Memorandum #2
Date: 5 December 1995
To: Al Santoli, Dino Carluccio, Bill Bell
From: Jay Veith
re: Further SIGINT information
As Jerry and I continue to discuss this SIGINT material, I have
come to strongly believe a statement Jerry made to me earlier this
year. There is a great difference between knowing SIGINT and just
reading SIGINT. While only 2% of all NSA material dealt with POWs,
you have to understand the other 98% to be able to place the 2% in
context. This is the reason I am sending this second message to you.
Before you explore this issue further, I think its necessary to
provide you with as much background info as possible. Thus, I wanted
to provide you some of the information that Jerry has so patiently
taught me. I hope that this memo, along with the next one, will
enable you, and any one else reading this, to gain a greater
appreciation and understanding of the intricacies of the "10
Americans executed" message. My next memo, hopefully later this
week, will discuss that message in detail, how it was developed, and
its importance. This memo is designed to provide some of the
background necessary to understand the execution message.
Additional documents supporting Mooney
On page 43 and 44 of The Bamboo Cage, Jerry told Nigel Cawthorne
details concerning the shootdown of an ICCS helicopter in 1973, how
NSA monitored the increase in alert status of the PAVN AAA units, and
the NSA's belief that the North Vietnamese would shoot the helicopter
down. Please see page labeled 1 for a copy of a message I found
dealing with this. While this message doesn't pertain to missing
Americans, I believe it shows a growing group of documents that are
supporting some of Mooney's prior statements.
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED/ $ WERE IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT] 1
M = 46
0991052
0 091949Z APR 73 FM TO ZEM
XXMM
$NVN ELEMENT
HANDLING OF ICCS SHOOTDOWN$
XXCC
BTWN 1029Z AND 1051Z, 08 APR 73, DOWNING OF TWO ICCS HELICOPTERS AND THE FIELD ELEMENTS ARE TO HANDLE THE ICCS REPRESENTATIVES INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. ARE DEFENDING AGAINST ACFT WELL AND HAVE SHOT DOWN ONE ACFT AND FORCED ONE ACFT TO LAND. FURTHER STATED ARE NOT TO DESTROY THE ACFT OR PICK UP ANYTHING FROM THE ACFT MUST BEHAVE WELL WHEN THE REPRESENTA- TIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION ARRIVES.
Declassified NSA material
We must be careful in dealing with the declassified NSA material
that has been released. For the most part, it is heavily redacted,
generally is vague, and often is wrong. With the PAVN units name
blacked out, it becomes difficult to separate accurate material from
inaccurate material. According to Jerry, almost 60% of NSA material
dealing with shootdowns came from Border Guard troops broadcasting in
clear text. This was called "Hot B." They would attempt to
shootdown planes from the rear, known as "tailshooting." When a
pilot would see the tracers going by, he would kick in the
afterburners and bank away. The PAVN troops would see the
afterburner and think they had shot down the plane, a fact they
invariably radioed in. We intercept it, and then verify it against
the Operational Reports, called OPREPs, that list plane losses.
However, that erroneous message still enters the database. This is
one of the reasons why one must be careful against taking an isolated
piece of intelligence and then trying to build something out of it
that it is not.
Collateral
This is where collateral material comes in, both as a check on the
COMINT, and as a step towards looking at events from an "all-source"
perspective, which is the integration of all types of intelligence to
form a more complete picture. For instance, an intercept discusses
the capture of too many people (South Vietnamese) for the prison
system in Binh Dinh Province to handle. (See page labeled 2.)
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED/ $ WERE IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT] 2
M = 403
1522051
P 311923Z MAY 72 FM TO
PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS TO BE BUILT IN SOUTHERN BIN DINH PROVINCE
FR ((BINH DINH PROVINCE)), ((HQ, BINH DINH PU)) 19 MAY 72 TO
--06 IN
IN ORDER TO GIVE TIMELY SUPPORT TO THE UPCOMING PLAN, AND FROM NOW UNTIL 5
JUNE, IT IS NECESSARY TO PREPARE AT LEAST 20 TONS OF RICE AND, AFTER THAT,
TO CONTINUE TO PREPARE MORE ((RICE)). (IT IS NECESSARY) TO PICK UP
FROM VAN CANH ((2)) AND IMMEDIATELY BUILD TWO PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS,
WITH A CAPACITY OF 1000 PERSONS. (IT IS NECESSARY) TO CAREFULLY PREPARE RICE,
SALT AND CASSAVA FOR THE PRISONERS. ((B)) 14-08N 108-58E,
BR 828 065. 19 MAY 72 0117Z
Later, a document is captured that supports this intercept. (See
page labeled 3. I put these two together.)
