CARROLL, JOHN LEONARD
Remains returned - ID announced 11/06/2007

Name: John Leonard Carroll
Rank/Branch: O4/US Air Force
Unit: 56th Special Operations Wing, Udorn AB TH, (RAVENS)
Date of Birth: 06 May 1940
Home City of Record: Decatur GA
Date of Loss: 07 November 1972
Country of Loss: Laos
Loss Coordinates: 191933N 1030630E (UG13378)
Status (in 1973): Killed/Body Not Recovered
Category: 1
Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground: O1
Other Personnel in Incident: (none missing)
Refno: 1944

Source: Compiled by Homecoming II Project 15 March 1990 with the assistance
of one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency
sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources,
interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK 2007.

REMARKS:

SYNOPSIS: The Steve Canyon program was a highly classified FAC (forward air
control) operation covering the military regions of Laos. U.S. military
operations in Laos were severely restricted during the Vietnam War era
because Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva Accords.

The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for military
support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North Vietnamese
communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces in
Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the
black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military to
perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision
of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos.

RAVEN was the radio call sign which identified the flyers of the Steve
Canyon Program. Men recruited for the program were rated Air Force officers
with at least six months experience in Vietnam. They tended to be the very
best of pilots, but by definition, this meant that they were also mavericks,
and considered a bit wild by the mainstream military establishment.

The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC and the 7/13th Air Force
56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, but their pay records were
maintained at Udorn with Detachment 1. Officially, they were on loan to the
U.S. Air Attache at Vientiane. Unofficially, they were sent to outposts like
Long Tieng, where their field commanders were the CIA, the Meo Generals, and
the U.S. Ambassador. Once on duty, they flew FAC missions which controlled
all U.S. air strikes over Laos.

All tactical strike aircraft had to be under the control of a FAC, who was
intimately familiar with the locale, the populous, and the tactical
situation. The FAC would find the target, order up U.S. fighter/bombers from
an airborne command and control center, mark the target accurately with
white phosphorus (Willy Pete) rockets, and control the operation throughout
the time the planes remained on station. After the fighters had departed,
the FAC stayed over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA).

The FAC also had to ensure that there were no attacks on civilians, a
complex problem in a war where there were no front lines and any hamlet
could suddenly become part of the combat zone. A FAC needed a fighter
pilot's mentality, but but was obliged to fly slow and low in such unarmed
and vulnerable aircraft as the Cessna O1 Bird Dog, and the Cessna O2.
Consequently, aircraft used by the Ravens were continually peppered with
ground fire. A strong fabric tape was simply slapped over the bullet holes
until the aircraft could no longer fly.

Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the war. The need for secrecy kept
their numbers low (never more than 22 at one time), and the critical need of
the Meo sometimes demanded each pilot fly 10 and 12 hour days. Some Ravens
completed their tour of approximately 6 months with a total of over 500
combat missions.

The Ravens in at Long Tieng in Military Region II, had, for several years,
the most difficult area in Laos. The base, just on the southern edge of the
Plain of Jars, was also the headquarters for the CIA-funded Meo army
commanded by General Vang Pao. An interesting account of this group can be
read in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens".

Major John L. Carroll was a Raven on station over the Plain of Jars region
of Xiangkhoang Province on November 7, 1972. At a point about 5 miles
southwest of the city of Ban Na Mai, Carroll's aircraft was struck by
hostile fire and crashed. Witnesses advised that Maj. Carroll died of a
massive head wound, and according to the Air Force, evidence of this death
was received the following day, although it is not stated what the evidence
consisted of.

The Defense Intelligence Agency further expanded Carroll's classification to
include an enemy knowledge ranking of 1. Category 1 indicates "confirmed
knowledge" and includes all personnel who were identified by the enemy by
name, identified by reliable information received from escapees or
releasees, reported by highly reliable intelligence sources, or identified
through analysis of all-source intelligence. If, indeed, Carroll died in the
crash of his aircraft or shortly thereafter, the enemy was on hand to
witness it.

Carroll is one of nearly 600 Americans lost in Laos. Even though the Pathet
Lao stated publicly that they held "tens of tens" of American prisoners, not
one American held in Laos was ever released -- or negotiated for. Someone
knows what happened to John L. Carroll.

