Memorandum #5
Date: 12 January 1996
To: Al Santoli, Dino Carluccio, Bill Bell
From: Jay Veith
re: Continued research in SIGINT material
I have discovered 3 new rolls of SIGINT and/or NSA related
materials, for a new total of 9. There could possibly be a tenth.
I have completed a review of 7 of the rolls. The roll in the FRD set
that I initially thought was a Lone Ranger apparently has a few
friends. I continue to find extremely interesting material, and this
memo will answer your request for any information on third party
involvement with American POWs.
Follow-up to Memo #4
Bill Bell believes that the "American Colonel" is in all
likelihood Tucker Gougleman, and that the Lt. Col. mentioned in the
fall of Ban Me Thout is probably Paul Struharik, a senior Province
Advisor, although listed as a State Employee, was probably CIA.
In terms of the April 4th, 1970 execution message, Jerry is
convinced after reviewing it that this is the Dennis Pugh incident
that he wrote an earlier affidavit on entitled, "A Mother's Tears."
His original affidavit stated Pugh was killed in 1972, but he now
concedes that it was 1970. Even Jerry, whose recall has been
impressive, occasionally has a memory lapse. He fully expected a 5%
error ratio. More importantly, Jerry believes the bombing of the SAM
site to prevent the shootdown of the U-2 that I described in Memo #4
is what triggered this incident. He wishes to emphasize, though,
that this was DIA's, not his, estimate, (accent on estimate), as to
who the likely candidate was. If you want to further investigate
this incident at NSA, Jerry has informed me of the individual at NSA
who sent the follow on message confirming the execution, (a message
I have not discovered), the channels used, and the office in NSA
where this person worked at. He believes there was only about a
dozen total revenge killings incidents by PAVN Air Defense units
against Americans.
Additional information on "10 Americans Executed"
I have found the "10 Americans executed" referenced in the NSA
"Southeast Asia Daily Summary" for 7 July 1972. (See page labeled
1.) This constitutes more internal evidence that NSA took this
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED] 1
1892200
P 072999Z JUL 72 FM TO
[STRUCK] TOPSECRET SECTION ONE
THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES DEVELOPMENTS NOTED THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA AVAILABLE AS OF 1500Z, 7 JULY
284TH REGIMENT HAD WITHDRWN FROM QUANG TRI CITY. ON 6 JULY, THE DIVISION
284TH AAA REGIMENT TO EXECUTE TEN AMERICANS. ELEMENTS OF THE 274TH
SAM REGIMENT IN THE LINH/DMZ AREA HAVE TO PREPARE TO
RETREAT.
intercept quite seriously, and its placement in this report is a key
indicator. Items do not simply appear in the "Daily Summary" because
of requirements or Technical Instructions. This "Daily Summary" is
sent to the various National Consumers of Intelligence, and
highlights the most important material in that section for that
particular day. Let me explain this procedure, so that you can judge
for yourself its importance.
Before items appear in the "Daily Summary," they are re-translated
and re-reviewed by higher echelon NSA staff. This is essentially a
second check on the accuracy of the original spot report. As you can
see, no changes were made to it by the NSA staff. On a daily basis,
the staff is looking for highlight items to place in the summary,
which are then read by high level customers known as "downtowners" in
NSA slang. (Think of an editor who has 50 news items. He is trying
to determine what goes on page 1 vs. page 12. The field can issue 25
"Songbirds" in one day, but they all can't be in the summary.) Once
an item meets the criteria, the staff sends it back to the
originator, in this case Mooney and his boss, to write a short
"blurb" describing the incident. Since this incident happened
outside North Vietnam, Mooney had to coordinate this with the other
Divisions involved in Southeast Asia work. They did not disagree
with the analysis.
Obviously, this item was considered important enough to make the
7 July summary. Again, nothing was changed/deleted by either the NSA
staff or the other Southeast Asia Divisions. Remember, the "Daily
Summary" is issued by the NSA staff to other agencies, not by Jerry
Mooney. The NSA staff would therefore have a vested interest in
ensuring that the material in the summary is accurate. I am not
trying to over-emphasize the importance of the placement of the "10
Americans" in the "Daily Summary", but this is not some "FYI" type
report. This is specifically written for high level government
personnel, although eventually it filters down to the analyst level.
