Memorandum #7
Date: 9 February 1996
To: Al Santoli, Dino Carluccio, Bill Bell
From: Jay Veith
re: Post-war Lao SIGINT concerning Americans
The Site 85 memo created interest among various people for further
study of any post-war SIGINT information from Laos on American POWs.
I did some additional research, and after re-looking at the Site 85
material, the Nhommarth operation in 1980/81, and some other post-war
documents generously sent to me by another researcher, Jerry and I
began to see a pattern that we thought you might find quite
interesting. Consequently, I would like to create a scenario for
discussion, a "strawman" if you will, that you, DPMO, or anyone else
can add to, take pot shots at, or what ever.
The difficulty in attempting this review is the heavy redaction of
the NSA material. Because we had to make some "educated guesses,"
and because some of the SIGINT material exists in an analytical "gray
area" that can provide several varying interpretations, we may very
well get some points incorrect. Obviously the government believes
that this material does not demonstrate that Americans were held back
in Laos. Their stance would probably be that from an "all-source"
perspective, there are no indicators that U.S. POWs remained in Laos
after Homecoming.
However, by putting this material together as a body, a "history" so
to speak, of Lao post-war intercepts, we believe it shows a potential
mutually reinforcing trend. Viewing pieces of this material in
isolation can lead to debunking of those individual pieces. We are
not suggesting that each piece not be thoroughly examined to see if
it in fact does fit into the pattern. But if a significant margin of
interpretation does exist, then the other side of the equation, that
SIGINT suggests the possibility the Lao are holding U.S. POWs, also
needs to be completely explored.
To keep these memos to a reasonable length, I need to break this into
two parts. Any time I place quotation marks around a statement from
a document, I have the document, but I have not included it in this
fax. First, some education is needed concerning what are known as
"Third Party Intercepts" provided to the U.S. government. Because
I'm starting to dance close to the edge here, I am leaving out some
information like codewords, etc. Memo 7 discuss intercepts from 1974
to the Nhom Marot operation. In Memo 8, I will discuss intercepts
from 1982 through 1986, including an incident in 1984 that I think is
as intriguing as Nhommarth, mainly because we have the documentation
to provide a more detailed analysis. Forgive me for repeating any
information you already know.
After the American withdrawal in 1973, the U.S. began to dismantle
its intelligence gathering apparatus in SE Asia. The EC-135 called
"Combat Apple" left in early 1974, and the C-130 known as "Comfy
Gator" departed in the summer. NSA left the U-2 "Olympic Torch" to
provide SIGINT coverage to support the ARVNs. With the fall of
Saigon and the war's end, most PAVN communications had switched to
landline and Manual Morse, so the U-2 was withdrawn in 1976.
Jerry states that he went to the CIA in 1976 to discuss the re-deployment
of the "Torch." He raised concerns over potential loss
of coverage on American POWs with the CIA rep, who assured him they
had plenty of HUMINT to follow U.S. POWs. Jerry brought this point
up during his Select Committee deposition. Apparently, the CIA rep
denied meeting Jerry, so Jerry asked the Senate investigators to
check the sign-in logs, which Jerry claims would support his
attendance at this meeting. Jerry never heard if this was done.
Foreign countries provide SIGINT data to the U.S. government. They
are broken down into First, Second, and Third Parties. First Party
are countries we have close cultural ties with. Second Party are
countries with which we have politically significant relationships.
Third party are with smaller countries, such as Thailand. For Third
Party intercept capabilities, the intelligence community furnishes
much of the funding, assists in training their operators, and
supplies a team of Americans for support. In return, these countries
provide us with the raw intelligence in computer formats similar to
our own.
With the removal of the "Torch," this left the Thai and the American
Embassy in Vientiane as the two primary SIGINT operators for U.S.
intelligence in SE Asia. Jerry always found the Thai excellent and
very reliable. They were not in the business to fool anyone or play
games, as their funding depended on it. Generally, the Thai's
stationed at Udorn did the intercept and NSA then did the analysis
and issued the reports.