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED] 3
IN 636181
IDCS-314/04542-72
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SUMMARY: A VEIT CONG (VC) DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN EARLY JUNE REVEALS THAT THE VC CAPTURED MANY MORE PRISONERS IN APRIL 1972 THAN EXPECTED, WHEN THEY OCCUPIED THE NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE. THE DOCUMENT INSTRUCTS VC CADRES ON TECHNIQUES TO BE EMPLOYED IN CONTROLLING AND EXPLOITING PRISONERS. SUGGESTIONS ARE GIVEN REGARDING BUIDING DETENTION CAMPS, ENSURING CAMP SECURITY, TRAIN- ING GUARDS AND CAMP WORKERS, ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES, SEGREGATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRISONERS, THE TYPES OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS TO BE PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY CONFISCATED, AND TECHNIQUES OF OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS. END SUMMARY.
1. A VC DOCUMENT DATED 6 MAY 1972 AND ORIGINATED BY "T.1B," IS ADDRESSED TO "ALL P'S, CITY AND PRISONER OF WAR AND DEFECTING SOLDIERS' CAMPS." MENT: T.1B IS PROBABLY THE MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION OF THE BINH DINH PROVINCE COMMITTEE. THE "P'S" ARE PROBABLY DISTRICT 5 COMMITTEES.) THE DOCUMENT EXPLAINS THAT WITHIN A FEW DAYS 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
14 203
This is the type of material that an NSA analyst would turn to in
trying to help verify the earlier COMINT. In essence, the NSA views
Collateral as supporting documentation. They place a higher value on
the SIGINT, naturally, but captured documents, FBIS material,
interrogation reports, all enter into the big picture. To the NSA,
SIGINT has a higher value because it comes directly from the mouth of
the enemy, and is more real time, whereas the other material is a
lagging indicator.
Who to Ask List
Jerry has also discussed in the past a program he referred to as
the "Who to Ask List." Frankly, we had the PAVN AAA system
thoroughly penetrated. They would broadcast in the clear, (as
opposed to the encrypted signals we generally have), using code
groups, generally based upon numbers. This code was based on a
Soviet style code called "Ferrier." We knew their locations, types
of equipment, names of the officers, Order of Battle, and could even
hear the Soviets talking in the background. (See page labeled 4 for
an example.)
[NOTE: BLANK AREAS WERE REDACTED/ {} UNDELINED BY JAY VEITH] 4
3211844
P 161750Z NOV 72 FM TO
NVN 377TH AIR DEFENSE DIVISION AIRCRAFT SHOOTDOWNS XXCC
-- -- ((IN HERE)) 136 ENGAGEMENTS (EIGHT AT NIGHT);
AMMUNITION ((EXPENDED)) 4,146 ROUNDS AND SHOT DOWN EIGHT AIRCRAFT. 241 ((1))
SHOT DOWN 13 AIRCRAFT. RESULTS OF SHOT DOWN NINE AIRCRAFT. 284((2))
STRUCK IN 43 ENCOUNTERS (24 AT NIGHT); AMMUNITION ((EXPENDED)) 2,900 ROUNDS
AND SHOT DOWN THREE AIRCRAFT ONE OF WHICH WAS AN F-4 THAT WAS DOWNED ON THE
NIGHT OF 21 SEPTEMBER BY BATTALION 120 ((3)). 243((4)) STRUCK IN 236
ENCOUNTERS (84 AT NIGHT); AMMUNITION ((EXPENDED)) 1,340 ROUNDS AND SHOT DOWN
SIX AIRCRAFT. 236((5)) STRUCK IN SEVEN ENGAGEMENTS (ONE OF WHICH WAS BY THE
ANTIAIRCRAFT COMPANY) FIRED SEVEN MISSILES) AND SHOT DOWN
THREE B-52'S. DIVISION) DECIDED THAT THE 230THE REGIMENT
((6)) IS A UNIT WHICH ADOPTED A {SEETHING EMULATIVE MOVEMENT} ((IN THAT)) THEY
POSITIVELY STRUCK IN ENEMY DURING THE NIGHT, AND SEIZED THE INITIATIVE IN
EFFECTIVELY STRIKING ENEMY WELL WHEN ((THEY)) APPEARED, AND THAT THEY SHOT
DOWN ELEVEN AIRCRAFT. ((WE)) COMMEND THE FOLLOWING UNITS, BATTALION
(120((3)) AND 284((2)) FOUGHT WELL AND SHOT DOWN TWO AIRCRAFT ONE OF WHICH
WAS AN F-4 AT NIGHT. BATTALION 102((7)) 280((8)) WAS POSITIVE IN SEIZING THE
INITIATIVE TO STRIKE THE ENEMY AND PROVIDING SECURITY. THEY SHOT DOWN THREE
AIRCRAFT. BATTALION 8((9)) AND 241((1)) HAD THE SPIRIT TO OVER DIFFI- CULTIES
BY POSITIVELY STRIKING THE ENEM, SHOOTING DOWN TEN AIRRAFT, AND THEREFORE
COMPLETING THE MISSION WELL. BATTALION 11((10)) OF 250((11)) FOUGHT
COURAGEOUSLY AND STEADFASTLY, AND THEY POSITIVELY STRUCK THE ENEMY,
REINFORCED THE FRIENDLY UNITS AND SHOT DOWN FOUR AIRCRAFT. BATTALIONS
61((12)) AND 62((13)) OF 263((5)) HAD THE SPIRIT TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES BY
TRANS- PORTING EIGHT PIECES OF EQUIPMENT TO STRIKE WELL AND ((THEY)) SHOT
DOWN THREE B-52'S. BATTALION 4((14)) OF 243((4)) ENTHUSIASTICALLY STRUCK
ALL DAY AND NIGHT, AND SHOT DOWN FOUR AIRCRAFT. ((1)) NVN 241ST AAA
REGIMENT. ((2)) NVN 284TH AAA REGIMENT. ((3)) 120TH AAA BATTALION, NVA 284TH
AAA REGIMENT. ((4)) NVN 243RD AAA REGIMENT. -((5)) NVN 236TH SAM REGIMENT.