Thus, DOD and the White House were informed of this intercept on a
second occasion, but until we get DPMO's analysis of their response,
what ultimately transpired remains unknown.
Chinese/Soviet/Cuban/North Korean involvement
In April of 1992, Tom Lang of the Senate Select Staff asked the
NSA to search its database for any references to
Chinese/Soviet/Cubans in conjunction with American POWs. (I added
North Korea.) The only Soviet references I have discovered so far
relates to joint Soviet/Vietnamese manned SAM sites, one of which
mentions a shootdown by a "unit of friends." (This one is different
than one I found mentioned in the NSA Correlation Study. There are
some unexplained differences between the microfilm, the NSA
Correlation Study, and the 15 Volume Uncorrelated set.) However, the
NSA reported the only Soviet references that they found were some CIA
SIGINT on Soviet journalist activity with U.S. POWs.
If there are additional references to the Soviets, either they
weren't included, or they must be in the redacted portions. While
Jerry has mentioned the use of the word Ban (friend) by the
Vietnamese to describe the Soviets, the main use I have seen of the
term "friends" in mentioning allies is to describe the Pathet Lao.
Jerry has told me that a fellow co-worker at NSA did a study of all
the Ban traffic, including Soviets heard speaking in the background
of Vietnamese radio traffic while they were assisting them at the SAM
sites. Yet, in the April of 1995 Joint Committee (the old Task Force
Russia) meeting held in Moscow, the Russians stated the Vietnamese
would not allow them in the SAM Command and Control vans, a statement
both Minarcin and Mooney find, at best, humorous.
If other Soviet material exists, none of it was released, or it is
so cleverly disguised that it is impossible to even recognize. This
would appear to be a violation of the Legal Agreement Mooney signed
with NSA during the Senate Select Committee. NSA was to review the
Russian Shipping and Civil Air traffic for references to American
POWs and release that material. I did see one or two Soviet Civil
Air and one Chinese Civil Air message. The Chinese message
referenced the movement of early released American POWs, and the
Soviet mentioned the transport of senior North Vietnamese leaders.
However, if the NSA fulfilled their part of the Agreement, I have
been unable to discover any correspondence even mentioning it, let
alone describing their actions. I would recommend that this question
be addressed.
The only mention of the North Koreans is of piloting MIGs against
U.S. aircraft. The Cubans are mentioned once. The Chinese, however,
are a somewhat more interesting story. In the NSA's reply to Lang's
request, NSA stated they could find only four reports. "In November
1967, two probable Americans were being held prisoner by Chinese
Communist forces responsible for shooting them down. In December
1969, an American agent was captured and interrogated in northern
Laos..." I could not find the two mentioned above, but I did find
this next one. If memory serves, I believe that the NVVC newsletter
also published this intercept early last year. "In 1974 the possible
Chinese-directed Division in Burma requesting information on all
captured in 1973, including Americans." However, the actual
intercept, dated 9 January 1974, is part of the "Daily ChiCom Ground
Forces Laos/Burma Summary." The request is for statistics from 1973
on numbers of criminals captured, executed, etc., and includes a
category on "American (word unknown)." That "word unknown" creates
ambiguity in the worth of this intercept, but it still should be
examined.
Although NSA may have labored under narrower restrictions than is
indicated in the text of the memo, I did find other intercepts
dealing with the Chinese, including about a dozen that deal with the
losses of American planes over or near Chinese airspace. Another
report states that "a Chinese merchant vessel had recovered an
American corpse floating in the water." I have not done any
additional research to determine whether this body was returned to
the U.S. or not. Two other intercepts describe the efforts by the
Chinese to recover U.S. aircraft debris. One of these intercepts,
from February of 1967, mentions the capture of US pilots by "CFNVN"
(Chinese Forces North Vietnam) near Kep airfield and that "there were
several items on the aircraft which had not been recovered by the
Chicoms."