More on Site 85
I have found the initial Site 85 intercept that the Follow-up One and
Two I sent in Memo 6 were based on. (Please see page labeled 1 of
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED] 1
P 071949Z JUN 77
FM TO
LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY TO DISINTER REMAINS OF AMERICANS KILLED IN LAOS
ON JUNE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY COMPANY 18,
WAS
TO EXHUME THE REMAINS
OF AMERICANS INTERRED AT AN UNNAMED LOCATION. COMPANY
19 PERSONNEL WERE NOT TO LOSE OR COMMINGLE ANY
REMAINS. TO REMOVE, IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE, ANY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FROM THE AIRCRAFT IN
WHICH THE DECEASED WERE FOUND AND TO PLACE THE NUMBER WITH
THE REMAINS.
XGD8 2
this fax.) This material is therefore either Thai or CIA embassy
intercept. Note the standard NSA format. We lean towards the Thai
doing the intercepts, and with NSA issuing the reports. However,
based on the limited information, this is a guess.
Any doubts that DIA had possession of this material in 1977 were
erased when I reviewed a document FOIAed out several years ago by a
researcher. Entitled "Pathet Lao Knowledgeability on U.S. PWs,"
dated 7 Dec 1977, it is from CDR. Bruce Heller of DIA's PW/MIA
Branch. The second page mentions reports of Pathet Lao efforts to
search for American remains. (See page 2.) If you look at the
REPORT OF LAO EFFORTS TO SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS
OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR U.S. PERSONNEL
Information received over the years indicates that the Pathet Lao did not have an organizaed system to account for enemy crash/gravesites. However, during the Presidential Commission's visit to Vientiane in March 1977, Lao officials stated that there was great difficulty in findinf MIA infor- mation and remains in the rugged terrain, particularly in view of the country's small population and lack of material means. The Lao Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the commission that "the Government of Laos has ordered before and will again for the people of Laos to seek infor- mation and remains." During both formal and informal meetings, responsible Lao officials agreed to receive further MIA case files and other pertinent material to assist in their search.
In recent months, information has been received through intelligence channels which report that the Lao have initiaited efforts to locate and exhume the remains of unaccounted-for U.S. personnel in various areas of Laos. These reports indi- cate that the Pathet Lao investigations have been primarily concentrated in raditionally Pathet Lao controlled territory. An analysis of the information appears generally accurate with relation to the type of aircraft invloved and the incident locations.
second paragraph, and then read the intercepts, you can clearly see
Heller is discussing the intercept material. This memo is not the
place to fully discuss the implications of DIA having this SIGINT
material on Site 85 in June 1977. That's a matter for the families
and the National organizations, but one good question to ask is why
this was not in Mel Holland's classified file. You may not be aware
that Mrs. Holland had never seen any of this material.
After the delegation's visit in 1977, the Lao began searching for the
remains of Americans. The question is both how successful they were
in recovering remains, and what is the potential universe of
recovered remains. A CIA cable, TDCS-315/04928-77, which appears to
be a conversation with a high ranking Lao official, added that there
are, "graves of American servicemen in Sam Neua province which are
not difficult to locate." Site 85 is in Sam Neua province, (now
called Houa Phan) as are the cases of David Hrdlicka and Charles
Shelton.
In regards to live POWs being taken off Site 85, further research
reveals that the LPDR Company 18 mentioned in the intercepts is the
Patchay Hmong Company 18, which was a group of Hmong which fought for
the Pathet Lao. These Hmong were stationed at Phou Pha Thi after the
war, and probably came from the area. If they were involved in the
battle, they would have acted as guides, engaged in tactical
reconnaissance, and acted as porters for the PAVN forces engaged in
the battle. Therefore, they should have some knowledge of the
incident beyond the remains recovery attempt. Additionally, if these
Hmong forces did serve in the area during the battle, they should
have been under the command of Lao Gen. Singkapo. This may be the
source of Singkapo's claim of 3 Americans taken off the hill. You
might want to pursue this further with DPMO.
