviet prison camp No. 307, near Yakutsk." The source said that "he became acquainted in the Soviet camp with two American Army prisoners who were captured in Korea in 1951."

Clearly, the State Department received and held SECRET data on Americans held in the USSR and can not pretend ignorance.

In summary after 14 plus years of research, looking through 1000's of pages of once classified CIA documents, having interviewed 100's of witnesses, it is my view that there is ample evidence that Americans captured in Korea, were left behind alive and that some survive today in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. This evidence should be presented for inclusion in the open public records of the Congressional Record and if at all possible (where time and money permit) a hearing should be conducted to air publicly this well documented evidence about Americans who were captured alive in the Korean war, who were not released. For background please read "Last Seen Alive" by Laurence Jolidon, Ink-Slinger Press ISBN 0-9646982-0-X.

The man who has identified himself in public meetings as the DPMO's Korean War MIA expert is Lt. Col. Martin Wisda 703-602-2202 Ext-156. As a paid government employee who presents himself as the an expert on Korean War MIAs, Col. Wisda should be beating down the door at the KGB archives to learn from Russia what they did with the Americans captured in Korea who were in Russian hands, but is he? Better check! Does the wait of this evidence stimulate Col. Wisda to act?

"You cannot solve problems with the same type of thinking that created them!" said A. Einstein.