An Air Activity report for 18 Oct 1967 describes an A6A, also near
Kep airfield, that fell into a rice paddy, and "they (the Chinese)
did not have sufficient forces to pursue the pilots," and "certain
parts of the aircraft (possibly radar/electrical) were not recovered
because those parts were underwater." No aircraft could be
correlated to this incident by NSA in this "conversation." However,
in a 22 Oct 1967 message to CINCPAC, (see page labeled 2), NSA stated
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED] 2
OCT 22 15 47Z67
DTG: 221600Z OCT 67 FM: TO:
[STRUCK] SECRET
SUBJ: BULLETIN
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE SUBMITTED TO CINCPAC DURING THE 24-HOUR PERIOD ENDING 22/1600Z. THESE ITEMS ARE PASSED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND TO SOLICIT YOUR COMMENTS. THEY ARE NOT INTENDED FOR REPRODUCTION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT COMMAND POSITION.
NORTH VIETNAM
ITEM 1: A DOWNED "A6A" AIRCRAFT ON 13 OCTOBER,
NEAR KEP AIRFIELD
A DOWNED A6A (INTRUDER) AIRCRAFT.
THE AIRCRAFT
HAD FALLEN INTO A PADDIE AND WAS NEARLY INTACT, BUT
CIVILIANS AND PEOPLE'S ARMY PERSONNEL STRIPPING
THE AIRCRAFT. THE RECOVERY OF THE IMPORTANT
PARTS, THE WEAPONS CONTROL SECTION WAS ONE OF THEM.
RECOVERY WAS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO THE POSITION
OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE DEPTH OF THE WATER.
THE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT SHOT DOWN - IT JUST FELL , AND
THE CREW, AFTER BAILING OUT, HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY CIVILIANS.
COMMENT: OPERATIONAL DATA CURRENTLY AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT NO A6A AIRCRAFT WAS LOST ON 17 OR 18 OCTOBER. AN A4E WAS LOST ON BOTH OF THESE DAYS; HOWEVER THE WOULD TEND TO DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TPE OF AIRCRAFT WAS ERRONEOUSLY IDENTIFIED [STRUCK] SECRET
that operational data indicated an A4E was lost on both 17 and 18
October, and "the (Blank) would tend to discount the possibility that
the type of aircraft was erroneously identified." In this message to
CINCPAC, NSA states the crew is listed as "being taken away by
civilians." Apparently, NSA judged the radio traffic to be
recounting an authentic incident, but couldn't correlate it to an A6A
loss based on U.S. operational data reported to NSA.
Is there Collateral to support this Chinese activity to recover
American aircraft parts? In a CIA cable from April of 1973
describing the "Exchange of Intelligence Information by North Vietnam
with Soviet Bloc countries and Communist countries between 1958 and
1968," the source reported that "Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
officials speculated that the Chinese intended to use...examination
of US aircraft to supplement Chinese Communist aircraft design," and
further, that the Soviets were being beaten to downed aircraft sites
by Chinese technicians.
It appears the Chinese were interested in recovering U.S. aircraft
debris, just as Mooney has stated. We have two "INTS", SIGINT and
HUMINT, describing this activity, which brings us closer to the
vaunted "all-source" requirements DPMO rightly argues about.
Therefore, if the Chinese were interested in American aircraft parts,
does it then follow that they would also be interested in the pilots,
the "China Bound" group that Mooney claims DIA told him about? Jerry
has consistently spoken about watching for a "Quantum Leap" in
ChiCom/Soviet aviation related technology, the so-called "Sighting
reports without people," that might provide a signature to watchful
intelligence analysts regarding a possible connection to U.S. POWs.
Unfortunately, the limited confines of this memo don't permit a wider
ranging discussion of this topic, but given these intercepts, perhaps
it is something you may care to discuss in a different setting.
Still Reading Vietnam's Mail
I found page labeled 3 of the fax material interesting, not
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED] 3
[STRUCK] SECRET
*** BEGIN MESSAGE 1***
CLASS [STRUCK] SECRET
1991511
P 171455Z JUL 92 FM TO
[STRUCK] SECRET
SERIAL:
SUBJ: POW-MIA MATTERS: QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL
UNIT BLOCK [HANDWRITTEN "ILLEGAL"] ACTIVITIES OF THE
AMERICANS MIA SEARCH TEAM ON 12 JULY 1992
TEXT:
VIETNAM'S QUANG BINH PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS
SUBORDINATE UNIT TO WATCH FOR AND BLOCK ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE AMERICAN
MIA SEARCH TEAM TO CONTACT PEOPLE OR TAKE "ILLEGAL" PHOTOGRAPHS ON
12 JULY 1992 THE PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS BORDER DEFENSE
POST (*BDP) 192 (A) *TIGHTLY MANAGE MANAGE SURVEILLANCE OF THE TEAM
(B), AND TO BE PARTICULARLY ATTENTIVE TO ANY ACTIONS BY THE TEAM TO
MAKE CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. SUCH ACTIONS AS
"ILLEGAL PHOTOGRAPHING" WERE TO BE PROMPTLY BLOCKED. EVERY ACTION
TAKEN BY THE 21-MEMBER SEARCH TEAM WAS TO BE REPORTED BY THE *BDP IN
DETAIL.