Nhommarth
It is not my intention here to revisit the entire Nhommarth
operation, only to highlight the NSA portion, which from the
available records appears to be fairly minor. However, some
interesting patterns develop when the NSA information is reviewed.
Given that the incursion and overhead imagery has been thoroughly
discussed, perhaps this is will add a different slant to the story.
The first indication of NSA involvement is a meeting held on 12 Dec
1979 between DIA and NSA. An intercept from 15 Nov 79 mentions the
movement of three US PWs from Vieng Sai to Attopeu to work in the
mines. Somebody asked COS Bangkok to obtain any additional info
"without compromising the source." This leads us to believe that the
Thai's again intercepted a message, or the CIA had HUMINT that
revealed this prisoner movement. Again, the redaction prevents
further clarity.
On 2 Dec 80, a CIA source had information concerning the movement of
20 American POWs. NSA apparently didn't have any (Blank) to
"substantiate the case" and thought it "a fraud," but there was
collateral that "specifically mentioned 20 American prisoners." On
12 Dec 80, DIA asked NSA to review all information from "March 79 to
present." On 18 Dec 1980, the NSA responded, mentioning a 1979
transport of "13 special prisoners transferred from northern Laos to
southern Laos," which is "correlated to collateral reports of
transfers of American and Thai prisoners." This is probably the
earlier 15 Nov 79 message. If so, then the mention of "correlated
collateral" makes the Nov message more interesting.
At 0700 hrs on 27 Dec 80, a Thai Spec Ops Intercept Unit, Team 213,
intercepted the famous message discussing the movement of the
American and Thai PWs from Attopeu Province. The message read:
"Refer to the Politbureau Ministry of Defense, that because the US
and Thai prisoners have been identified by Thais, Politbureau orders
they be removed from Attopeu Province. Aircraft will pick up POWs at
the airfield on 28 Dec at 1230hrs. Station Comment: Message
allegedly sent from Vientiane (call sign 53) to Attopeu Headquarters
and intercepted by Team-213. It was signed by the Supreme Commander
of the LPDR."
The CIA asked the Thai for a copy of the message. The Thai said they
had not recorded the transmission, so the CIA had doubts about Team-213's
capabilities and the validity of the message. According to CIA
files, the CIA felt this was "a fabrication. It was, therefore,
never disseminated."
Jerry is only vaguely familiar with the Nhommarth operation. This is
his analysis of this intercept, one he had never seen before. He
feels that one reason the Thai may not have recorded the message is
that Team-213 was probably a back pack team sent either into Laos or
nearby to monitor low power transmissions from Vientiane. They would
write out the code, and someone else would do the decrypt. This
could account for the Thai not presenting the information to the CIA
until the evening of the 29th. More importantly, and a telling
indicator for Jerry, is the use by the Lao of the two digit call
sign, called dinomes. This was standard PAVN or Pathet Lao practice
for voice transmissions during the war. Finally, not being
disseminated is a suppression of intelligence. You can mention in a
cable you believe a message is a fabrication, but filing it away is
a violation of intelligence collection requirements.
Concurrently, on the same day, the CIA, who had a very sensitive
source close to senior members of the Lao government, passed them
virtually the same information. In this instance, Collateral, and by
the Agency's own later admission, very good Collateral, backed up the
SIGINT. This same source had initially reported on 14 Nov 1980 that
30 Americans were being held at Nhommarth. DIA is informed, and then
asks NSA for help. One month later, the Thai get an intercept.
Incredibly, apparently because the CIA dismissed the Thai intercept,
they never put the two together.
These are the 1977-1980 instances of Thai intelligence tracking the
movement of U.S. and Thai POWs or remains recovery that I could find.
I'm sure other people have other pieces. Looking closely at the POW
intelligence gathered in Laos by the Thai's, Jerry believes the CIA
should not have so easily dismissed their capabilities. I realize
the Nhommarth operation has been scrutinized heavily, and perhaps we
are finding coincidences were none exist. Memo 8, however, will show
a continuing pattern of this combined SIGINT/HUMINT POW intelligence
from the Thai.