Since U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ended, nearly 10,000 reports have
been received by the U.S. Government relating to Americans missing in
Southeast Asia. Many authorities have reluctantly concluded that hundreds
are still alive in captivity today. While John Carroll may not be among
them, he would be one of the first to volunteer, in the Raven spirit, to
assist them to freedom. It's time we brought our men home.

John L. Carroll graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1962.

===============================

From - Mon Apr 10 13:05:06 2000
From: "Lee, Thomas E. - SAIC" <TLee@NSES.com>
Subject: Information correction

First I would like to establish my credentials with you, before I point
out errors in the descriptive write-ups on approximately 20 entries in
your data base.

I am a retired US Air Force Colonel who served in Laos covertly as part
of DoD Project 404 from June 1968-June 1969. I was the intelligence
officer in Savannakhet operating in "civilian" status working for the US
Embassy. I carried civilian documentation for presentation but also
possessed my military ID card. We wore civilian clothes. One of my roles
was to support the Raven forward air controllers (FAC), the US FACs
operating from "in-country" bases in Laos. See my website at
http://members.xoom.com/targeteer.

The following is a paragraph from your description of the "Raven"
Forward Air Controllers operating in Laos.

We lost 21 of them from 1966-1973.

"The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for
military support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North
Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist
forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could
be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the
military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos
under supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos."

****
An error in the above description is that most of the US military
personnel operating in Laos were NOT "sheep-dipped" as you described. We
were in the "Black" in that we were technically not there, we were
assigned to out of country units and our in-country existence was
generally classified for part of the 1964-1973 period. (The existence of
these operations was revealed during Congressional Hearings in late 1969
or 1970). The Raven Program and the complementary DoD Project 404 both
began in 1966. However, there was no mustering out of the service for
the Ravens or the Project 404 personnel. To my knowledge the only
program that was "sheep dipped" as you described was Project Heavy Green
(the Air Force troops supporting Site 85 and the TACAN site support).
That accounted for under 100 people. (13 were lost) There were military
personnel operating within the Air America and CIA (CAS) operations that
may have operated under different rules.

Critically speaking the US devised the sheep dipping process. It was
used across the US intelligence community.  The non-communist forces had
virtually nothing to do with that process. They did play a role in
accepting the US military members in "civilian" status by accepting our
presence and not "spilling the beans". We were not deceiving the
opposition because they knew we were military. Our deception was aimed
at the World scene and the US population regarding our activities in
contravention of the 1962 Geneva Accords.

****
This was a very unique period and very misunderstood period in our
military history due to its classified nature. Fortunately, we are able
to tell our story now. Those of us that served in Laos are trying to
correct this mis-information and myth that has grown up around these
activities so they are better understood in their real context.

Respectfully,

Tom Lee 
(Thomas E. Lee, Colonel USAF (Ret))
Savannakhet, Laos
1968-1969 

==========================

Subject: RE: Carroll, John L. Refno: 1944
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2000 09:01:16 -0700
From: Paul Gregoire <ponga@mindspring.com>

I am very familiar with the "accuracy" of military reports. My version of
the incident comes from the perspective of being on the scene of the rescue
attempt. I have no knowledge of exactly where Major Carroll's aircraft was
hit but I do know where it went down. I did not see Major Carroll's body
but I spoke to the people who did immediately after the incident. You have
my permission to to post my remarks and my email address.

Paul Gregoire

----------

 I recently surfed onto your website and out of curiosity I checked on the
the name of Major John L. Carroll, USAF. I am somewhat familiar with the
incident involving Major Carroll as I was involved in his attempted rescue.
Your synopsis of the incident is not totally accurate. Your account states
that Carroll's aircraft was hit near the "city" of Ban Na Mai and crashed.
The verbiage used would lead one to believe that Maj. Carroll crashed
immediately after being hit. Such was not the case. His aircraft was hit
somewhere on the eastern PDJ which caused some engine damage. At the time he
was hit I was in an Air America S-58T enroute from LS-32, located to the
north of the PDJ, to LS-20A, the CIA base at Long Tieng. We were taking a
circuitous route back to LS-20A because of the massive enemy presence on the
PDJ, especially at the southwestern edge.