(A) LOCATED IN THE BO *TRACH (1734N 10625E) AREA
OF QUANG BINH PROVINCE.
(B) PRESENTLY IN THE YEN *TRACH SUBDISTRICT OF PROBABLE
BO *TRACH. 141712Z JUL 92.
[STRUCK] SECRET
because I expect someone to climb the ramparts and wave this around
while screaming about Vietnam's "superb" cooperation, but for two
other factors. One, the obvious implication is that our intercept
capabilities in Southeast Asia, while nowhere near wartime levels,
still can provide the occasional nugget. This is only one more piece
in a growing mosaic on Vietnamese POW/MIA cooperation. I would
expect certain elements of Vietnam's Army and Security forces to be
less than thrilled over American military teams roaming their
countryside. But after reading Mike Janich's testimony, my sympathy
has increased for the average JTF-FA team leader or DPMO analyst
trying to find answers to old questions, all the while having to deal
with the Vietnamese. I suspect that some of these individuals would
have an interesting perspective on Vietnamese cooperation vs. the
current rhetoric.
REFNO 1937
Although I haven't investigated particular cases, in reviewing
some intercepts from the 267th SAM Regiment, one in particular has
caught our eye. On 18 Oct 1972, Battalion 52 of the 267th SAM
Regiment reported the transfer of two captured pilots. In attempting
to determine who they might be, based on location and approximate
date, the loss of Peacock and Price, both non-returnees, in an A6A
has intrigued us.
REFNO 1937 took off on 12 Oct 72 on a night recon mission from
Thailand, heading east. 29 minutes after takeoff they reported into
the FAC and went Tactical. 4 minutes later they reported the weather
was too poor over the target and they were returning to base. 8
minutes later the FAC reported an explosion on the ground at approx.
UTM XE600450, (17-28N 106-25E) which is middle Quang Binh Province,
northwest of the ferry at Song Gianh at Dong Hoi. There was no
beeper, no voice, and SAR efforts were terminated on October 14th
without locating the aircraft. JTF-FA has investigated the case
once, and found nothing. DPMO believes the SRV has little info on
this case, and our reporting, both "special" and HUMINT, is not very
good. When I checked the NSA Correlation Study, 1937 was not listed.
What are the North Vietnamese saying? On 18 Oct 72, Battalion 52
of the 267th wants to "transfer two captured pilots from Trung Thuan
(17-51N 106-18E) and on to Ha Tinh." They report that at least one
of the pilots is very weak, and they are having problems moving him
because of "transportation difficulties." Trung Thuan is about 10
klicks north of Dong Hoi, well within the area reported by the FAC.
The Song Gianh ferry, located north of Dong Hoi, is a major logistics
point, and had AAA defenses around it. The report is definitely not
emulation traffic, as Ha Tinh is where the Air Defense Command
authority is located. This intercept appears to be the Division
getting ready to accept the prisoners, even though the last Order of
Battle location puts the 267th in the Nam Dinh area, over 100 klicks
to the north of this incident. In fact, this location would remain
on the books well into November. I checked the "All-Loss" report to
see if there could anyone else in the area to account for the pilots,
but the only pertinent loss is a USMC A6 on 13 Oct 72 that went down
at UTM XE504316. But it can't be these guys because they are listed
as an "Operational" loss, which means they were recovered, assuming
that U.S. records are accurate. They are accurate, aren't they?
This area of Quang Binh is a poor area, and although it has
remained a bit of a "No man's land," there is some reporting of POWs
in this area. The Larry Potts case, or possibly Clemmie Mckinney,
was in this area, and Bill has heard rumors of holding camps in this
district. Could in this SIGINT correlate to Price and Peacock?
Possibly. At least, it deserves further study.