((6)) NVN 230TH AAA REGIMENT. ((7)) 102ND AAA BATTALION, NVN 280TH AAA
REGIMENT. ((8)) NVN 280TH AAA REGIMENT. ((7)) 102ND AAA BATTALION, NVN 280TH
AAA REGIMENT. ((8)) NVN 280TH AAA REGIMENT. ((9)) 8TH AAA BATTALION, NVN
241ST AAA REGIMENT. ((10)) 11TH AAA BATTALION, NVN 250TH AAA REGIMENT. ((11)
NVN 250TH AAA REGIMENT. ((12)) 61ST SAM BATTALION, NVN 236TH SAM REGIMENT.
((13)) 62ND SAM BATTALION, NVN 236TH SAM REGIMENT. ((14)) 4TH AAA BATTALION,
NVN 243RD AAA REGIMENT.
In late 1972, Mooney's group was asked to comply a list of the
names of Americans shot down by the various AAA and SAM units.
Mooney's group did the various Regiments and Divisions for North
Vietnam, while the people who followed Group 559 complied one for the
Binh Trams in Laos. This was to be given to Kissinger at the Paris
Peace Talks so that he could ask the North Vietnamese to account for
the missing men. It is Mooney's contention that we should be asking
for, and receiving, the Weapons Control Center logs for each of the
Air Defense units. These records are better than the Politburo
records, Jerry believes, since they should be unsullied by political
concerns.
In reviewing the list of documents turned over by the Vietnamese
in 1993, I do note something referred to as "shootdown records." The
documents I have seen from that group are clearly not what Mooney is
referring to. The most important Air Defense document, the 58 page
Group 559 list of shoot downs, appears to be a compilation from these
types of Air Defense Logs. I find it fascinating that how the PAVN
Air Defense reports read in the Group 559 document is exactly how
Mooney describes them in his affidavit listed in the January, 1992
hearing transcript. In various Oral Histories conducted, JTF-FA
interviewed the authors of the PAVN Air Defense Command History.
They claim to have written the book only using newspaper and magazine
articles. Also, in having looked at the material turned over in 1995
by the Vietnamese, there is very little Air Defense information. I
have not seen the 1994 documents. Thus, the question becomes, have
we asked for it, and if so, what has been the Vietnamese response.
Dummy and control traffic vs. the real McCoy
Finally, how does the NSA tell a dummy or a propaganda message
from the real thing. A dummy message could be the Vietnamese trying
to pass false data, or more often, is a political officer who is
trying to bolster troop morale. Jerry called these "Emulation"
messages. (Please look at page 4 again to see where I have
underlined the words.) To anyone who has studied communist
documents, the term is used often by the communists, such as in
conducting an "emulation movement," a campaign to get other units to
mimic the actions of some successful unit.
In summary, I have tried to make several points. First, a growing
body of documentation to back up Jerry's claims, claims such as the
shootdown of the ICCS helicopter, our penetration of the Vietnamese
AAA communication nets, and obviously, the execution incident.
Second, the necessity of being careful in handling any type of
intelligence in isolation, and of guarding against creating
unwarranted claims from mis-reading the available declassified NSA
material. Lastly, the ability of the NSA to verify dummy traffic
versus real time, highly significant intelligence. This goes to the
heart of the execution message. It is a combination of technology,
experience, and having an outstanding database to check the validity
of a message against. Simply put, my next memo will discuss the NSA
in-house Quality Control checks that will propel the execution
message out of the realm of speculation, and provide you with a
clear-cut description of the difference between a dummy and control
message, and a message, like the execution message, that was believed
not to be.
This is the difference between just reading SIGINT and knowing
SIGINT.
Thank you for your patience as I have tried to explain this
complex subject. If you have any questions, please call.