 While we were enroute, approximately halfway through our flight, we heard
Major Carroll's radio calls on Guard channel relating to his circumstances.
He advised that his aircraft had been hit and that he was heading for
LS-20A. That began a series of transmissions between Major Carroll and
several Air America helicopters operating out of LS-20A. Major Carroll began
reporting that he was losing oil pressure and that the oil and cylinder head
temperatures were rising rapidly, all indications of an impending engine
failure. These conversations went on for a period of at least 15-20 minutes
while Major Carroll continued to fly toward LS-20A. Just prior to our own
arrival at Long Tieng to refuel, we heard Major Carroll announce that his
temperatures were pegged in the red and that his oil pressure was zero. The
AAM helicopters then told Major Carroll to turn north from his present
position and land out on the PDJ away from any roads while he still had
power. He radioed that he would continue to try for Long Tieng. The AAM
pilots again tried to convince him to turn north, land with power and they
would pick him up. At that point at least two AAM helicopters had him in
sight and were rapidly closing on him. Major Carroll again said that he was
going to try for LS-20A. That was the last transmission I heard from him. A
few minutes later one of the AAM Hueys radioed that he was down on the PDJ -
right next to a road.

 A few minutes later we landed at Long Tieng to refuel. At the time I felt
that we would probably not be involved in the rescue because there were
already at least two helicopters in the area who would conduct the rescue of
Major Carroll. A short time later, after refueling, we were told to proceed
to the PDJ and assist in the rescue. We were airborne very quickly and
proceeded to the southwestern edge of the PDJ. Upon arrival we were greeted
by the sight of two AAM Hueys flying toward us, one spewing a huge purple
cloud of jet fuel behind him, caused by numerous hits to the fuel tanks.
Shortly after they passed us the damaged helicopter went down but the crew
was rescued by his wingman.

 We continued on to the location where Major Carroll went down. I recall
that there was a Raven in the air as well as two AAM Hueys along with our
S-58T. There had been no contact with Major Carroll but we could plainly
seen his O-1 on the ground. Being the last on the scene we tried to get an
idea of the situation. Apparently one pickup attempt had already been made
which resulted in the shot up Huey we had passed. The Raven was trying to
get some fixed wing support for us prior to making another attempt. The area
was known to be at the forward edge of the enemy's lines and was swarming
with large enemy units. While waiting for fixed wing support and orbiting
directly over the downed aircraft we began receiving very heavy fire from a
23 mm antiaircraft gun. In order to avoid the fire from this gun we
deliberately flew into a cloud layer for several minutes. When we broke out
of the clouds we were somewhat disoriented and had lost sight of the the
downed aircraft and all the other rescue aircraft. By the time we regained
our bearings and got back into the area a flight of A-7's had arrived and
were being directed onto some targets by the Raven FAC. I recall watching a
series of air bursts from 37 mm antiaircraft guns explode behind each A-7 as
they made their runs. All of this activity was in very close proximity to
the downed O-1. There still had not been any radio contact with Major
Carroll during this entire time. Because of the extremely high threat of
antiaircraft fire in the immediate area one of the AAM Hueys decided that he
would make a low level dash from the north to effect the rescue. He
proceeded north a few miles, spiraled down to a few feet above the ground
and rushed south to the downed aircraft. The copilot of that Huey later told
me that as they came over a gentle rise they spotted the O-1 alongside the
road. Up to that point they had received no fire. As they slowed and came to
a hover in preparation for landing he saw that the pilot of the O-1, Major
Carroll was hanging out of the open door of the aircraft and that he had
what was obviously a severe injury to the back of his head. He made no
movement as the helicopter hovered only a few feet away. We apparently had
not been able to see Major Carroll's body because it was under the high wing
of the O-1. The Huey crew later said that at that point literally hundreds
of enemy troops stood up in the tall grass all around them, some as close as
50 feet. Knowing that it was senseless to try to recover the body in those
impossible conditions, they spun around and egressed to the north. Although
they received very heavy small arms fire on the way out they safely departed
the area. The SAR effort was canceled shortly after that and we returned to
base.

 I am convinced that Major Carroll was killed almost immediately after
landing his aircraft in the midst of a very large enemy force. A valiant
attempt was made to rescue him or to recover his body. Any further attempts
to do so would have undoubtedly resulted in many more deaths. He was not
abandoned to his fate.

 Paul Gregoire
 Air America 1970-72